|Appears in Collections:||Economics Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Efficient bargains in the context of recent labour market experience and policy|
|Author(s):||Hart, Robert A|
|Citation:||Hart RA & Moutos T (1991) Efficient bargains in the context of recent labour market experience and policy, European Journal of Political Economy, 7 (2), pp. 169-181.|
|Abstract:||In Europe in recent times, bargaining between a leading nationally based union and a representative group of employers over the issues of employment, wages and working time has proved to be influential in a much wider industrial context. Adopting a generalized Nash bargaining approach, this paper considers the possible effects on such ‘key' bargains of several prominent labour market events and policies experienced since the middle 1970s. These include the impacts of OPEC supply shocks, changes in union power, a switch in emphasis from income to payroll taxes as well as growing government economic orthodoxy as expressed through the goal of a balanced budget.|
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