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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1092
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dc.contributor.authorFinus, Michaelen_UK
dc.contributor.authorSaiz, M Elenaen_UK
dc.contributor.authorHendrix, Eligius M Ten_UK
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-09T00:29:06Z-
dc.date.available2013-06-09T00:29:06Z-
dc.date.issued2009-02en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/1092-
dc.description.abstractWe consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_UK
dc.relationFinus M, Saiz ME & Hendrix EMT (2009) An Empirical Test of New Developments in Coalition Theory for the Design of International Environmental Agreements. Environment and Development Economics, 14 (1), pp. 117-137. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X08004634en_UK
dc.rightsPublished in Environment and Development Economics. Copyright: Cambridge University Press.en_UK
dc.subjectEnvironmental policy, International cooperationen_UK
dc.subjectEnvironmental law, Internationalen_UK
dc.subjectCoalition (Social sciences)en_UK
dc.titleAn Empirical Test of New Developments in Coalition Theory for the Design of International Environmental Agreementsen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[EDE_Finus_et_al.pdf] Publisher conditions require a 12 month embargo.en_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S1355770X08004634en_UK
dc.citation.jtitleEnvironment and Development Economicsen_UK
dc.citation.issn1469-4395en_UK
dc.citation.issn1355-770Xen_UK
dc.citation.volume14en_UK
dc.citation.issue1en_UK
dc.citation.spage117en_UK
dc.citation.epage137en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.author.emailmichael.finus@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationWageningen Universityen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationWageningen Universityen_UK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000264139600007en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-67749145285en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid827905en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2009-02-28en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2009-04-21en_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_UK
local.rioxx.authorFinus, Michael|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorSaiz, M Elena|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorHendrix, Eligius M T|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2010-03-29en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved||2010-03-28en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved|2010-03-29|en_UK
local.rioxx.filenameEDE_Finus_et_al.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source1355-770Xen_UK
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