|Appears in Collections:||Economics Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits|
Mackenzie, Ian A
|Keywords:||tradable permit market|
|Publisher:||Walter de Gruyter / Berkeley Electronic Press|
|Citation:||Hanley N & Mackenzie IA (2010) The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits, BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 10 (1 (Article 56)).|
|Abstract:||The establishment of a tradable permit market requires the regulator to select a level of aggregate emissions and then distribute the associated permits to specific groups. Both these decisions create opportunities for rent seeking. In this paper, we use a contest model to analyse the incentives to rent seek for pollution permits and to analyse the consequences for social welfare. We find differences in firms' rent-seeking choices compared to a conventional rent-seeking contest. We see that a fundamental aspect of firms' incentives to rent seek depends on the market value of the permits, that is, the value of the ex post reallocated rents. This impact depends on the responsiveness of the regulator to aggregate rent-seeking effort. The responsiveness, in some cases, may improve welfare by reducing the per-unit value of permits, which may lower the rent-seeking effort more than it increases the damages experienced from the additional emissions.|
|Rights:||Publisher allows this work to be made available in this repository. Published in B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Volume 10, Issue 1, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2497, July 2010 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH/ Walter de Gruyter, Inc with the following policy: the Author/Editor may deposit the Publisher's PDF version of the Article on Author's/Editor's own website or Author's/Editor's institute's designated repository, provided it is not made publicly available until 12 months after official publication. The final publication is available at www.degruyter.com|
|Hanley_2010_The_Effects_of_Rent_Seeking.pdf||325.91 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.