|Appears in Collections:||Economics Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||An Empirical Test of New Developments in Coalition Theory for the Design of International Environmental Agreements|
Saiz, M Elena
Hendrix, Eligius M T
|Citation:||Finus M, Saiz ME & Hendrix EMT (2009) An Empirical Test of New Developments in Coalition Theory for the Design of International Environmental Agreements, Environment and Development Economics, 14 (1), pp. 117-137.|
|Abstract:||We consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.|
|Rights:||Published in Environment and Development Economics. Copyright: Cambridge University Press.|
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