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Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers
Peer Review Status: Unrefereed
Title: How should we incentivize private landowners to "produce" more biodiversity?
Author(s): Hanley, Nicholas
Banerjee, Simanti
Lennox, Gareth D
Armsworth, Paul R
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Citation: Hanley N, Banerjee S, Lennox GD & Armsworth PR (2012) How should we incentivize private landowners to "produce" more biodiversity?. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2012-02.
Keywords: biodiversity
policy design
conservation auctions
agglomeration bonus
JEL Code(s): Q57
Issue Date: Feb-2012
Series/Report no.: Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2012-02
Abstract: Globally, much biodiversity is found on private land. Acting to conserve such biodiversity thus requires the design of policies which influence the decision-making of farmers and foresters. In this paper, we outline the economic characteristics of this problem, before reviewing a number of policy options such as conservation auctions and conservation easements. We then discuss a number of policy design problems, such as need for spatial coordination and the choice between paying for outcomes rather than actions, before summarizing what the evidence and theory developed to date tells us about those aspects of biodiversity policy design which need careful attention from policy makers and environmental regulators.
Type: Working or Discussion Paper
Affiliation: Economics
University of Sheffield
University of Tennessee

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