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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1084
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dc.contributor.authorAltamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlosen_UK
dc.contributor.authorFinus, Michaelen_UK
dc.contributor.authorDellink, Roben_UK
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-21T23:14:17Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-21T23:14:17Z-
dc.date.issued2008-01en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/1084-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study the effect of different treaty designs on the success of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We analyze the standard assumption of an efficient abatement scheme and three uniform abatement quota schemes. Apart from analytical results, the analysis is supported by simulations based on the STACO (stability of coalitions) model. It turns out that quota agreements where the members decide by majority or unanimity voting are successful in overcoming free-rider incentives within an IEA. Finally, our results provide a rationale for the application of uniform abatement quotas in IEAs.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell / The University of Manchesteren_UK
dc.relationAltamirano-Cabrera J, Finus M & Dellink R (2008) Do Abatement Quotas Lead to More Successful Climate Coalitions?. Manchester School, 76 (1), pp. 104-129. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01052.xen_UK
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author; you can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.en_UK
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserveden_UK
dc.subjectEnvironmental policy International cooperationen_UK
dc.subjectEnvironmental law, Internationalen_UK
dc.titleDo Abatement Quotas Lead to More Successful Climate Coalitions?en_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargodate2078-02-01en_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[manc_1052.pdf] The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.en_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01052.xen_UK
dc.citation.jtitleManchester Schoolen_UK
dc.citation.issn1467-9957en_UK
dc.citation.issn1463-6786en_UK
dc.citation.volume76en_UK
dc.citation.issue1en_UK
dc.citation.spage104en_UK
dc.citation.epage129en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.author.emailmichael.finus@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationEcole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanneen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationVU University Amsterdamen_UK
dc.identifier.wtid827703en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2008-01-31en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2009-04-20en_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_UK
local.rioxx.authorAltamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorFinus, Michael|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorDellink, Rob|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2078-02-01en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved||en_UK
local.rioxx.filenamemanc_1052.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source1463-6786en_UK
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