Two concepts of power: Knowledge (re)production in English history education discourse

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Introduction

English history teachers have long prided themselves on the centrality of disciplinary knowledge to their pedagogy and practice (Counsell, 2011; Smith, 2019). From at least the 1970s, the view that children should learn not just accounts of the past, but the processes through which these accounts are constructed, has been something of a guiding philosophy in curriculum planning. However, in a recent paper (Smith and Jackson, 2017), we suggested that this professional unanimity was fracturing somewhat and that two distinct positions – radical social realism (RSR) and traditional social realism (TSR) – had emerged. While both positions clung to the importance of disciplinary knowledge to teachers’ planning, TSRs were increasingly coming to the view that disciplinary knowledge should not be a curricular end in itself, but rather an important outcome which emerged from rigorous attention to more concrete forms of knowledge.

Where our 2017 paper had restricted itself to discussion of historical knowledge and its acquisition by children, this chapter goes further in suggesting that these epistemic arguments are intimately related to questions of power and the purpose of schooling. This chapter extends our two types of social realism, but, in doing so, recognises that this is a typology under formation. Consequently, we present what we see as ideal types around which ideas are seeming to coalesce. In doing so, we are not seeking to characterise the educational philosophy of particular
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thinkers on history education, but rather sketching the limits of the nebulae which may one day form recognisable points in the sky. While our argument is tentative, we remain hopeful that the terms and concepts that we propose will be useful to others in helping to understand the shifting ground in English history education.

Our chapter begins with a discussion of social realism and its relationship to the history curriculum before considering the ways in which this served to unite the English history teaching profession in the years between the first English National Curriculum in 1991 and the most recent in 2013. The chapter then identifies some of the fracture lines along which this consensus broke and discusses these in political, pedagogic and epistemic terms. At each point we will not only identify what distinguishes the TSR and RSR positions from each other, but also what distinguishes each from the more familiar concepts of ‘traditional’ and ‘progressive’ education. Our chapter concludes with some reflection on the utility of these terms and possible future directions for history education in England.

Social realism in overview

Social realism emerged in the early 2000s as a theoretical response to new approaches in curriculum making championed by supranational bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2005). To social realists, these new curricula were too eager to emphasise transferable ‘skills’ at the expense of knowledge and too ready to erode boundaries between school subjects (Young, 2008). In essence, social realism postulated that although subject disciplines were socially constructed, they reflected real domains of knowledge which existed independent of our social understanding of them. To social realists, disciplines evolved according to conventions and habits which were socially determined but these conventions were realist in orientation – they aspired to know the world ‘out there’ better. In a 2010 paper, Young and Muller considered the impact of these insights for the school curriculum and suggested three possible futures for schooling, which were later given a book-length treatment (Young et al., 2014).

Future 1 is described as ‘inherited from the nineteenth century’ (Young et al., 2014: 58). It is a curriculum in which subject disciplines were sacrosanct, the pedagogy behaviourist, and success defined in terms of university entrance. In opposition to this, Future 2 covers various ‘alternative’ or ‘progressive’ models of education which challenge the
domination of disciplines and are, in various ways, learner-centred. These curricula, the authors argue, ‘celebrate the experience of the pupils, whatever that may be rather than the idea that the purpose of schools is to introduce them to knowledge beyond their experience’ (Young et al., 2014: 62). While Future 1 assumes that knowledge is set, it is given to us through tradition and that it is beyond question, Future 2 makes the exact opposite error, it concludes that since all knowledge is socially constructed, it is impossible to choose between competing accounts on rational grounds. Future 3 is offered as a resolution to this invidious choice wherein knowledge is constructed in specialist disciplinary teams. This knowledge is fallible but ‘subjects … [are] the most reliable tools we have for enabling students to acquire knowledge and make sense of the world’ (Young et al., 2014: 67).

**Social realism and history**

The attraction of a Future 3 curriculum to history educators was obvious. History, almost by definition, deals in uncertainties, inferences and probabilities. The idealised historian is avowedly modernist – she puts forward her best account but accepts the contingency of this account and awaits rebuttal with Popperian eagerness. In turn, this ideal has informed what school children are taught – that it is in the nature of historical accounts to disagree, that the conclusions we reach are a product of the questions we ask and the evidence we use. This social realist (Future 3) conception of knowledge has formed the basis of history curriculum planning in England since the work of the Schools’ Council History Project in the 1970s (Schools History Project, 1976; Rogers, 1979). Despite periodic accusations that such lessons represent a relativist free-for-all (Deuchar, 1989; McGovern, 2007), history teachers became adept at exploring with their pupils the limits of interpretation and the nature of ‘better’ and ‘worse’ accounts.

Furthermore, this strong theoretical basis to curriculum planning proved exceptionally useful to teachers. When the first National Curriculum was written in the early 1990s, history teachers resisted a list of prescribed knowledge using arguments about the nature of the discipline. Phillips (1998; 77) quoted the independent Chair of the History Curriculum Working Group (HWG) at the time:

I had my eyes opened by the HWG. I had lived with history and had been taught the subject in a very old-fashioned way. Then when
I heard the arguments put forward by HWG members it came as something of a culture shock. I became impressed with many of the arguments which I never knew existed.

