Scrutiny of ministerial ethics and standards of conduct in the UK: diluted accountability?Sean Kippin and Robert PyperDivision of History, Heritage and Politics, University of Stirling, UK; School of Education and Social Sciences, University of the West of Scotland, UKIMPACT The UK’s system for regulating the standards of conduct of its politicians today consists of an overlapping array of different bodies. Focusing primarily on ministers, the authors critique these arrangements and argue that they collectively—and in most cases individually—do not satisfy the demands of substantive accountability, owing to the high potential for political interference and the ‘gaps’ in the system. Particularly problematic is the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, an office which has been repeatedly shown to be toothless, subject to political interference and navigable by a ‘rogue’ prime minister such as Boris Johnson. In place of this, the authors recommend substantive reform of the system, with a single regulator, a new ‘Office of Parliamentary and Ministerial Standards’, at its core. This body would be independent of both parliament and government, adequately resourced to engage in and lead detailed investigations and empowered to make definitive rulings as to when the various codes of conduct have been breached. This article contains insights and analysis which will be of significance for those managing scrutiny and oversight processes relating to ethics and standards of conduct, at all levels of governance. While focused on the UK, the insights of this article are particularly pertinent for other ‘Westminster’ systems (including within the UK), but may also be of interest to scholars concerned with how to safeguard political systems against the impact of populist and authoritarian actors, who are gaining a foothold in parliaments across the democratic world and achieving executive power.ABSTRACT Concerns about the conduct of UK politicians abound. This article assesses the country’s key standards and ethics bodies against fundamental benchmarks of accountability, and argues that their disparate and uncoordinated nature hinders independent scrutiny, and has created a system of accountability characterised by vacuums, varied performance and diluted effectiveness. The key arguments for systemic reform, particularly as they pertain to ministerial standards, are summarised in this article.KEYWORDS Accountability; codes of conduct; Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL); parliamentary oversight; parliamentary standards; UK parliamentOne of the hallmarks of sound governance and public administration is the establishment and maintenance of high standards of personal probity, ethical behaviour and conduct. Weak or compromised systems of governance and public administration are often characterised by poor standards of conduct within and among the governing élites and limited or inadequate systems and processes for scrutiny and accountability in relation to personal and professional conduct. By contrast, strong and stable governance and efficacious public administration can be associated with, inter alia, clear, efficient and effective mechanisms for investigating and reporting on cases of alleged misconduct by those in positions of power. This article examines the modern development of concerns about ethics and standards of conduct in the UK system of government. We proceed to outline the emergence, from the 1990s, of a nexus of standards and ethics bodies examining the conduct of politicians, noting the ad hoc nature of the process and the absence of an holistic, systemic and strategic approach. The emergence, development and performance of the key standards and ethics bodies are assessed against fundamental benchmarks of accountability. In each case, some background is provided as to the emergence and role of the body in question, along with some ‘landmark’ cases that were of sufficiently high profile to contribute to the erosion of public trust in the system. These cases provide an opportunity to assess the practical operation of the system. Some persistent criticisms are noted here, too, alongside some broader observations. The article draws on a range of publicly-available documentary sources and other published analysis, including reports, parliamentary proceedings and committee sessions, all of which were subjected to close analysis. We use this material to explore the effectiveness and accountability of the regime and conclude that the disparate and unco-ordinated elements of the nexus provide evidence of limited independence, gaps and vacuums, and varied and sometimes diluted forms of accountability. While our primary focus is on government ministers, we also make observations as to the effectiveness of the standards system as a whole, owing to the relative indivisibility of ministerial and parliamentary roles. We conclude with a summary of the key arguments for systemic reform and a somewhat pessimistic account of the prospects for this, set against a (at the time of writing) looming general election. We explore the possibility of a ‘window of opportunity’ for substantive reform, arguing that there will always be strong incentives for UK politicians not to adopt the type of reform proposed.© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4. 0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent. PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2024.2350438
