|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||How Many Normative Notions of Rationality? A Critical Study of Wedgwood’s The Value of Rationality|
|Citation:||Melis G (2019) How Many Normative Notions of Rationality? A Critical Study of Wedgwood’s The Value of Rationality. Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz088|
|Abstract:||First paragraph: The main goal of Wedgwood’s book , expected to be the first instalment of a trilogy, is to defend the claim that the concept of rationality is normative. Among other things, on Wedgwood’s understanding, this is supposed to entail that ‘we always ought to be as we are rationally required to be’ (33). Since Wedgwood argues that a mentalist variety of internalism is true of rationality, in his picture the demands of rationality may be characterized as the demand that the agent is broadly coherent—that one’s way of thinking fit with the mental states and events present in one’s mind at the relevant times (4).|
|Rights:||This item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The version of record Giacomo Melis, How Many Normative Notions of Rationality? A Critical Study of Wedgwood’s The Value of Rationality, Analysis, anz088 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz088.|
|Notes:||Output Status: Forthcoming/Available Online|
|Value of Rationality Critical Notice.pdf||Fulltext - Accepted Version||379.11 kB||Adobe PDF||Under Embargo until 2020-12-10 Request a copy|
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