|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?|
|Citation:||Czajkowski M, Hanley N, LaRiviere J & Simpson K (2014) What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay? [SEDP-2014-05]. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2014-05.|
|JEL Code(s):||Q51: Valuation of Environmental Effects|
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
D81: Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
|Series/Report no.:||Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2014-05|
|Abstract:||In this study we elicit agents' prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.|
|Affiliation:||University of Warsaw|
University of Tennessee
|SEDP-2014-05-Czajkowski-Hanley-LaRiviere-Simpson.pdf||Fulltext - Accepted Version||455.26 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
The metadata of the records in the Repository are available under the CC0 public domain dedication: No Rights Reserved https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.