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Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality
Author(s): Way, Jonathan
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Keywords: Self-knowledge, Theory of
Issue Date: Dec-2009
Date Deposited: 17-Feb-2010
Citation: Way J (2009) Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Abstract: First paragraph: Rationality seems to be normative. If you fail to do something rationality requires of you, you have failed in a serious way. The charge of irrationality is, in and of itself, a serious criticism. By contrast, other systems of requirements seem not to be normative. For example, if you fail to do something that etiquette requires of you, or that freemasonry requires of you, you may not have failed in a serious way. These requirements do not have the genuine normative force that rational requirements seem to have.
Rights: Published in the Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy by the University of Southern California.

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