Alterities of global citizenship: education, human rights, and everyday bordering

Author(s): Mostafa Gamal and Dalene M Swanson


Published by EG Press Limited on behalf of the European Group for the Study of Deviancy and Social Control electronically 6 January 2019


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Mostafa Gamal and Dalene M Swanson

Abstract

Assumptions abound regarding societal embetterment at the heart of global interconnections and the distributions of knowledge through international educational organisations and structures worldwide (Swanson, 2013; 2015). In schools and higher education institutions internationally, the cultivation of global citizenship in students has been at the centre of policy discourses at both institutional and curricular levels. Premised on a hegemonic neoliberal assumption that higher education needs to be “responsive to the requirements and challenges related to the globalization of societies, economy and labour markets” (Kalvemark and Van der Wende, 1997: 19), global citizenship as operationalised within policy and curricular discourses purports to enable students to “compete successfully in an increasingly cosmopolitan world of work by expanding their intercultural and cross-cultural competency” (Haigh, 2014, p.13). Student mobility is one such mechanism that is reputed to enable students to participate in a global knowledge economy by affording them opportunities to establish global connections (Andrade, 2006, Bartram, 2008, Sherry et al., 2008). Yet, in locating the discussion on global citizenship within a broader context of the “securitization” of immigration (Aas, 2011; Huysmans, 2006), crimmigration (Stumpf, 2006), “new mobilities” (Sheller and Urry, 2006)

1 Mostafa Gamal is PhD candidate at the University of Stirling. His research focuses on the internationalisation of the curriculum, the ethical and philosophical complexities it involves, and the application of critical postcolonial and decolonial thinking to educational research. He is currently a lecturer at a Further Education college and teaches a range of social sciences subjects (Sociology, Psychology and Politics). Mostafa is a member of the CDN International Development Network steering group. He is also a member of the Ethical Internationalisation in Higher Education (EIHE) Network.

Dr Dalene M Swanson is a senior academic in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Stirling. She is also Adjunct Professor at the University of Alberta, and an International Faculty Associate of the Centre for Culture, Identity and Education at The University of British Columbia in Canada. She is also on the International Advisory Board of the UNESCO Chair in Democracy, Global Citizenship, and Transformative Education, and is a member of the Ethical Internationalisation in Higher Education Network (EIHE). Dalene’s research focuses on socio-political and critical perspectives in education, centred on issues related to democracy, internationalisation, critical global citizenship, critical postcolonial/decolonial studies, critical development studies and education, and social and ecological justice. Dalene also has specialist expertise in critical mathematics education and STEM as well as reconceptualist curriculum studies. She writes extensively on African indigenous thought, especially Ubuntu philosophy, and also specialises in critical and post-critical artsbased, narrative and post-foundational research methodologies.
and the ensuing drive to delegitimise the mobility of others, variously constituted as “the refugee, the asylum seeker, the illegal immigrant, or the non-citizen”, a darker underbelly of the neoliberal strand of global citizenship is revealed. Tracing its under-acknowledged meanings, this article seeks to open a theoretical space to trouble this notion of global citizenship in respect of some appropriations and applications. The arguments herein seek to recast the dominant view of global citizenship in relational terms by problematising “the margins or point of contact” (Isin, 2002, p.3) between the global citizen and its alterity. Within the operation of relationality, it renders visible the state violence inherent, yet hidden, in this space. It foregrounds sites of violence enacted through an ‘immobile infrastructure’ of bordering, and an extant social, political and legal context that legitimises practices such as criminalisation, securitisation, detention, deportation and banishment of the alterities of the global citizen. These bordering ideologies traverse sites and bodies, and become foundational to states of containment as well as everyday life in every sphere. It is asserted, as a consequence, that new political philosophy requires being countenanced around the figure of the refugee rather than the global citizen.

Key Words: Global citizenship/global citizen; Alterities; Internationalisation; Bordering; Human rights; Violences; Migrant; Securitisation.

Introduction: Whose Global Citizenship, Whose Rights?

In Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?, Jacques Rancière speaks of the historical collapse of the Soviet Union in relation to the rise of what became a new myth: the ensuing “charter of the irresistible movement leading to a peaceful posthistorical world where global democracy would match the global market of liberal economy” (2004, p. 297). For him, the ‘Rights of Man’, vaunted as the triumph of Western Enlightenment and Liberal Democracy, soon “turned out to be the rights of the rightless, of the populations hunted out of their homes and land and threatened by ethnic slaughter. They appeared more and more as the rights of the victims, the rights of those who were unable to enact any rights or even any claim in their name...” (p. 297-298). What came with this, according to Rancière, was a creeping suspicion that the ‘Man’ in the ‘Rights of Man’ was merely an abstraction, that the real rights were the rights of citizens. According to this political understanding, one’s rights are no longer a function of a state of nature, the defining features of one’s humanity, but are tied to the global construct of nation state. Not everyone has rights! Those caught on the other side of the fortified walls of
statehood, are rightless, constituted as objects of otherness and derision, exemplified in the promulgated, nativist populism of Brexit. At best, under a social liberal orientation to this ideological operation, they become charitable subjects of sentiment, invested in embodied contradiction (Swanson, 2011), inflected with pity and compassion via a ‘politics of benevolence’ (Jefferess, 2008).

In a similar vein, Gorgio Agamben (1998) acknowledges Hannah Arendt’s critique of the construct of ‘human rights’ where she opines that ‘the countryless refugee’ presents an opportunity for the development of a new paradigm of historical consciousness. For Agamben, a new subject of the representation of the political, other than the prevailing ‘Man’ or ‘Citizen’ and their guaranteed rights, should be centralised and held up for political attention. For him, a new political philosophy needs, instead, to be built on the ‘figure of the refugee’. It is in the context of the increasing attention to the refugee, the migrant, the stateless subject, the rightless non-citizen, that the pervasive neoliberal orientation of the concept of ‘global citizen’ comes into stark relief. In so doing, it demands attention and gives voice to its hidden shadows. Given the political backdrop of forced mobility and statelessness proliferating on a global scale, the questions of ‘whose rights’ and ‘whose global citizenship’ rings loudly, provoking the necessities of conscience/consciousness.

