|Appears in Collections:||Economics Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Membership Rules and Stability of Coalition Structures in Positive Externality Games|
|Citation:||Finus M & Rundshagen B (2009) Membership Rules and Stability of Coalition Structures in Positive Externality Games, Social Choice and Welfare, 32 (3), pp. 389-406.|
|Abstract:||This paper compares the stability of coalition structures under six institutional settings of treaty formation in positive externality games. We argue that many economic problems belong to the class of positive externality games (i.e. outsiders benefit from the formation of coalitions) and hence our results can be applied to many situations. It is shown that it is easier to sustain agreements under exclusive than under open membership and the higher the “degree of consensus” necessary to form a coalition.|
|Rights:||The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author; you can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.|
|Affiliation:||University of Stirling|
University of Hagen
|Social Choice and Welfare.pdf||217.18 kB||Adobe PDF||Under Embargo until 31/12/2999 Request a copy|
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