Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Appears in Collections:Accounting and Finance Working Papers
Title: The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations
Author(s): Herbst, Patrick
Walz, Uwe
Contact Email:
Citation: Herbst P & Walz U (2011) The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network.
Keywords: Managing innovations
vertical R&D
R&D collaboration
JEL Code(s): L22
Issue Date: 18-Apr-2011
Publisher: Social Science Research Network
Series/Report no.: SSRN Working Paper Series
Abstract: Suppliers play a major role in the downstream firm's innovation processes. We analyse ownership allocations and the choice of R&D technology in vertical R&D cooperations. Given incomplete contracts on the R&D outcome, there is a trade-off between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). We find that the market solution yields the specific technology in too few cases. More intense product market competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier. The use of exit clauses increases the gains from the collaboration.
Type: Working or Discussion Paper
Rights: Author retains copyright.
Affiliation: Accounting and Finance
Goethe University Frankfurt

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Herbst_2011_The_Design_of_Vertical_RandD_Collaborations.pdf282.58 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

This item is protected by original copyright

Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

The metadata of the records in the Repository are available under the CC0 public domain dedication: No Rights Reserved

If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.