Education, alterities and/of global citizenship

Assumptions abound regarding societal embetterment at the heart of global interconnections and the distributions of knowledge through international educational organisations and structures worldwide (Swanson, 2013; 2015). In schools and higher education institutions internationally, the cultivation of global citizenship in students has been at the centre of policy discourses at both institutional and curricular levels, informing practice, but also being shaped by the new managerial behaviourisms (Swanson, 2011; 2015; Swanson and Pashby, 2016). How students are to be judged and assessed according to measures of ‘global competencies’ is a new way of ‘embedding’ ‘global citizenship’ by way of the market, and is code for installing economic interests into justice-oriented discourses (Swanson, 2015). At stake in the advancement of global citizenship discourses is the coalescing of a set of interests, inter alia around a hegemonic neoliberal view of ‘internationalisation’. The hinging of ‘internationalisation’ and ‘global citizenship’ is neither natural nor
disinterested. Such a view of internationalisation through the service of global citizenship aims at “making higher education responsive to the requirements and challenges related to the globalization of societies, economy and labour markets” (Kalvemark and Van der Wende, 1997: 19). In a process of intensification of internationalisation and the celebration of new possibilities and connections, new limitations have also been produced, although these often have “become invisible from the perspective of the dominant gaze within the sweep of solidifying discourses on the rightness of international ‘partnerships’ and marketization of Western-author(iz)ed or Scientifically-endorsed ‘New Knowledge’” (Swanson, 2013, p. 333-4). The mobility of students, the acquisition and quantification of international students, and the purported ‘internationalisation of the curriculum’ are examples of mechanisms that have occupied a privileged position in these efforts. These initiatives claim to enable students to “compete successfully in an increasingly cosmopolitan world of work by expanding their intercultural and cross-cultural competency” (Haigh, 2014, p.13). Other rhetoric takes less of an overtly economic function, hiding behind softer, justice-sounding discourses, yet often conflating liberal orientations with neoliberal economic intentions nevertheless (Swanson and Pashby, 2016). All in all, these mechanisms are reputed to enable students to participate in a global knowledge economy by affording them opportunities to establish global connections (Andrade, 2006, Bartram, 2008, Sherry et al., 2008).

On another level, in locating the discussion on global citizenship within a broader context of the “securitization” of immigration (Aas, 2011; Huysmans, 2006), crimmigration (Stumpf, 2006), “new mobilities” (Sheller and Urry, 2006) and the ensuing drive to delegitimise the mobility of others, variously constituted as “the refugee, the asylum seeker, the illegal immigrant, or the non-citizen”, a darker underbelly of the neoliberal strand of global citizenship is revealed. Tracing its under-acknowledged meanings, this article seeks to open a theoretical space to trouble this notion of global citizenship in respect of some appropriations and applications. The arguments herein seek to recast the dominant view of global citizenship in relational terms by problematising “the margins or point of contact” (Isin, 2002, p.3) between the global citizen and its alterity. Concomitantly, this article seeks to admit to the realm of intelligibility the “excluded”, “excessive” and “wasted humans” who are “thrown out of focus, cast in the shadow, forced into the vague or invisible background - no longer belonging to ‘what is’” (Bauman, 2004, p.18), by rendering visible the state violence inherent, yet hidden, in this space. To
speak of global citizenship relationally is to acknowledge that it has perspective, power and position. It marks out the spaces of the self/other and citizen/non-citizen as quavering dualities intrinsic to it. The approach taken in this article does not imply, however, an attempt to address the many ways in which the alterities of global citizen are marginalised. To do so would suggest that these categories, “the global citizen” and its alterities (“the refugee”, “the asylum seeker”, “the illegal immigrant” and “the non-citizen”) “pre-existed citizenship and that, once defined, it excluded them...” (Isin, 2002, p.3). Rather, the focus of argumentation is on the ways in which the alterities of this strand of global citizen are silenced, and yet they also remain features of the condition of neoliberalised global citizenship. This operates in a similarly dual sense to Derrida’s *différence*, being both the relational difference and deferral of meaning (Derrida, 1978). In this tenor, the “global citizen”, “the refugee”, “the asylum seeker”, “the illegal immigrant” and “the non-citizen” do not exist as categories in and of themselves, as entities that correspond with particular classes of reality, but only in relation to each other. These categories, as the alterities of global citizenship, emerge within a set of discursive practices that “makes appeal to, or demands on ... normative ideals and values, both vis-à-vis the state and with respect to other citizens” (Bloemraad, 2018, p. 5). In other terms, these alterities perform global citizenship in their regularisation of border discourses, marking out ‘legitimate centre’ from ‘de/il-legitimate margin’, so that “the other side of the line” (De Sousa Santos, 2007, p. 45) is constituted *within* the discourse of global citizenship, which then performs ‘the walling in’ and the border(ing) (Swanson, 2016).

In advancing its arguments, this article unpacks global citizenship as framed within a dominant neoliberal world politics, and traces the ways in which it is articulated and theorised. It addresses the normative and aspirational characteristics of global citizenship, leading to a second emphasis and parallel argument relating to the symbolic and material violence implicated in the construction of alterities of global citizenship in global citizenship’s neoliberal mode of operation. Two particular sites of this violence are marked out and emphasised: the legal and legislative framework that constructs the alterity of the global citizen as “threat”; and the spatial and architectural configurations that “constrain, immobilize, segregate, incarcerate, or disperse” these alterities (Isin, 2002, p.49). The article draws together these lines of argument by asserting that in the repetitious, visible performativity of “illegality” in the mobility of global alterities, such border(ing) global citizenship performances
simultaneously work to render invisible the violence inherent in this denial of intersubjective relationality.

**Global citizenship and the unfettered mobility**

The term, ‘global citizenship’, has gained currency within a range of contexts. Its discussion is often linked to globalisation as a political and economic rationality. Government policies and institutional strategies are replete with reference to global citizenship and often invoke the ‘feel good’ sentiment of the concept as a desired outcome or a key graduate attribute or ‘competency’ in educating global graduates. Similarly, academic literature on the internationalisation of the curriculum specifies the development of global citizenship in the students as a desired outcome. Its meaning, nevertheless, remains open to a range of interpretations and appropriations (Swanson, 2011; Andreotti, 2006, Jefferess, 2008) and this depends on normative, existential and aspirational assumptions. In attempting to map the different orientations of the ways in which this concept has been understood, a range of theorists offer a number of classifications. Andreotti (2006) creates a duality in defining a soft vs. critical global citizenship. Swanson and Pashby (2016), present versions of global citizenship and global citizenship education as shaped by liberal humanist global social justice discourses, nationalist discourses, neoliberal discourses, and finally critical discourses that seek transformative, emancipatory or anti-oppressive ideals. Stein (2015) suggests that discussions of global citizenship can be grouped under the following categories: neoliberal, liberal humanist, anti-oppressive and a fourth dimension she refers to as an “Incommensurable Position”. Scholars such as Andreotti, Abdi, Shultz, Khoo, Stein, Pashby, Swanson, and others have asserted that a deepening hegemonic neoliberal orientation to global citizenship is being deployed in university strategies and policies worldwide. Concomitantly, Akdag and Swanson (2017) note that there is an increasing installation of “private interests and neoliberal governance logic within the corporate university”, and that the “capital value of education (…) as a private good” is tied to a “market-oriented commodification of knowledge within universities, underpinned by a repositioning of universities as entrepreneurial enterprises” (p. 1). The interest in this version of global citizenship is to enable a “largely depoliticized, market-centric means to ensure students will be attractive to employers” (Stein, 2015, p. 244). Shultz (2007) also characterises this neoliberal global citizen as a highly mobile “entrepreneur” who
participates in the global New Knowledge economy. She refers to this global citizen as a “traveller” who “strives to create a place beyond traditional boundaries and local restrictions where he or she can access the political, social, economic, and environmental rewards of participation in a global society” (Shultz, 2007, p.250). For this citizen, economic and social relationships “are sought freely across time and space without being encumbered by national boundaries” (Shultz, 207, 251). The internationalisation of Higher Education (HE) is deemed crucial in this process, legitimating it within existing institutions. Through activities such as the recruitment of international students and exchange programmes, this neoliberal orientation to internationalisation of HE is said to increase the mobility of students and staff as well as to develop in students global attributes such as ‘intercultural competence’, which will enable students to “negotiate ... a liberal global environment” premised on “a fundamental understanding that as individuals we should be able to move through the world freely” (Shultz, 2007, p. 252).

