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dc.contributor.authorÁrnadóttir, Steinvör Thöll-
dc.description.abstractLockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker’s argument and demonstrate two ways in which it fails. Functionalism does not rid the Lockean of the problem of too many thinkers.en_UK
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag-
dc.relationÁrnadóttir ST (2010) Functionalism and Thinking Animals, Philosophical Studies, 147 (3), pp. 347-354.-
dc.rightsPublished in Philosophical Studies by Springer Verlag. The original publication is available at
dc.subject.lcshSelf (Philosophy)-
dc.subject.lcshIdentity (Psychology)-
dc.subject.lcshAnimal intelligence-
dc.subject.lcshFunctionalism (Psychology)-
dc.titleFunctionalism and Thinking Animalsen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.citation.jtitlePhilosophical Studies-
dc.type.statusPost-print (author final draft post-refereeing)-
Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles

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