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dc.contributor.authorLi, Jiaweien_UK
dc.contributor.authorVasilakos, Athanasiosen_UK
dc.contributor.authorKendall, Grahamen_UK
dc.description.abstractBackward induction has led to some controversy in specific games, the surprise exam paradox and iterated prisoner’s dilemma for example, despite its wide use in solving finitely repeated games with complete information. In this paper, a typical misuse of backward induction is revealed by analyzing the surprise exam paradox, and the reason why backward induction may fail is investigated. The surprise exam paradox represents a set of repeated games with strategy constraints and has not been fully investigated in game theory. The agents in real-world activities always face constraints in decision making, for example, a budget limitation. In a repeated game with strategy constraints, the players’ choices in different stages are not independent and later choices depend on previous choices because of the strategy constraints. Backward induction cannot be applied in its normal use and it needs to be combined with Bayes’ theorem in solving these kinds of problems. We also investigate how the strategy constraints influence the equilibrium and show how to solve repeated games with strategy constraints by analyzing a repeated battle of the sexes game with a budget constraint.en_UK
dc.relationLi J, Vasilakos A & Kendall G (2013) Backward Induction and Repeated Games With Strategy Constraints: An Inspiration From the Surprise Exam Paradox. IEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in Games, 5 (3), pp. 242-250.
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.en_UK
dc.subjectBackward inductionen_UK
dc.subjectBayes' theoremen_UK
dc.subjectrepeated game theoryen_UK
dc.subjectsurprise exam paradoxen_UK
dc.titleBackward Induction and Repeated Games With Strategy Constraints: An Inspiration From the Surprise Exam Paradoxen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[06514088.pdf] The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.en_UK
dc.citation.jtitleIEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in Gamesen_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationComputing Scienceen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationKuwait Universityen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Nottinghamen_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
local.rioxx.authorLi, Jiawei|0000-0003-4685-2615en_UK
local.rioxx.authorVasilakos, Athanasios|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorKendall, Graham|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|
Appears in Collections:Computing Science and Mathematics Journal Articles

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