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Appears in Collections:Management, Work and Organisation Working Papers
Title: Inclusive and Exclusive Social Preferences: A Deweyan Framework to Explain Governance Heterogeneity
Author(s): Sacchetti, Silvia
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Citation: Sacchetti S (2013) Inclusive and Exclusive Social Preferences: A Deweyan Framework to Explain Governance Heterogeneity.
Keywords: cooperative firms
firm governance
John Dewey
public interest
social enterprises
social preferences
JEL Code(s): B00: History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
L20: Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
L30: Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
Issue Date: 28-Feb-2013
Date Deposited: 11-Mar-2013
Publisher: Institute for Socio-Management, Stirling Management School, University of Stirling
Abstract: We suggest that the pragmatist theory of public interest has implications for the contraposition between self-regarding and other-regarding preferences in economics. We re-consider this distinction and replace some of the existing categories with the idea of inclusive and exclusive social preferences over both organizational and strategic decision-making domains. The value is in the idea of both exclusive and inclusive preferences being social in nature and in the application both to the internal organization and its impacts on people outside. Our framework explains governance heterogeneity by contrasting exclusive and inclusive social preferences in cooperatives, social enterprises, as well as traditional corporations. A discussion of the evolution of social preferences is addressed through examples and regional experiences. We argue that the social preferences perspective contributes to understand the cause of strategic failure in the development of localities and regions.
Type: Working Paper
Affiliation: Socio-Management - LEGACY

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