Global citizenship in the cosmopolitan tradition

With respect to the liberal humanist view of global citizenship, global citizenship education derives much of its conceptual underpinning from a theorisation of cosmopolitanism (Stein, 2015). Whilst acknowledging the various political, moral, cultural and economic strands of cosmopolitanism, it is moral cosmopolitanism, especially as theorised by Nussbaum (1994) and Appiah (2005, 2006), that undergirds much of the liberal understanding of this term. According to Hansen (2008), moral cosmopolitanism “pivots around conceptions of the good, of justice, or of virtue that are said to cut across political, cultural, and religious boundaries” (2008, p. 292), qualities that are cultivated through “open-mindedness and impartiality” (2008, p. 292). Nussbaum and Appiah are exponents of this approach. According to Nussbaum, liberal education seeks to cultivate in global citizens three distinctive capacities:

the Socratic ability to criticize one’s own traditions and to carry on an argument on terms of mutual respect for reason; (2) the ability to think as a citizen of the whole world, not just some local region or group; and (3) the ‘narrative imagination,’ the ability to imagine what it would be like to be in the position of someone very different from oneself. (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 289)
This moral cosmopolitanism translates into a view of global citizenship as the cultivation of intercultural understanding and sensitivity, granting credence to and enabling “a commitment to development projects in the Global South, whether through research, service learning, or other engagements” (Stein, 2015, p.245).

These moralistic and liberal views of a cosmopolitan global citizenship have been extensively critiqued from different perspectives and on a number of levels (see Andreotti, 2006; Shultz, 2007; Pashby, 2011; Swanson, 2011, 2015; Swanson and Pashby, 2016). Among these critiques is the assertion that a liberal humanist view focuses “global relationships on an individual level, rather than on a structural scale” (Stein, 2015), whilst the neoliberal view reduces global citizenship to a set of competences that are acquired through education. A third strand of global citizenship theorizing is marked by demands for “more critical, politicized, and historicized approaches to global engagement” (Stein, 2015, p.246). In its various forms, this orientation seeks to decolonize global citizenship education by problematising the Eurocentric roots of global citizenship and cosmopolitanism (Swanson, 2015; Stein, 2015). In this sense, “global citizenship’s institutionalization as the ‘great white hope’ of international relations (Brysk, 2002), testifies to its often racialized and privileged framing” (Swanson, 2015, p. 28), and global citizenship operations in this mode seek to “identify how colonial, racialized, and gendered flows of power, wealth, and knowledge operate to the advantage of the Global North, as a whole, and elites in both the Global North and South” (Stein, 2015, p. 246).

While this brief contextualisation of global citizenship offers some ways in which the term is conceptualised, such operations are not exhaustive. Nevertheless, two interrelated issues are brought to the fore that course through these discourses. The first one relates to the normative aspect that dominates the liberal humanist understanding of global citizenship. Whilst this approach recognises the need to “incorporate into notions of citizenship ideas about global social justice, the environment, difference” (Barlin, 2011, p. 256), it is marked by an “almost exclusive concern with defining new, better models [of global citizenship], capable of addressing the kind of political and social issues which are of current concern” (p.357). By advocating personal renewal or transformation as opposed to structural changes in the conditions that give rise to global inequalities and dominance, this view of global citizenship translates into a normative and aspirational view of the global citizen as someone who:
is aware of the wider world and has a sense of their own role as a world citizen;
respects and values diversity;
has an understanding of how the world works;
is outraged by social injustice;
participates in the community at a range of levels, from the local to the global;
is willing to act to make the world a more equitable and sustainable place;
takes responsibility for their actions.

This model of the global citizen, its conditions for belonging, as well as the attributes to be cultivated, are premised on a view of citizenship “as an extension of and thus rooted in national citizenship” (Pashby, 2011, p.437). This also is undergirded by a view of the global citizen as a normative citizen-subject whose “identities move naturally and neutrally from a Northern/Western context of family to nation to global community” (Pashby, 2011, p. 437).

These views evoke the following questions: What is the nature of the political community which is presumably enacted by this conception of global citizenship? Who is fit for this exercise of global citizenship? In grappling with these questions, the global citizenship can be problematised by addressing its “obscene” Other (De Genova, 2013): the refugee, the asylum seeker, the deportee, the “illegal” immigrant. This attests to the ways in which these categories, construed as “probationary” citizens, “failed citizens” (Swanson, 2013; Anderson, 2014), and “tolerated citizens” (Anderson, 2014), are inherent in particular discourses of (global) citizenship. This constitution is marked by symbolic and material state violence. It can be referenced in relation to the ways in which alterities of global citizenship are governed, regulated and marked by an array of disciplinary discourses and practices, such as illegality, criminality, surveillance, detention, deportation and banishment. This strand of global citizenship can thus be articulated in its ontological relationality to what it seeks to silence and exclude. Reciprocally, the unfettered mobility and freedom of movement that activates the neoliberal version of global citizenship exacts problematisation. By contrast, mobility is not a neutral aspect of globalisation as attested to within the hegemonic neoliberal notion of global citizenship, but as Beauchamps, et al.,(2017) avers, “[M]obility is
never innocent”. It is an uneven process where gains to some simultaneously enact what Sheller and Urry (2006, p. 210) refer to as “disconnection, social exclusion, and inaudibility” for others (cited in Beauchamps et al., 2017, p. 6). This leads to a consideration of what can be called ‘the violence of inscription’.

