|Appears in Collections:||Economics Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review|
|Author(s):||de Vries, Frans|
|Keywords:||Environmental policy instruments|
|Citation:||de Vries F & Hanley N (2016) Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review. Environmental and Resource Economics, 63 (4), pp. 687-702. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-015-9996-8|
|Abstract:||This paper provides a succinct review of the main developments in the literature on incentive-based policy mechanisms in the contexts of pollution control and biodiversity conservation, dating from the early beginnings of the science in the 1960s. A focal point in the review is on the design features of these policy mechanisms. Key developments in policy design were originally established in controlling externalities arising from pollution and have since been extended to policy design tailored towards biodiversity conservation. Special emphasis is given to the spatial characteristics of the environmental problems underlying both pollution control and biodiversity conservation. The paper concludes by drawing some lessons and setting out elements of a future research agenda in both policy domains.|
|Rights:||This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.|
|de Vries and Hanley_Environ Resource Econ_2016.pdf||Fulltext - Published Version||475.68 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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