|Appears in Collections:||Accounting and Finance Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations|
|Citation:||Herbst P & Walz U (2017) The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations, Economica, 84 (333), pp. 54-77.|
|Abstract:||Suppliers play a major role in firms' innovation processes. We analyse ownership and technology choices in vertical R&D collaborations. Under non-contractible R&D outcomes, trade-offs arise between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). Stronger downstream competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier and favours contracting over ownership rather than specific performance contracts. Downstream ownership is combined with the specific technology if the supplier's expertise is more pronounced or the specific technology is more productive. Contracts incorporating exit clauses increase the gains from collaborations.|
|Rights:||This item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Herbst, P. and Walz, U. (2016), The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations. Economica. doi: 10.1111/ecca.12183, which will be published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecca.12183/abstract. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.|
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