**The violence of inscription**

The darker underbelly of a neoliberal version of global citizenship, as pointed to earlier, can be understood in terms of innate violences. Brown (2010) aptly testifies to these violences in her commentary:

> What we have come to call globalized world harbors fundamental tensions between opening and barricading, fusion and partition, erasure and reinscription. These tensions materialize as increasingly liberalized borders, on the one hand, and the development of unprecedented funds, energies, and technologies to border fortification, on the other. (p.7)

The issue of mobility underscores these violences in its inherent contradiction in relation to global citizenship. The literature on internationalisation and global citizenship education (GCE) is replete with various expressions of respect for diversity and the cognitive, affective, cultural and social outcomes associated with engaging diversity. In the case of HE, global citizenship purportedly affords opportunities to develop “cross-cultural capability” (Killick, 2011) in students. Internationalisation is also said to develop “respect and tolerance among people”, to foster a “commitment to international solidarity” and “human security” as well as build “a climate of global peace” (International Association of Universities, cited in Black, 2004, p.24). The mobility of the student is seen as crucial in this process. As Blond, et al. (2007, p.28) suggests: “Mobility promotes a deeper understanding of different cultures and values, going beyond mere familiarity to encourage personal friendship across national boundaries, and demonstrates a country’s interest in achieving a reciprocal relationship with the rest of the world”. Running parallel to this free and unfettered mobility, however, are a set of practices and discourses that simultaneously construct certain types of political subjectivities, while delegitimising their mobility, and in some cases by relegating these subjectivities to a “variegated spectrum of ‘legalities’, ‘illegibilities’” (De Genova, 2013) and conditionalities. As Cresswell (2010, p.20) avers, “forms of mobility ... are political – they are implicated in the production of power and relations of domination”.
The discussion that follows explores this paradox by opening up a space, not only to grasp the conditions of these marginalised and precarious subjectivities, but to render visible the violence implicated in their inscription. It also attests to the symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) implicated in the erasure of these conditions within dominant global citizenship discourse. In order to articulate the “obscene” Other (De Genova, 2013) of the global citizen, the legal, political and social processes that set the contours through which this Other of the global citizen is rendered intelligible need being addressed. As a start, this requires examining some of the “immobile infrastructure” of bordering, not as mere barriers that hinder movement, but rather as “spectacle” (De Genova, 2013) for the production, securitisation and criminalisation of certain mobilities. This necessitates an examination of the social, political and legal context that provides a rationale for these structures, as well as a review of practices that illustrate the inherent state violence implicated in them.

**Fixities, spectacles, and illegalities**

Drawing on insights from critical geography and the “new mobilities” paradigm (Sheller and Urry, 2006), attention can be granted, not only to the idea of flow, but also to the “seemingly immobile infrastructures of security” (Beauchamps, et al., 2017), such as borders, checkpoints and walls. These ‘fixities” and “moorings” (Urry 2003, p. 138) do not only inhibit and constrain movements and mobility, but are sites that have different effects on mobility and produce different articulations of (non)belonging. As Pallitto and Heyman (2008) argue, borders, border security regimes and their techniques of identification, inspection, clearance, and surveillance are sites for the production and amplification of differential mobility effects, and in this sense, “the ability of individuals to negotiate borders becomes unequal” (p. 318). These inequalities are manifest in three intersecting categories, namely: inequalities of rights, inequalities of risk, and inequalities of movement (Pallitto and Heyman, 2008, p. 318). These “fixities” and the security techniques that categorise travellers are also “spectacles” for the “sociopolitical production of migrant ‘illegality’” (De Genova, 2013, p. 1181). Not only do these fixities render ‘illegality’ visible and performative, but they also come to represent:

The violence inherent in these spaces and zones are manifestations of the “theatrics of propping up sovereignty” (Brown, 2010, p. 93). As Brown (2010) avers, the intensity of border fortification is underpinned by the “promise to secure, protect, rehabilitate, contain or keep at bay” the “generic… threatening figures of otherness” (p.115) and “gratify a wish for sovereignty restored to the subject, as well as to the state” (Brown, 2010, p.107). But “these immobile infrastructures of security”:

generate an increasingly closed and policed collective identity in place of the open society they would defend ... [W]alls are not merely ineffective in resurrecting the eroding nation-state sovereignty to which they respond, but they contribute new forms of xenophobia and parochialism to a postnational era. They abet the production of subjects defended against worldliness. (Brown, 2010, p. 41)

These zones and the assemblage of securitisation technologies (identification, sorting, surveillance) they operate within, as well as the violence they enact, disguise and justify, are intelligible within the context of a range of discursive practices. Examples of such practices are the securitisation of certain political subjectivities, detention and deportation. However, before attending to the ways in which these border technologies operate, a consideration of the discourses that inform them would serve to highlight the “connection of power, subjugation and exploitation articulated through racism, to those associated with class, gender and religion” (Bhui, 2016, p. 276). That is to say, in considering the inequalities of movement (Pallitto and Heyman, 2008, p. 318), which produce “the global hierarchy of mobility’ (Bauman, 1998, p. 69)”, through the concept of intersectionality, these securitisation technologies illuminate “how membership in more than one marginalized group can increase the magnitude of the disadvantage facing particular subgroups” (Johnson, 2009, p.4). In particular, race, class and gender have concomitantly operated as key tropes “to justify control and exclusion” of the “unwanted” (Bhui, 2016, p.274), a process referred to as xeno-racism.
Race and Class: (im)mobilities

As a practice of exclusion and discrimination, xeno-racism (Fekete, 2001; Sivanandan, 2001; Weber and Bowling, 2008) “is discrimination against people not just because of the colour of their skin, but because of a range of other identities, including poverty, asylum-seeking status and religion” (Bhui, 2016, p.274). As Sivanandan, (2001, p.2) avers, xeno-racism is:

a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial countries, but at the newer categories of the displaced and dispossessed whites, who are beating at western Europe’s doors, the Europe that displaced them in the first place. It is racism in substance but xeno in form - a racism that is meted out to impoverished strangers even if they are white.

The ways in which markers of poverty and racial difference are mobilised in border technologies “to select, eject and immobilize” (Italic in original, Weber and Bowling, 2008, p. 367) coalesce around two discriminatory practices. The first one relates to the “persistence of both covert and, in some cases, explicit racial profiling in the policing of immigration law” to constrain the mobility of others (Bhui, 2016, p. 273). The second one relates to immigration entry rules, including pre-entry clearance, which have the explicit aim of excluding the poor.

