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Appears in Collections:Economics Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Modesty May Pay!
Authors: Finus, Michael
Maus, Stefan
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Issue Date: Oct-2008
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell / Association for Public Economic Theory
Citation: Finus M & Maus S (2008) Modesty May Pay!, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10 (5), pp. 801-826.
Abstract: Most noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation. In this paper, we consider the possibility that countries agree on modest instead of ambitious abatement targets. It is shown that this can be an explanation for higher participation and more successful treaties. Thus, modesty may well pay, though the first-best optimum cannot be achieved. It is also demonstrated that our model extension makes it easier to relate the stylized model to actual negotiations.
Type: Journal Article
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Rights: The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author; you can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.
Affiliation: University of Stirling
University of Hagen

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