|Appears in Collections:||Economics Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Do Abatement Quotas Lead to More Successful Climate Coalitions?|
|Citation:||Altamirano-Cabrera J, Finus M & Dellink R (2008) Do Abatement Quotas Lead to More Successful Climate Coalitions?, Manchester School, 76 (1), pp. 104-129.|
|Abstract:||In this paper we study the effect of different treaty designs on the success of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We analyze the standard assumption of an efficient abatement scheme and three uniform abatement quota schemes. Apart from analytical results, the analysis is supported by simulations based on the STACO (stability of coalitions) model. It turns out that quota agreements where the members decide by majority or unanimity voting are successful in overcoming free-rider incentives within an IEA. Finally, our results provide a rationale for the application of uniform abatement quotas in IEAs.|
|Rights:||The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author; you can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.|
|manc_1052.pdf||203.1 kB||Adobe PDF||Under Embargo until 31/1/2078 Request a copy|
Note: If any of the files in this item are currently embargoed, you can request a copy directly from the author by clicking the padlock icon above. However, this facility is dependent on the depositor still being contactable at their original email address.
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.