Whilst the full complexity and diversity of the the linkage between race and migration cannot be captured here (for a critical review of the overlapping nexi between migration and racialisation, see Erel et al., 2016), this section will be limited to illustrating one aspect of racial profiling as a discriminatory practice used in “sorting” passengers in airports. Woodfield et al (2006) established the following in their study:

... 5 per 10,000 White Northern passengers were issued an IS81 [Authority to detain for examination/further examination]. In contrast, White Southern passengers were stopped at a rate of 38 per 10,000 and Black passengers were stopped at a rate of 86 per 10,000 (17 times the rate for White Northern passengers). For other ethnic groups (Asian, Oriental, Middle Eastern and Mixed Race) the IS81 rates were all around the 14 to 19 per 10,000 level, higher than the rates for the White Northern group but lower than the rates for White Southern and Black passengers (p. 2006, p.30).
Additionally, Woodfield et al (2006) compared the difference between white and non-white passengers from Canada, the USA and South Africa in terms of being stopped for further questioning in the UK. For white Americans, the stop rate is 2 per 10,000, while for ‘non-white’ passengers this rate rose to 5 per 10,000. For white Canadians, the stop rate is 4 per 10,000 but for ‘non-white’ passengers the figure rose to 35. For South African White passengers, the rate the stop rate is 14, whereas for ‘non–white’ passengers this rate rose to 148 per 10,000 (Woodfield et al., 2006, p. 31).

Whilst the markers of ethnicity have clearly guided the decisions of immigration officers in the Woodfield et al. (2006) study, discrimination based on assumptions about the social-economic status of passengers “disproportionately affect poor migrants seeking entry” (Bhui, 2016, p. 373). This is evident not only in point of entry, but also in pre-entry clearance conditions. As Woodfield et al., demonstrate, the decision to grant/deny entry to passengers is based on a range of assumptions that relate to the financial status of the passenger. In other words, class markers are used by immigration officers in order to exclude “the disadvantaged ‘suspect’ poor who threaten established privilege, and who occupy the lower reaches of the ‘global hierarchy of mobility’ (Bauman, 1998, p. 69)” (Bhui, 2016, p. 275). In this respect, Woodfield et al. note:

> Passengers’ appearance and clothing may also be of interest to IOs [Immigration Officers]. Some people ‘look the part’, for example, “smart, well-dressed businessmen” or “American ladies who’ve got loads of jewellery on ... their hair is perfect ... their make up is perfect, and their clothes are really nice”. In these cases, the passengers’ appearance implies confidence and affluence. In other situations, however, passengers who ‘look the part’ may raise concern, such as young women wearing white stiletto shoes and short skirts, who might possibly be involved in prostitution. Passengers with very cheap worn clothing, who look “very impoverished”, may be asked how much money they have brought with them. (Woodfield et al, 2006, p.15)

What is striking about what the study by Woodfield et al. reveals is not just that it reaffirms the view that “class, and more specifically, poverty, has long been associated with problematic mobility and has been central to the process of sorting ... the welcome from the unwelcome” (Weber and Bowling, 2008, p. 363), but rather the “class contempt” it articulates (Webster, 2008). For Webster, “class contempt varies from the subtlest forms of aversion to visceral revulsion, disgust and sneering that serves to project all that is bad and
immoral onto the other, while reciprocally enhancing and confirming the
goodness, self-regard and status of one’s own class” (2008, p.293). This
process of making poverty as the failure to embody a habitus (Bourdieu and
Wacquant, 1992) that is congruent with middle class norms is used to
distinguish between what Bauman (1996) refers to as “tourists” and
“vagabonds”. For tourists, “mobility is the name of the game: one must be able
to move when the needs push or the dreams call. This ability the tourists call
freedom, autonomy or independence, and they cherish it more than anything
else” (p. 12). The vagabound, by contrast, is:

... the tourist’s alter ego – just as the destitute is the alter ego of the rich,
the savage the alter ego of the civilised, or the stranger the alter ego of the
native. Being an alter ego means to serve as a rubbish bin into which all
ineffable premonitions, unspoken fears, secret self-deprecations and guilts
too awesome to be thought of are dumped; to be alter ego means to serve
as a public exposition of the innermost private, as an inner demon to be
publicly exorcised, an effigy in which all that which cannot be suppressed
may be burnt. Alter ego is the dark and sinister backcloth against which the
purified ego may shine. (p.15)

The recent debate in the UK about whether or not international students
should be included in the net migration figures the government wishes to
reduce is a case in point. The bill, which has subsequently been amended to
exclude international students from the migration figures, has been opposed
by a range of institutions. #WeAreInternational, the campaign group which is
supported by many universities and business organisations, declared its firm
“commitment to the UK remaining a welcoming home of global scholarship,
which provides a superb education to the most talented people from around
the world”, and that the inclusion of international students in net migration
figures “could damage the UK’s long standing reputation for leading global
higher education”. Whilst, this sentiment is to be applauded in so far as it
amplifies the voices of the “immigrant”, the economic driver is the guiding
principle, to which the rhetoric of this campaign testifies:

students studying at UK universities bring economic, social and cultural
benefits at a local and national level. Two thirds of British adults (66 per
cent) agree that international students have a positive impact on the local
economies of the towns and cities that they study in, and three in five (59
per cent) agree that the economic contribution of international students
helps create jobs. 61 per cent agree that international students have a
valuable social and cultural impact on the towns and cities they live in...
Non-UK students generate an estimated £11 billion for the economy. EU students alone contributed £3.7bn for the UK economy and supported over 34,000 jobs in all corners of the country.

Bauman’s tourists are welcome as they will “draw upon the sometimes vast resources necessary to make educational mobility happen” (Brookes and Waters, 2011, p. 130) in exchange for the opportunity to accumulate international cultural and social capital. In contrast to this, vagabonds are seen as a “a fiscal liability” (Weber and Bowling, 2008, p.370) and are not worthy of our advocacy.

As noted earlier, the second discriminatory practice is evidenced by the pre-entry clearance visa process. As is the case with the above, the aim is to “manage migration” by selecting and attracting certain categories of “immigrants” that will contribute to the economy of the host country. In the case of pre-entry visa to the USA, Johnson (2009, p.8) suggests that “three features of modern U.S. immigration laws (many more could be added) operate to discriminate—directly or indirectly—on the basis of class: the public-charge exclusion, the per-country caps on immigration, and the limited number of employment visas for low- and moderately-skilled workers”. Accordingly, the Immigration & Nationality Act requires that consular officers consider the following attributes before issuing an entry visa: the applicant’s age, health, family status, assets, resources and financial status, and education and skills. Similarly, to gain entry to the UK, a range of documents need to be submitted to consular staff. In addition to a valid passport, documents relating to the financial status of applicants are given prominence and these include:

Financial documents showing that you have sufficient funds available. These must clearly show that you have access to the funds, such as:

- bank statements
- building society book
- proof of earnings such as a letter from employer confirming employment details
- (start date of employment, salary, role, company contact details) where a third party (who is either in the UK or who will be legally in the UK at the time of your visit) is providing financial support to you e.g. a business, a friend or a relative, documents to show they have sufficient resources to support you in addition to themselves and any dependant family should be provided

(UK Visa and Applications)
In both cases, as Johnston (2009, p. 9) concludes, “prospective entrant must establish that he or she is and will continue to be a member of a particular socioeconomic class—most definitely not poor or likely to ever become poor—to lawfully migrate”.

