Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/3477
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dc.contributor.authorBanerjee, Simantien_UK
dc.contributor.authorKwasnica, Anthony Men_UK
dc.contributor.authorShortle, James Sen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-22T22:35:21Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-22T22:35:21Z-
dc.date.issued2011-11-01en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/3477-
dc.description.abstractThe Agglomeration Bonus (AB) – a subsidy mechanism can incentivize neighboring landowners to spatially coordinate their land use decisions for effective provision of ecosystem services such as biodiversity protection. In this paper we explore individual AB performance on a local network in a laboratory setting. In our experiments, we vary the local network size while keeping the number of neighbors for each player same. Results suggest better AB performance and greater spatial coordination in smaller groups relative to bigger ones. In bigger groups however we observe localized areas of coordinated land use choices which indicate partial AB effectiveness.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.relationBanerjee S, Kwasnica AM & Shortle JS (2011) Agglomeration Bonus in Local Networks: A laboratory examination of spatial coordination failure. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2011-18.en_UK
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2011-18en_UK
dc.subjectAgglomeration Bonusen_UK
dc.subjectcoordination failureen_UK
dc.subjectlocal networksen_UK
dc.subjectexperimentsen_UK
dc.subjectEconomic policyen_UK
dc.subjectEquilibrium (Economics)en_UK
dc.titleAgglomeration Bonus in Local Networks: A laboratory examination of spatial coordination failureen_UK
dc.typeWorking Paperen_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusUnpublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedUnrefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.author.emaileconomics@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.citation.date01/11/2011en_UK
dc.subject.jelC72: Noncooperative Gamesen_UK
dc.subject.jelC73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Gamesen_UK
dc.subject.jelC91: Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individualen_UK
dc.subject.jelC92: Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavioren_UK
dc.subject.jelQ24: Renewable Resources and Conservation: Landen_UK
dc.subject.jelQ57: Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services; Biodiversity Conservation; Bioeconomics; Industrial Ecologyen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationEconomicsen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPenn State Universityen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPenn State Universityen_UK
dc.identifier.wtid839704en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2011-11-01en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2011-11-21en_UK
rioxxterms.typeWorking paperen_UK
rioxxterms.versionAMen_UK
local.rioxx.authorBanerjee, Simanti|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorKwasnica, Anthony M|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorShortle, James S|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2011-11-21en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved|2011-11-21|en_UK
local.rioxx.filenameSEDP-2011-18-Banerjee-Kwasnica-Shortle.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
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