Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers
Peer Review Status: Unrefereed
Title: Agglomeration Bonus in Local Networks: A laboratory examination of spatial coordination failure
Author(s): Banerjee, Simanti
Kwasnica, Anthony M
Shortle, James S
Contact Email:
Citation: Banerjee S, Kwasnica AM & Shortle JS (2011) Agglomeration Bonus in Local Networks: A laboratory examination of spatial coordination failure. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2011-18.
Keywords: Agglomeration Bonus
coordination failure
local networks
Economic policy
Equilibrium (Economics)
JEL Code(s): C72: Noncooperative Games
C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C91: Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
C92: Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Q24: Renewable Resources and Conservation: Land
Q57: Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services; Biodiversity Conservation; Bioeconomics; Industrial Ecology
Issue Date: 1-Nov-2011
Date Deposited: 21-Nov-2011
Series/Report no.: Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2011-18
Abstract: The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) – a subsidy mechanism can incentivize neighboring landowners to spatially coordinate their land use decisions for effective provision of ecosystem services such as biodiversity protection. In this paper we explore individual AB performance on a local network in a laboratory setting. In our experiments, we vary the local network size while keeping the number of neighbors for each player same. Results suggest better AB performance and greater spatial coordination in smaller groups relative to bigger ones. In bigger groups however we observe localized areas of coordinated land use choices which indicate partial AB effectiveness.
Type: Working Paper
Affiliation: Economics
Penn State University
Penn State University

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
SEDP-2011-18-Banerjee-Kwasnica-Shortle.pdfFulltext - Accepted Version495.05 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

This item is protected by original copyright

Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

The metadata of the records in the Repository are available under the CC0 public domain dedication: No Rights Reserved

If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.