At the basis of these securitising discursive practices is contradiction, reinforcing the various faces of violence and performing the violence of contradiction itself. This is a violence that is at once overt and hidden, representational and structural, and manifest in the bordering technologies and processes of securitisation.

**Securitisation and the violence of/in contradiction**

In a content analysis of media representation of Europe’s 2015 “refugee crisis”, Greussing et al. (2017) argue that the portrayal of refugees and asylum seekers oscillates between two discourses: A victimisation discourse that conceives of these subjects as “innocent victims… in need of help because of circumstances that lie beyond their own responsibilities” (p. 1751); and a problem discourse that frames them “as invaders and threat to the physical, economic, and cultural well-being of the respective host country” (p. 1751). These arrivals are associated “with illegality, terrorism, and crime …and are accused of draining public resources that would otherwise be granted to members of the host society” (p. 1751). As Muller (2004) suggests, within citizenship and immigration policies, the use of discourses and images of threat to national identity, state sovereignty, social stability and insecurity, represented by “the migrant, refugee, alien, and ‘Other’”, has intensified in recent decades. By invoking the figure of the migrant, refugee and asylum seeker as an “existential threat” (William, 2003, p. 516), these political identities are “securitized”, or made into a “security issue”.

What is of theoretical and political concern about this securitisation is the “representational violence” it entails (Carpi, 2014). According to securitisation theory, the issue of “security” is not an objective condition, but it is both relational and socially-constructed through a regime of “securitizing speech–acts”. That is to say, identities and issues become ‘securitised’ through a range of social processes and representations that “do not simply describe ‘an existing security situation’ (who or what is being secured and from whom), but bring into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such” (William, 2003, p. 513). In securitising the political identities of the migrant, refugee and asylum seeker, what is also played out in its intensity is a further
aspect of “representational violence”, one that seeks to depolicise the figure of the refugee and asylum seeker. Accordingly, these figures are no longer what brings “home distant noises of war and the stench of gutted homes and scorched villages” (Bauman, 2004, p. 76), but rather one that seeks to reify and proclaim a monolith of identities for these alterities as the “unwanted”. Bauman (2004) articulates some of the ways in which the identities of the “unwanted” are cemented:

Overgeneral, unwarranted or even fanciful as the association of terrorists with asylum seekers and ‘economic migrant’ might have been, it did the job: the figure of the ‘asylum seeker’, once prompting human compassion and spurring an urge to help, has been sullied and defiled, while the very idea of ‘asylum’, once a matter of civil and civilized pride, has been reclassified as a dreadful concoction of shameful naivety, and criminal irresponsibility (p.57).

As William (2003, p.519) notes, once these identities are securitised, “their negotiability and flexibility are challenged, denied, or suppressed”.

One aspect of the securitisation of immigration is that which is referred to as the criminalisation of immigration (Aas, 2011; Huysmans, 2006; Stumpf, 2007). In this tenor, the criminal justice system and the immigration law converge (Aas and Bosworth, 2013; Stumpf, 2006; Turnbull and Hasselberg, 2016), and alter the nature of the judicial status of citizenship and “illegality”, as well as the relationship of the individual to the state (De Genova 2002, p. 422). In the UK, for example, successive governments have introduced a range of increasingly repressive legislation that has shifted the context of ‘immigration’ to the domain of criminal law. Whilst a detailed chronology of the various legislation that contributed to this convergence falls outside the remit of this article, some of the crucial legislations that provided the legal framework need noting. This framework supports and informs the cultural context for the criminalisation of the immigrant.

**Historical notes on law, securitisation and bordering**

As a historical exercise, it is noteworthy that Cherti (2014) provides a useful chronology of legislation relating to immigration in the UK from 1904 to 2014. According to Cherti (2014), the criminalisation of “irregular” immigration was first introduced in the Immigration Act 1971, but this criminalisation has intensified from 1997 till the present. The 1971 Immigration Act configured the category of the “illegal entrant”, constituted as a “person unlawfully entering...
or seeking to enter in breach of a deportation order or the immigration laws and including also a person who has so entered” (cited in Cherti, 2014, p. 5). Various legislations have followed this legal direction, however the intensity and “the frenzy of law making activity” (Cherti, 2014, p. 10) has signalled a greater reliance on the criminal justice system and the associated penal institutions and agencies with respect to immigration. Some of the official pronouncements have explicitly advocated and justified the resort to criminal law. For instance, Jack Straw, Home Secretary from 1997-2001, stated that “the enforcement [of immigration rules] must be backed by the national law” (cited in Cherti, 2014, p. 11). Similarly, in the 1988 green paper, *Fairer, Faster and Firmer*, states that “the criminal law has a role to play in stamping out abuse of immigration control” (Home Office 1998, cited in Cherti, 2014, p.11). To this effect, a number of legislations have added 84 new types of immigration offences, compared with only 70 that were introduced between 1905 and 1998 (Aliverti, 2012). These new “offences” can be classified “as supporting different purposes”, such as the removal and the detection of “offenders”. In legal terms, the failure to comply with specific duties on the part of the “immigrant” is treated as an offence. For instance, “failure to attend and give evidence or produce documents before an immigration judge, the failure by a detainee to submit to medical examination and the failure to supply information requested by the authorities, by employers or financial institutions” (Aliverti, 2012, p. 421) incurs criminal sanctions, leading to deportation. The second group of offences serves the purpose of detection. These replicate existing laws such as deception and document fraud, including false identity documents.

As it stands, the list of new immigration offences or the “hyper-criminalisation” of immigration (Aliverti, 2012) covers a number of activities (see the UK’s Crown Prosecution Service for a list of these offences). Underscoring the enduring process of criminalisation is socio-political context. In the UK, for example, this frenzy of restrictive and criminalising legislation, as Aliverti (2012) argues, needs to be understood as the government’s “response to public pressure to bring immigration under control” (p. 421). This move is against the background of “increasing social anxieties about the steady dismantling of the welfare state, the erosion of social security protections and the restructuring of the labour market” (p. 421). Similarly, the rise of nationalist popul(ar)ism (Gamal and Swanson, 2017) has led to, as noted before, “the theatrics of propping up sovereignty” (Brown, 2010) through devising and implementing draconian immigration legislation. As Garland
(2001) suggests, by resorting to the criminal justice system, this reaction is “acting out” what can be understood as “a form of denial or evasion by the State that, conscious about the impossibility of or difficulties in solving a particular problem—such as reducing crime, improving social conditions or managing immigration, adopts more criminal legislation” (Garland, 2001, p. 131, cited in Aliverti, 2012, p. 421). This shoring up of sovereignty, “acting out”, and the violence it entails, can perhaps be better illustrated by Theresa May’s pronouncement of creating measures to “give illegal migrants a really hostile reception” (Home Secretary May in The Telegraph 2012) by creating “a hostile environment”. This approach is joined with the practices and performances of everyday ‘bordering and ordering’ (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018), that enacts material, representational and symbolic violences against the non-citizen Other.

