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Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Functionalism and Thinking Animals
Author(s): Árnadóttir, Steinvör Thöll
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Keywords: Self (Philosophy)
Identity (Psychology)
Animal intelligence
Functionalism (Psychology)
Issue Date: 2010
Date Deposited: 7-Apr-2011
Citation: Árnadóttir ST (2010) Functionalism and Thinking Animals. Philosophical Studies, 147 (3), pp. 347-354.
Abstract: Lockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker’s argument and demonstrate two ways in which it fails. Functionalism does not rid the Lockean of the problem of too many thinkers.
DOI Link: 10.1007/s11098-008-9287-0
Rights: Published in Philosophical Studies by Springer Verlag. The original publication is available at

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