|Appears in Collections:||Psychology Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Belief and Counterfactuality: A teleological theory of belief attribution|
Basic Conditional Reasoning
|Citation:||Rafetseder E & Perner J (2018) Belief and Counterfactuality: A teleological theory of belief attribution, Zeitschrift fur Psychologie, 226 (2), pp. 110-121.|
|Abstract:||The development and relation of counterfactual reasoning and false belief understanding were examined in 3- to 7-year-old children ( N=75) and adult controls (N=14). The key question was whether false belief understanding engages counterfactual reasoning to infer what somebody else falsely believes. Findings revealed a strong correlation between false belief and counterfactual questions even in conditions in which children could commit errors other than the reality bias (rp=.51). The data suggest that mastery of belief attribution and counterfactual reasoning is not limited to one point in development but rather develops over a longer period. Moreover, the rare occurrence of reality errors calls into question whether young children's errors in the classic false belief task are indeed the result of a failure to inhibit what they know to be actually the case. The data speak in favour of a teleological theory of belief attribution and challenges established theories of belief attribution.|
|Rights:||Published under Hogrefe OpenMind License (https://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/abs/10.1027/a000001): Based on and Compatible with the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License, creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/|
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