Immigration, criminalization, and (de)citizenship discourses

The discursive and political coupling of immigration and criminalisation, as well as the legal and legislative framework that undergirds it, occasions a shift in thinking about mobility. In contrast to a hegemonic neoliberal discourse of global citizenship that conceives of mobility as unfettered, the criminalisation of migration (‘crimmigration’) recasts mobility “as a criminal act, to which the appropriate state response is punitive and carceral” (Griffiths, 2017, p. 535). Related to this approach is that discussion of global citizenship necessarily engenders a corresponding discussion of the precarity and vulnerability exacted in the mobility of certain political identities, as constructed by the legal framework noted earlier. As Ettlinger (2007, p. 322) suggests, “precarity lies in the unpredictability of terror, which can emanate from a wide range of contexts”. It is “engendered by a wide range of processes” and “extends across space and time and also materializes (differently) in social, economic, political, and cultural spheres” (p. 324). The resort to an assemblage of securitisation technologies and criminal law–prosecution, conviction and imprisonment–in rendering the mobility of the “Other” intelligible by situating it within “a different moral, ethical and legal framework for dealing with non-citizens” (Bosworth and Guild, 2008, p. 712), brings to light the precarity it installs within the system, which becomes manifest in the practice of indefinite detention and deportation.

As De Genova (2013) argues, border policing and immigration procedures as well as various immobile structures, render visible the spectacle of
“illegality”. Similarly, these practices and structures render visible and elevate to the status of ‘the real’ the threat posed by the non-citizen. Zembylas (2009) argues nevertheless that in making ‘migrants’ visible, what is rendered invisible is that many of their rights are being violated. These violations range from the state practicing a deliberate policy of destitution of groups that are highly vulnerable (Darling, 2009), including prevention of access to work, education, health care and housing (Tyler, 2006), to detention and deportation.

Within the UK context, the resort to the detention of “unwanted” non-citizens remains an administrative issue and its legality “is determined administratively” (Costello, 2015, p. 144). To appreciate the scale of the resort to detention, the following commentary highlights research commissioned by the UK Bar Council:

The UK has one of the largest immigration detention systems in Europe. There are around 3,400 people being held in immigration detention, and the numbers have increased considerably over the last decade. There are nine dedicated ‘Immigration Removal Centres’ around the UK, many run by private, profit-making security contractors, using detainee labour at wages as low as £1 per hour to augment their competitive edge. Some 14% of immigration detainees are held in prisons, typically after serving a custodial sentence. Around 30,000 people spend widely varying lengths of time in immigration detention centres each year, indeed some people spend several years in detention, as there is no time limit (Lindley, 2017, p.4).

As Costello (2015) notes, there are “many troubling aspects” of immigration detention in the UK. Amongst these, she outlines a number of “procedural deficits” such as the fact that “there is no requirement for judicial approval or review for detention to be lawful. The legality of detention is determined administratively. Bail applications may be brought, but these do not review the legality of detention as such, and many detainees do not bring these applications” (p. 144). In contrast to this, “in some other jurisdictions, judges review the legality of detention automatically at regular intervals”. Further, the UK immigration detention system “may be indefinite in duration—there is no legal outer time limit for detention” (p.144). The legal justification for immigration detention, compared with other forms of deprivation of liberty, does not seem to be “constrained by human rights law” (Costello, 2015, p. 143). Thus, in the absence of grounds for the deprivation of liberty, immigration detention entails forms of detention that are “highly suspect”: preventive detention (to prevent the detainee from engaging in a particular
conduct in the future), coercive detention (to ensure compliance on the part of the detainee with legal requirement) and punitive detention (to be meted out after conviction of a crime) (Costello, 2015, p.146). In the absence of judicial safeguards as previously outlined, the figure of the detainee is cast in “the condition of luminal drift”:

...with no way of knowing whether it is transitory or permanent. Even if they are stationary for a time, they are on a journey that is never completed since its destination (arrival or return) remains forever unclear, while a place they could call ‘final’ remains forever inaccessible. They are never to be free from the gnawing sense of the transience, indefiniteness and provisional nature of any settlement. (Bauman, 2004, p. 76)

Taken together, these practices of privation, “deliberate policy of destitution”, the suspension of due process, and the normalisation of the violence of the state, symbolic and material, that these entail, might reflect Agamben's (1998) categorisation of “bare life”, as a figure “outside the law” (Darling, 2009, p. 650). Agamben conceives of “bare life” in reference to the “homo sacer” of Roman Law: the banned – the figure who can be killed and is yet not worthy of sacrifice. This figure is denied “the rights of the politicised citizen” at the same time as it “acts to assert the authority of the sovereign through their exclusion from politicised life” (Darling, p. 651). That is to say, the reduction to “bare life”, an existence stripped of its political significance, entails a double violence in its relationship to the political: “first, in the form of the exclusion from the polis—it is included in the political in the form of exclusion—and, second, in the form of the unlimited exposure to violation, which does not count as a crime” (Ziarek, 2008, p. 90). The detention centre is thus the Agambian camp, which is a space “opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule. In the camp, the state of exception ... is now given a permanent spatial arrangement, which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order” (Agamben, 1998, p. 169, original emphasis, cited in Darling, 2009, p. 652). Similarly, as William (2002, p. 286) suggests, the detention centre or camp “delivers surplus humanity into a zone of indistinction, invoking a near permanent state of emergency to place its subjects indefinitely ‘on hold’ on the edge of the juridical order—all so that the sovereign system of states and its division of citizens to states can be re-established”. As a site of violence and violation of rights, the detention centre is the space in which the “homo sacer”—who is “no longer recognised as ‘legitimate’ or worthy of the right to exist in the UK” (Darling, 2009, p. 651) - is abandoned. As Mills (2004, p.42) avers, for Agamben, “the originary relation of
the law to life is not application, but abandonment” (cited in Darling, 2009, p. 651). Further, such abandonment acts as a violent force to refuse “those whose lives it controls” from any “politically valid response”. It therefore “operates as a form of technologised administration” (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005, p. 23, cited in Darling, 2009, p. 651).

