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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1089
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dc.contributor.authorFinus, Michaelen_UK
dc.contributor.authorMaus, Stefanen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-08T23:31:46Z-
dc.date.available2013-06-08T23:31:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008-10en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/1089-
dc.description.abstractMost noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation. In this paper, we consider the possibility that countries agree on modest instead of ambitious abatement targets. It is shown that this can be an explanation for higher participation and more successful treaties. Thus, modesty may well pay, though the first-best optimum cannot be achieved. It is also demonstrated that our model extension makes it easier to relate the stylized model to actual negotiations.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell / Association for Public Economic Theoryen_UK
dc.relationFinus M & Maus S (2008) Modesty May Pay!. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10 (5), pp. 801-826. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00387.xen_UK
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author; you can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.en_UK
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserveden_UK
dc.subjectEnvironmental policy International cooperationen_UK
dc.subjectEnvironmental law, Internationalen_UK
dc.titleModesty May Pay!en_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargodate3000-01-01en_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[jpet_387.pdf] The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.en_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00387.xen_UK
dc.citation.jtitleJournal of Public Economic Theoryen_UK
dc.citation.issn1467-9779en_UK
dc.citation.issn1097-3923en_UK
dc.citation.volume10en_UK
dc.citation.issue5en_UK
dc.citation.spage801en_UK
dc.citation.epage826en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.author.emailmichael.finus@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Hagenen_UK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000259151300005en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-51249114054en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid828387en_UK
dc.date.accepted2008-05-13en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2008-05-13en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2009-04-21en_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_UK
local.rioxx.authorFinus, Michael|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorMaus, Stefan|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate3000-01-01en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved||en_UK
local.rioxx.filenamejpet_387.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source1097-3923en_UK
Appears in Collections:Economics Journal Articles

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