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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/3431
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dc.contributor.authorKosnik, Leaen_UK
dc.contributor.authorLange, Ianen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-20T03:24:02Z-
dc.date.available2018-04-20T03:24:02Z-
dc.date.issued2011-09en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/3431-
dc.description.abstractPolicy shocks affect the rent distribution in long-term contracts, which can lead to such contracts being renegotiated. We seek an understanding of what aspects of contract design, in the face of a substantial policy shock, affect the propensity to renegotiate. We test our hypotheses using data on U.S. coal contracts after the policy shock of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Contracts are divided into two categories, those that were renegotiated following the shock and those that were not. Characteristics of the contract are used to explain whether or not the contract was ultimately renegotiated. Results provide guidance on rent re-distribution and contract renegotiation more generally and are applicable to contemporary policy issues such as climate change legislationen_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherElsevieren_UK
dc.relationKosnik L & Lange I (2011) Contract Renegotiation and Rent Re-distribution: Who Gets Raked Over the Coals?. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62 (2), pp. 155-165. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.006en_UK
dc.rightsPublished in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management by Elsevier.; This is the peer reviewed version of this article.; NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, VOL 62, ISSUE 2, (September 2011). DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.006en_UK
dc.subjectContract Renegotiationen_UK
dc.subjectCoal Contractsen_UK
dc.subjectAcid Rainen_UK
dc.subjectIndustrial productivity Historyen_UK
dc.subjectEnvironmental permitsen_UK
dc.titleContract Renegotiation and Rent Re-distribution: Who Gets Raked Over the Coals?en_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.006en_UK
dc.citation.jtitleJournal of Environmental Economics and Managementen_UK
dc.citation.issn0095-0696en_UK
dc.citation.volume62en_UK
dc.citation.issue2en_UK
dc.citation.spage155en_UK
dc.citation.epage165en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.author.emaili.a.lange@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Missouri - Columbiaen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationEconomicsen_UK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000295313700003en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-80051945672en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid892802en_UK
dc.date.accepted1990-01-01en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted1990-01-01en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2011-10-18en_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionAMen_UK
local.rioxx.authorKosnik, Lea|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorLange, Ian|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2011-10-18en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved|2011-10-18|en_UK
local.rioxx.filenameMS20053_JEEM_final (2).pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount2en_UK
local.rioxx.source0095-0696en_UK
Appears in Collections:Economics Journal Articles

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