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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/27633
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dc.contributor.authorDiasakos, Theodoros Men_UK
dc.contributor.authorKoufopoulos, Kostasen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-17T00:08:57Z-
dc.date.available2018-08-17T00:08:57Z-
dc.date.issued2018-09-30en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/27633-
dc.description.abstractThis paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We extend the three-stage game in Hellwig (1987) by allowing firms to endogenously choose whether or not to pre-commit on their contractual offers (menus). We show how this mechanism can deliver the Miyazaki–Wilson–Spence allocation as the unique perfect-Bayesian equilibrium. This allocation is the unique incentive-efficient and individually-rational maximizer of the utility of the most profitable type. In fact, given that the informed player has only two types, it is the unique core allocation and thus the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson (1983).en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_UK
dc.relationDiasakos TM & Koufopoulos K (2018) (Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem. Games and Economic Behavior, 111, pp. 159-186. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.007en_UK
dc.rightsThis item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. Accepted refereed manuscript of: Diasakos TM & Koufopoulos K (2018) (Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem, Games and Economic Behavior, 111, pp. 159-186. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.007 © 2018, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_UK
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_UK
dc.subjectEconomics and Econometricsen_UK
dc.subjectFinanceen_UK
dc.title(Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problemen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargodate2019-11-29en_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[YGAME2862main.pdf] Publisher requires embargo of 18 months after formal publication.en_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.007en_UK
dc.citation.jtitleGames and Economic Behavioren_UK
dc.citation.issn0899-8256en_UK
dc.citation.volume111en_UK
dc.citation.spage159en_UK
dc.citation.epage186en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.author.emailtheodoros.diasakos@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.citation.date28/05/2018en_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationEconomicsen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Leicesteren_UK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000446949800011en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85049329959en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid958540en_UK
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0001-7364-1472en_UK
dc.date.accepted2018-05-16en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-05-16en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2018-08-16en_UK
rioxxterms.apcnot requireden_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionAMen_UK
local.rioxx.authorDiasakos, Theodoros M|0000-0001-7364-1472en_UK
local.rioxx.authorKoufopoulos, Kostas|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2019-11-29en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved||2019-11-28en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/|2019-11-29|en_UK
local.rioxx.filenameYGAME2862main.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source0899-8256en_UK
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