|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions|
|Citation:||Hale B & Wright C (2015) Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 91 (1), pp. 325-364.|
|Abstract:||We begin by drawing attention to some drawbacks of what we shall call the Frege-Quine definition of analytic truth. With this we contrast the definition of analytic propositions given by Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre.If Bolzano’s definition is viewed, as Bolzano himself almost certainly did not view it, as attempting to capture the notion of analyticity as truth-in-virtue-of-meaning which occupied centre stage during the first half of the last century and which, Quine’s influential assault on it notwithstanding,continues to attract philosophical attention, it runs into some very serious problems. We argue that Bolzano’s central idea can, nevertheless,be used as the basis of a new definition which avoids these problems and possesses definite advantages over the Frege-Quine approach.|
|Rights:||Publisher policy allows this work to be made available in this repository. Published in Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2015, Vol. 91 Issue 1, p325-364 by Brill/Rodopi. The original publication is available at: http://www.brill.com/products/book/themes-ontology-mind-and-logic#TOC_1|
|Affiliation:||University of Sheffield|
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