If detention acts as a “sovereign act of abandonment which places individuals outside the law” (Darling, 2009, p. 652), whilst simultaneously inside its territory, deportation as “a normalised and quotidian part of immigration and social control” (Anderson, et al., 2011) articulates a further instance of state violence, which is enacted through the processes for constructing “the deportable subject” (Anderson, et al., 2011, p.552). In this vein, the rise of the “deportation state” (Anderson, et al., 2011, p. 552) and the increasing reliance on criminal justice techniques to forcibly remove people, “establishes, in a particularly powerful and definitive way, that an individual is not fit for citizenship or even further residence in the society in question” (Anderson, et al., 2011, p. 548). The hyper-criminalisation (Aliverti, 2012) of the non-citizen engendered by the reclassification of the mobility and behaviour of migrants “from immigration to criminal matters” has led to an increase in the number of immigration offences and ‘crimes’ that particularly “likely to be, or can only be, committed by non-citizens such as entering the country without a valid identity document, not cooperating with removal and working without permission.” (Griffiths, 2017, p. 536). The deportable subject - instituted in the legal and legislative process - is constituted, in De Genova’s (2013) terms, as “citizenship’s obscene supplement... mobilized as an alarming signal of estrangement” and one that “supplies the proxy for reactionary populist paroxysms of exclusionary animosity” (p. 1194).

This state of play raises two issues: The first relates to the re-figuring of the status of the very being of the deportee. That is to say, in casting the deportee as “a criminal” and deportation as a measure that reveals a person’s “‘criminal lifestyle’ or ‘criminal character’” (Griffiths, 2017), the “incontestably and indelibly criminal” (Griffiths, 2017, p. 531) renders rehabilitation impossible. This symbolic, and hence also representational, violence has shifted the focus “from people’s specific, verified actions, to their being: from incidents to persona” (Griffiths, 2017, p. 542). Thus, whilst prison “(in part) punishes behavior”, deportation “punishes presence and being” (Griffiths, 2017, p. 542). In this manner, as Aliverti (2012, p. 429) suggests, “criminal punishment is then redundant and unfit to deal with immigration offenders. The actual role of
criminal punishment in relation to the individual offenders is emptied of content”.

The second issue relates to deportation as “a technology of citizenship” (Walters, 2002, p. 288). That is to say, as Bosworth and Guild (2008: 317) suggest, deportation has a “constitutive role to play, both in formulating an ideal of the British citizen and in establishing the borders of the nation state. Citizenship in this mode is both “formal and normative” (Anderson, 2014, p. 3). As a formal entity, citizenship entails a legal status of rights and responsibilities exercised within a polity. As a normative entity, citizenship is a “marker of identification” (Hindess, 2000, p. 1487) to a community of value that is populated “not simply by Citizens, but by Good Citizens, imagined law-abiding and hard-working members of stable and respectable families” (Anderson, 2014, p. 3). Deportation, thus, “affirms the political community’s idealised view of what membership should (or should not) mean” (Anderson, et al., 2011, p.548). This raises the question of the nature of the normative political community articulated in school curricula, citizenship tests, ceremonies, deportation and “British values”. Perhaps more importantly, deportation and deprivation of citizenship as Fargues (2017: 884) suggests should be seen as an effort to ‘renationalise’ citizenship by reasserting that national membership is a privilege that states can take back”. This conditionality renders naturalised citizens highly insecure as: “tolerated as ‘eternal guests’ on probation but forever vulnerable to rejection “(Griffith, 2017, p. 530).

**Conclusions**

The normative political community, and the “lines of exteriority” (Nancy, 1992, p.393) it is attempting to uphold through a range of legal and socio-political practices, has thrown into sharp relief the violence of exclusion as the bare “working of injustice” (Nancy, 1992, p.392). Practices such the securitisation, hyper-criminalisation of identities, and the resort to a punitive rationality in governing and disciplining certain political identities are violent and exclusionary in so far as they entail border operations, such as detention without time-limit or judicial reviews, deportation, citizenship stripping and banishment. By juxtaposing these practices with the discourses of global citizenship, this article has attempted to open a critical space to recast the global citizen and its alterities in relational terms and to rethink them in their “intimate doubleness” (Nancy, 1992, p. 392). In other words, the alterities of the global citizen, which the normative political “community wants to exclude
[and with which it] does not let itself be identified” (Nancy, 1992, p. 393) are “nothing other than the in...or the ‘in-between’” (Nancy, 1992, p. 393, emphasis in original). Concomitantly, in its attempt to exclude the figure of the alterities of the global citizen, such a community “excludes its own foundations” (Nancy, 1992, p. 393).

At the same time, in privileging the neoliberal framing of global citizenship, what is glossed over is the precarisation of the alterities of the global citizen. This lack of acknowledgment of the “Other” and his/her precarious condition (Markell 2003), entails “the revelation of oneself as having denied or distorted [the] relationship” (Cavell, 1999, p. 428) with said Other. This denial, whilst it becomes “a medium of injustice” (Markell, 2003, p. 2) by “closing off some people’s practical possibilities for the sake of other people’s sense of ... invulnerability” (Markell, 2003, p. 2), is significant in so far as it shifts the discussion of precariousness from a focus on the alterities of the global citizenship to the structural sources that bring forth this lack of acknowledgement, including the meaning of this lack for those “who commit or benefit from it” Markell (2003, p. 21). These relationalities that construct alterity and exclusion in relation to the global citizen are also intersectional, and are impacted by class, race, gender and other complexly interrelated social difference discourses.

In returning to Hannah Arendt’s critique of the construct of ‘human rights’, support can be given to her assertion that a new focus on the ‘the countryless refugee’ offers an opportunity for the development of a new paradigm of historical consciousness. The shift from human rights to citizenship rights is a marker of our times. Citizen rights give credence to neoliberal discourses of the nation state, hyper-securitisation, the global conflicts of international relations framed within the operations of global capitalism, and global citizenship in its neoliberal mode. A number of violences are performed through global citizenship operations in its neoliberal modality. These are material, representational, and symbolic in nature, amongst other violences performed. Global citizenship in the veins of liberal humanism and, more so, neoliberalism has come to represent those violences while acting to hide them, inflecting its own contradictions. The centralising of the ‘figure of the refugee’ may well offer an opportunity to render speakable the plight of the refugee/non-citizen/unwanted Other, if it is accorded the space and attention of critical political consciousness. For this to happen, strains of global citizenship, and by extrapolation – global citizenship education, that silence and neutralise the alterities of global citizenship need being unpacked,
revealed, and contested. In Butlerian terms, the question of whose life is grievable, needs to be asked in correspondence with whose freedom of mobility is possible, and whose global citizenship, and global citizenship education, can be enacted for whom. The privilege afforded the global citizen in whose name the unwanted migratory Other is made intelligible, is one propped up by an architecture of bordering, one which marks the contradiction of global citizenship in this modality as a fatal flaw (Swanson, 2016).

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#WeAreInternational: Available:  