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Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers
Peer Review Status: Unrefereed
Title: Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy
Author(s): Finus, Michael
Rubbelke, Dirk T G
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Citation: Finus M & Rubbelke DTG (2008) Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2008-13.
Keywords: ancillary benefits
climate policy
coalition formation
game theory
impure public goods
JEL Code(s): C72
Issue Date: Jul-2008
Series/Report no.: Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2008-13
Abstract: Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms?
Type: Working or Discussion Paper
Affiliation: University of Stirling
Center for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslo

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