Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/31746
Appears in Collections:Computing Science and Mathematics Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Zoocentrism in the weeds? Cultivating plant models for cognitive yield
Author(s): Linson, Adam
Calvo, Paco
Keywords: Philosophy
History and Philosophy of Science
General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
Homology
Homoplasy
Model organisms
Cognitive modelling
Minimal cognition
Aristotle
Issue Date: Oct-2020
Date Deposited: 28-Sep-2020
Citation: Linson A & Calvo P (2020) Zoocentrism in the weeds? Cultivating plant models for cognitive yield. Biology and Philosophy, 35 (5), Art. No.: 49. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-020-09766-y
Abstract: It remains at best controversial to claim, non-figuratively, that plants are cognitive agents. At the same time, it is taken as trivially true that many (if not all) animals are cognitive agents, arguably through an implicit or explicit appeal to natural science. Yet, any given definition of cognition implicates at least some further processes, such as perception, action, memory, and learning, which must be observed either behaviorally, psychologically, neuronally, or otherwise physiologically. Crucially, however, for such observations to be intelligible, they must be counted as evidence for some model. These models in turn point to homologies of physiology and behavior that facilitate the attribution of cognition to some non-human animals. But, if one is dealing with a model of animal cognition, it is tautological that only animals can provide evidence, and absurd to claim that plants can. The more substantive claim that, given a general model of cognition, only animals but not plants can provide evidence, must be evaluated on its merits. As evidence mounts that plants meet established criteria of cognition, from physiology to behavior, they continue to be denied entry into the cognitive club. We trace this exclusionary tendency back to Aristotle, and attempt to counter it by drawing on the philosophy of modelling and a range of findings from plant science. Our argument illustrates how a difference in degree between plant and animals is typically mistaken for a difference in kind.
DOI Link: 10.1007/s10539-020-09766-y
Rights: This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Licence URL(s): http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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