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http://hdl.handle.net/1893/11109
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Hart, Robert A | en_UK |
dc.contributor.author | Moutos, Thomas | en_UK |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-02-25T23:13:27Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-02-25T23:13:27Z | en_UK |
dc.date.issued | 1994-12 | en_UK |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1893/11109 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We evaluate firm/union preferences for pure wage and profit sharing compensation under the generalized Nash bargaining solution concept. Emphasis is given to the effects of taxes on income as well as profit and payroll taxes. Taxes are shown to play an important role and their assessment is extended to embrace the effects of payroll tax ceilings. Finally, we consider whether differential labour/capital taxes and subsidies might influence the parties' choice of compensation system. | en_UK |
dc.language.iso | en | en_UK |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_UK |
dc.relation | Hart RA & Moutos T (1994) Tax structure and the choice of compensation system. European Journal of Political Economy, 10 (4), pp. 765-781. https://doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680%2894%2990037-X | en_UK |
dc.rights | The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. | en_UK |
dc.rights.uri | http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved | en_UK |
dc.subject | Wages | en_UK |
dc.subject | Profit shares | en_UK |
dc.subject | Nash bargaining | en_UK |
dc.subject | Taxation effects | en_UK |
dc.subject | Capital/labour subsidies | en_UK |
dc.title | Tax structure and the choice of compensation system | en_UK |
dc.type | Journal Article | en_UK |
dc.rights.embargodate | 3000-01-01 | en_UK |
dc.rights.embargoreason | [Hart_1994_Tax_structure.pdf] The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work. | en_UK |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/0176-2680(94)90037-X | en_UK |
dc.citation.jtitle | European Journal of Political Economy | en_UK |
dc.citation.issn | 0176-2680 | en_UK |
dc.citation.volume | 10 | en_UK |
dc.citation.issue | 4 | en_UK |
dc.citation.spage | 765 | en_UK |
dc.citation.epage | 781 | en_UK |
dc.citation.publicationstatus | Published | en_UK |
dc.citation.peerreviewed | Refereed | en_UK |
dc.type.status | VoR - Version of Record | en_UK |
dc.author.email | r.a.hart@stir.ac.uk | en_UK |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Economics | en_UK |
dc.contributor.affiliation | University of Stirling | en_UK |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-34248247662 | en_UK |
dc.identifier.wtid | 738269 | en_UK |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 1994-12-31 | en_UK |
dc.date.filedepositdate | 2013-02-25 | en_UK |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_UK |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_UK |
local.rioxx.author | Hart, Robert A| | en_UK |
local.rioxx.author | Moutos, Thomas| | en_UK |
local.rioxx.project | Internal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331 | en_UK |
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate | 3000-01-01 | en_UK |
local.rioxx.licence | http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved|| | en_UK |
local.rioxx.filename | Hart_1994_Tax_structure.pdf | en_UK |
local.rioxx.filecount | 1 | en_UK |
local.rioxx.source | 0176-2680 | en_UK |
Appears in Collections: | Economics Journal Articles |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Hart_1994_Tax_structure.pdf | Fulltext - Published Version | 995.07 kB | Adobe PDF | Under Embargo until 3000-01-01 Request a copy |
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