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Appears in Collections:Economics Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: The Enforcement Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: Flawed or Promising Concepts?
Author(s): Finus, Michael
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Keywords: Kyoto protocol
Non-compliance procedures
Game theoretic analysis
Game theory
Kyoto Protocol
Issue Date: Apr-2008
Date Deposited: 20-Apr-2009
Citation: Finus M (2008) The Enforcement Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: Flawed or Promising Concepts?. Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, 1 (1), pp. 13-25.
Abstract: The Kyoto Protocol is praised by some scholars and criticized by others. This paper evaluates the enforcement mechanisms comprising monitoring and noncompliance procedures based on an informal game theoretic analysis. It is argued that the monitoring system has achieved an unprecedented level of sophistication. It also appears that the non-compliance procedures have achieved a remarkable quality (in particular when judged in view of past international environmental treaties) in terms of their deterrence potential and credibility, though there is room for improvement. Possibilities for improvement are outlined and possible supplemental non-compliance procedures are proposed.
DOI Link: 10.1007/s12076-008-0002-8
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