Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1088
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dc.contributor.authorFinus, Michaelen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-29T14:59:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-29T14:59:35Z-
dc.date.issued2008-04en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/1088-
dc.description.abstractThe Kyoto Protocol is praised by some scholars and criticized by others. This paper evaluates the enforcement mechanisms comprising monitoring and noncompliance procedures based on an informal game theoretic analysis. It is argued that the monitoring system has achieved an unprecedented level of sophistication. It also appears that the non-compliance procedures have achieved a remarkable quality (in particular when judged in view of past international environmental treaties) in terms of their deterrence potential and credibility, though there is room for improvement. Possibilities for improvement are outlined and possible supplemental non-compliance procedures are proposed.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherSpringeren_UK
dc.relationFinus M (2008) The Enforcement Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: Flawed or Promising Concepts?. Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, 1 (1), pp. 13-25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12076-008-0002-8en_UK
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author; you can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.en_UK
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserveden_UK
dc.subjectKyoto protocolen_UK
dc.subjectMonitoringen_UK
dc.subjectNon-compliance proceduresen_UK
dc.subjectGame theoretic analysisen_UK
dc.subjectGame theoryen_UK
dc.subjectKyoto Protocolen_UK
dc.titleThe Enforcement Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: Flawed or Promising Concepts?en_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargodate2999-12-24en_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[Letters in Spatial.pdf] The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.en_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s12076-008-0002-8en_UK
dc.citation.jtitleLetters in Spatial and Resource Sciencesen_UK
dc.citation.issn1864-404Xen_UK
dc.citation.issn1864-4031en_UK
dc.citation.volume1en_UK
dc.citation.issue1en_UK
dc.citation.spage13en_UK
dc.citation.epage25en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.author.emailmichael.finus@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.citation.date23/02/2008en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-49749149731en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid827948en_UK
dc.date.accepted2008-02-07en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2008-02-07en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2009-04-20en_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_UK
local.rioxx.authorFinus, Michael|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2999-12-24en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved||en_UK
local.rioxx.filenameLetters in Spatial.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source1864-4031en_UK
Appears in Collections:Economics Journal Articles

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