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dc.contributor.authorWay, Jonathan-
dc.description.abstractFirst paragraph: Rationality seems to be normative. If you fail to do something rationality requires of you, you have failed in a serious way. The charge of irrationality is, in and of itself, a serious criticism. By contrast, other systems of requirements seem not to be normative. For example, if you fail to do something that etiquette requires of you, or that freemasonry requires of you, you may not have failed in a serious way. These requirements do not have the genuine normative force that rational requirements seem to have.en_UK
dc.publisherUniversity of Southern California-
dc.relationWay J (2009) Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.-
dc.rightsPublished in the Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy by the University of Southern California.-
dc.subject.lcshSelf-knowledge, Theory of-
dc.titleTwo Accounts of the Normativity of Rationalityen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.citation.jtitleJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy-
dc.type.statusPost-print (author final draft post-refereeing)-
Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles

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