1. STORRE
  2. Stirling Management School
  3. Economics
  4. Economics Journal Articles
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1097
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFinus, Michaelen_UK
dc.contributor.authorRundshagen, Biancaen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-09T07:35:34Z-
dc.date.available2013-06-09T07:35:34Z-
dc.date.issued2009-03en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/1097-
dc.description.abstractThis paper compares the stability of coalition structures under six institutional settings of treaty formation in positive externality games. We argue that many economic problems belong to the class of positive externality games (i.e. outsiders benefit from the formation of coalitions) and hence our results can be applied to many situations. It is shown that it is easier to sustain agreements under exclusive than under open membership and the higher the “degree of consensus” necessary to form a coalition.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherSpringeren_UK
dc.relationFinus M & Rundshagen B (2009) Membership Rules and Stability of Coalition Structures in Positive Externality Games. Social Choice and Welfare, 32 (3), pp. 389-406. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0330-zen_UK
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author; you can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.en_UK
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserveden_UK
dc.subjectCoalition (Social sciences)en_UK
dc.subjectInternational cooperationen_UK
dc.titleMembership Rules and Stability of Coalition Structures in Positive Externality Gamesen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargodate3000-01-01en_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[Social Choice and Welfare.pdf] The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.en_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-008-0330-zen_UK
dc.citation.jtitleSocial Choice and Welfareen_UK
dc.citation.issn1432-217Xen_UK
dc.citation.issn0176-1714en_UK
dc.citation.volume32en_UK
dc.citation.issue3en_UK
dc.citation.spage389en_UK
dc.citation.epage406en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.author.emailmichael.finus@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Hagenen_UK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000262786700004en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-58849085448en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid827937en_UK
dc.date.accepted2008-08-05en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2008-08-05en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2009-04-21en_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_UK
local.rioxx.authorFinus, Michael|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorRundshagen, Bianca|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate3000-01-01en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved||en_UK
local.rioxx.filenameSocial Choice and Welfare.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source0176-1714en_UK
Appears in Collections:Economics Journal Articles

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Social Choice and Welfare.pdfFulltext - Published Version217.18 kBAdobe PDFUnder Embargo until 3000-01-01    Request a copy


This item is protected by original copyright

View License
Show simple item record


Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

The metadata of the records in the Repository are available under the CC0 public domain dedication: No Rights Reserved https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact library@stir.ac.uk providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.