Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/32962
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dc.contributor.authorRakotonarivo, O Sarobidyen_UK
dc.contributor.authorBell, Andrewen_UK
dc.contributor.authorDillon, Brianen_UK
dc.contributor.authorDuthie, A Bradleyen_UK
dc.contributor.authorKipchumba, Adamsen_UK
dc.contributor.authorAndriarilala Rasolofoson, Ranaivoen_UK
dc.contributor.authorRazafimanahaka, Julieen_UK
dc.contributor.authorBunnefeld, Nilsen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-24T00:03:51Z-
dc.date.available2021-07-24T00:03:51Z-
dc.date.issued2021en_UK
dc.identifier.other661987en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/32962-
dc.description.abstractClearing forests for swidden agriculture, despite providing food to millions of farmers in the tropics, can be a major driver of deforestation. Payments for ecosystem services schemes can help stop swidden agriculture-induced forest loss by rewarding forest users for maintaining forests. Clear and secure property rights are a key prerequisite for the success of these payment schemes. In this study, we use a novel iterative and dynamic game in Madagascar and Kenya to examine farmer responses to individual and communal rights to forestlands, with and without financial incentives, in the context of swidden agricultural landscapes. We find that farmer pro conservation behaviour, defined by the propensity to keep forests or fallows on their lands, as well as the effects of land tenure and conservation incentive treatments on such behaviour, differ across the two contexts. The average percentages of land left forest/fallow in the game are 65 and 35% in Kenya and Madagascar, respectively. Individual ownership significantly improves decisions to preserve forests or leave land fallow in Madagascar but has no significant effect in Kenya. Also, the effect of the individual tenure treatment varies across education and wealth levels in Madagascar. Subsidy increases farmers' willingness to support conservation interests in both countries, but its effect is four times greater in Kenya. We find no interaction effects of the two treatments in either country. We conclude that the effectiveness of financial incentives for conservation and tenure reform in preserving forestland vary significantly across contexts. We show how interactive games can help develop a more targeted and practical approach to environmental policy.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherFrontiers Mediaen_UK
dc.relationRakotonarivo OS, Bell A, Dillon B, Duthie AB, Kipchumba A, Andriarilala Rasolofoson R, Razafimanahaka J & Bunnefeld N (2021) Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Payments and Property Rights on Forest User Decisions. Frontiers in Conservation Science, 2, Art. No.: 661987. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcosc.2021.661987en_UK
dc.rights© 2021 Rakotonarivo, Bell, Dillon, Duthie, Kipchumba, Rasolofoson, Razafimanahaka and Bunnefeld. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.en_UK
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_UK
dc.subjectinteractive gameen_UK
dc.subjectswidden agricultureen_UK
dc.subjectpayments for ecosystem servicesen_UK
dc.subjectproperty rightsen_UK
dc.subjectforest land tenureen_UK
dc.subjectforest conservationen_UK
dc.subjectMadagascaren_UK
dc.subjectKenyaen_UK
dc.titleExperimental Evidence on the Impact of Payments and Property Rights on Forest User Decisionsen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.3389/fcosc.2021.661987en_UK
dc.citation.jtitleFrontiers in Conservation Scienceen_UK
dc.citation.issn2673-611Xen_UK
dc.citation.issn2673-611Xen_UK
dc.citation.volume2en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.contributor.funderEuropean Commission (Horizon 2020)en_UK
dc.citation.date16/07/2021en_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationBiological and Environmental Sciencesen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationNew York Universityen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationCornell Universityen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationBiological and Environmental Sciencesen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationCornell Universityen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationMadagasikara Voakajyen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationBiological and Environmental Sciencesen_UK
dc.identifier.wtid1743387en_UK
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0002-8032-1431en_UK
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0001-8343-4995en_UK
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0002-1349-4463en_UK
dc.date.accepted2021-06-28en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2021-06-28en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2021-07-23en_UK
dc.relation.funderprojectConFooBioen_UK
dc.relation.funderref679651en_UK
rioxxterms.apcpaiden_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_UK
local.rioxx.authorRakotonarivo, O Sarobidy|0000-0002-8032-1431en_UK
local.rioxx.authorBell, Andrew|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorDillon, Brian|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorDuthie, A Bradley|0000-0001-8343-4995en_UK
local.rioxx.authorKipchumba, Adams|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorAndriarilala Rasolofoson, Ranaivo|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorRazafimanahaka, Julie|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorBunnefeld, Nils|0000-0002-1349-4463en_UK
local.rioxx.project679651|European Commission (Horizon 2020)|en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2021-07-23en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/|2021-07-23|en_UK
local.rioxx.filenamefcosc-02-661987.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source2673-611Xen_UK
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