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dc.contributor.authorLi, Jiawei-
dc.contributor.authorKendall, Graham-
dc.contributor.authorJohn, Robert-
dc.description.abstractStability analysis is an important research direction in evolutionary game theory. Evolutionarily stable states have a close relationship with Nash equilibria of repeated games, which are characterized by the folk theorem. When applying the folk theorem, one needs to compute the minimax profile of the game in order to find Nash equilibria. Computing the minimax profile is an NP-hard problem. In this paper, we investigate a new methodology to compute evolutionary stable states based on the level-k equilibrium, a new refinement of Nash equilibrium in repeated games. A level-k equilibrium is implemented by a group of players who adopt reactive strategies and who have no incentive to deviate from their strategies simultaneously. Computing the level-k equilibria is tractable because the minimax payoffs and strategies are not needed. As an application, this paper develops a tractable algorithm to compute the evolutionarily stable states and the Pareto front of n-player symmetric games. Three games, including the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, are analyzed by means of the proposed methodology.en_UK
dc.relationLi J, Kendall G & John R (2016) Computing Nash Equilibria and Evolutionarily Stable States of Evolutionary Games, IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 20 (3), pp. 460-469.-
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.-
dc.subjectEvolutionary game theoryen_UK
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_UK
dc.subjectNash equilibrium (NE)en_UK
dc.subjectevolutionary stabilityen_UK
dc.subjectfolk theoremen_UK
dc.subjectiterated prisoner’s dilemmaen_UK
dc.titleComputing Nash Equilibria and Evolutionarily Stable States of Evolutionary Gamesen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargoreasonThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.-
dc.citation.jtitleIEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation-
dc.type.statusPublisher version (final published refereed version)-
dc.contributor.affiliationComputing Science - CSM Dept-
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Nottingham-
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Nottingham-
Appears in Collections:Computing Science and Mathematics Journal Articles

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