Background and origins of contemporary concerns about ethics and standards of conductThe personal responsibilities of UK government ministers can be viewed in terms of three ‘layers’: .The fundamental requirement to obey the law, in common with all private citizens..The need to abide by the rules and conventions of the House of Commons and the House Lords..The constraints placed upon members of the government via the content of the Ministerial Code.This seemingly straightforward picture is complicated by the fact that ministers have an additional duty related to their Royal Prerogative Powers. These grant ministers particular powers but, additionally, place restrictions and duties that go beyond the ordinary law.Historically, significant emphasis was placed upon the unwritten expectation that members of parliament (MPs) and government ministers would behave ‘honourably’, with only general formal codifications of rules of conduct set out in ‘Erskine May’ (the handbook of parliamentary procedure— see UK Parliament, 2024), the House of Commons speaker’s rulings and resolutions on votes requiring declarations of interest, and the ‘conflicts of interest’ sections of the unpublished ‘Questions of Procedure for Ministers’ (the forerunner of the Ministerial Code). For elected members generally, one observer noted the paucity of ‘guidance on how [they] should conduct their private activities other than that they do not offend the criminal law, the Resolutions, and some ill-defined standards concerning individual integrity and the reputation of the House’ (Doig, 1984, p. 208).Scandals were relatively rare but, occasionally, serious cases arose from the failure of ministers to abide by the law and/or parliamentary and government standards of conduct. Twentieth century examples included: the Marconi scandal of 1912 (Donaldson, 1962) which implicated several ministers in insider trading; the corrupt practices at the Board of Trade in 1948, which led to the resignation of a minister, John Belcher, in the wake of the Lynskey Tribunal’s investigation (Gross, 1964); and the Poulson affair, which engulfed numerous public figures who had links to the corrupt architect and led to the resignation of Reginald Maudling as Home Secretary in 1972 (Fitzwalter & Taylor, 1981). These scandals had financial impropriety or misconduct at their core, but others saw ministers caught up in matters linked to security or the shifting, unwritten codes of public morality. Located within these categories were cases including the Profumo affair of 1963, within which issues of security, lying to the House of Commons and sexual ‘misconduct’ led to the resignation of the War Minister (Knightley & Kennedy, 1987), the Jellicoe/Lambton sex scandal of 1973, which also led to ministerial resignations (Parris, 1997, pp. 185–190), and the resignations of ministers David Mellor and Tim Yeo in 1992 and 1993 following scrutiny of their private lives during the Major government’s attempt to reassert ‘traditional values’ as part of its ‘back to basics’ campaign (Parris, 1997, pp. 300– 308, 323-339).It was the Major government’s increasing concern about allegations of ‘sleaze’ (see Leigh & Vulliamy, 1997) and, in particular, the revelations in 1994 that a lobbying firm, Ian Green Associates, had paid Conservative MPs to ask parliamentary questions and to lobby on behalf of the businessman Mohamed Al-Fayed (Hencke, 1994), which led directly to the establishment of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), chaired by Lord Nolan.Nolan moved quickly to publish ‘The Seven Principles of Public Life’ (selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership), which were applicable to anyone in public office: elected or otherwise (CSPL, 1995). All public bodies were to produce codes of conduct incorporating these principles, adjustments were to be made to existing ministerial and civil service codes and parliamentary practices; and ‘internal systems for maintaining standards [were to be] supported by independent scrutiny’ Table 1. Selected UK parliamentary and ministerial standards bodies’ roles.Name and year foundedRemitLeadership, appointment, and compositionPowersCommittee on Privileges (16th century; reformed 2012)Consideration of matters relating to the privileges of parliament and its membersA committee of MPs, directly elected by the House of Commons (including the chair)Carrying out of investigations (can instigate); recommendation of sanctions (whole House of Commons must approve)Committee on Standards in Public Life (1994)Advice to prime minister on ethical standards in public life (including but not limited to politics)The chair and individual members (always four men and four women) are appointed to five-year terms by the prime ministerIssuance of policy advice; periodic issuance of reports and on specific issuesCommissioner for Standards (1995)Investigation of alleged breaches of the Members Code of Conduct. Upholding of standards of conduct, provision of advice and guidance on the Code of ConductAn individual officer of the House of Commons, appointed directly by the speaker following an open recruitment processIssuance of recommendations; investigations; issuance of reportsIndependent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests (2006)Advice to the prime minister on matters relating to the conduct of ministers and potential conflicts of interestAn individual appointed by and directly responsible to the prime ministerProvision of advice; issuance of reports; investigation of ministers (not instigation)Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (2009)Sets and administers MPs expenses, allowances, and pay. Investigates alleged expense claim related misconductA board of directors, responsible for the overall management and direction of the organisation. The board consists of a chair, a chief executive, and up to seven other non-executive members, all of whom are appointed by the speaker (in consultation with party leaders in the House of Commons).Investigation (can instigate); recommendation of sanction; issuance of reportsCommittee on Standards (2012)Investigates complaints about the conduct of MPs and oversight of the Register of Members’ Financial InterestsA hybrid committee of MPs and ‘lay members’. The former are elected by the House of Commons, the latter appointed through open competitionInvestigation; recommendation of sanctions (whole House of Commons must approve)2 S. KIPPIN AND R. PYPER