Much later, in 2013, when the UK Conservative government attempted to introduce a curriculum which discarded these ideas, history teachers united in opposition (Smith, 2017, 2019). Again, this opposition was marked by sophisticated depoliticised defences of the subject in epistemic terms. The arguments proved persuasive and the curriculum was withdrawn.

Although decades in the making, the consensus among history teachers began to fracture in the years after 2013. These divergent ideas can be seen most clearly in the pages of Teaching History, the professional journal of history teachers in England and Wales. During the 2013 curriculum contestation, the journal had been the vanguard of opposition to core-knowledge curricula (Smith, 2017), and throughout its history, editorials and articles in the journal had advanced the long-standing view that children co-constructed meanings from history. By 2018, the editorial tone of the journal had changed significantly: ‘a focus on the provisional nature of knowledge, and the need for pupils to understand its construction through evidence, argument, and interpretation, swiftly became establishment orthodoxy’ (Counsell et al., 2018: 2).

The long-standing consensus had now been re-framed as an ‘orthodoxy’ imposed by a putative ‘establishment’. This is a curious characterisation of the preceding decades of history curriculum making. First, the ‘orthodoxy’ being questioned here was never imposed from outside, it was the product of decades of internal debates within the history-teaching community. Second, it is by no means clear who the ‘the establishment’ in this narrative are. The term surely cannot refer to government and policymakers who had been so effectively rebuffed in previous curriculum contestations. In any case, this editorial casts doubt on one of the foundational principles of modern history-curriculum design: that the most interesting kinds of knowledge in history are provisional and, indeed, that it is this very falsifiability which elevates them above the certitude of more spurious accounts of the past.

While almost all history teachers in England continue to subscribe to the Future 3 conception of the subject, it is clear in this editorial (Counsell et al 2018) that some history teachers are now concerned that the pendulum has swung too far in favour of child-centredness. These writers (whom we have termed traditional social realists or TSRs) argue for a return to a rigorous focus on children writing better history and
seek to combine Young’s Future 3 with aspects of the Future 1-oriented core knowledge arguments of E. D. Hirsch (Murray, 2017). Against this position are the group we term ‘radical social realists’ (RSRs) who argue that the dangers posed by the narrow conception of knowledge and false certitude of Future 1, outweigh the dangers posed by the child-centredness of Future 2. For RSRs, the role of the individual in making sense of the past is necessarily central and non-negotiable: curricula do not exist without someone to teach and someone to learn. In effect, this dispute is one of the lesser of two evils: for TSRs the potential for children to construct idiosyncratic epistemic frames in a curriculum which seeks to relate knowledge to the everyday, is a greater danger than the risks of devaluing or denigrating children’s lived experience. RSRs take the opposite view: that not taking due account of children’s everyday knowledge positions them as deficient and risks alienation from the knowledge we seek (alongside TSRs) to develop.

The differences and commonalities between the two positions can be shown diagrammatically (Figure 7.1).

It is apparent from Figure 7.1 that a core commitment to disciplinary knowledge and the liberating effects of an historical education continue

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**Figure 7.1** Differences and similarities between traditional and radical social realism (Author, 2021)
to unite the two positions. However, it is similarly apparent that important differences exist. These can be considered under three subheadings:

- Political differences – The purpose of the curriculum;
- Pedagogical differences – The child and the curriculum; and
- Epistemic differences – Knowledge and the curriculum.

Although it is necessary to disaggregate these differences for the purposes of discussion, it is important to remember that each of these positions – TSR and RSR – form a total system with respect to education. The diagrams in Figure 7.2 attempt to illustrate these systems but fall foul of all the limitations associated with capturing dynamic processes in static form.

**Political differences – The purpose of the curriculum**

The top and bottom lines of each diagram in Figure 7.2 show us the purposes of the curriculum in each conception: the top line gives the overall purpose of education, while the bottom line gives the purpose of history specifically within that. Thus, on the one hand we have a radical social realist position which aspires to social change through an emphasis on developing children’s historical consciousness, while in the traditional social realist position the aspiration is that children who can think historically might succeed within society as currently constituted.
The TSR position is more limited and therefore easier to explain. A common criticism of existing forms of curriculum is that their ‘lack’ of hard knowledge disadvantages children in state education relative to their counterparts in private education who benefit from curricula more focused on traditional forms of knowledge. The danger with existing progressive forms of national curricula, it is argued, is that children are denied access to the kinds of knowledge which allow them to participate in society’s conversation. As a result, inequality becomes entrenched as the elite (with access to elite knowledge gained in elite schools) continue to dominate society’s conversation while the majority are excluded. In support of this argument, traditionalists and TSRs cite dominance of the privately educated in politics, the media and the judiciary (Wheelahan, 2010). The logic of this argument is simplistic, but compelling: since the upper echelons of society are dominated by the graduates of elite schools, more schools should seek to emulate the curricula of these schools. In this conception, the purpose of schooling is social mobility, and the mechanism for social mobility is rigorous thinking within existing disciplines – in our case historical thinking. If children can be made better at history (and other subjects) then success in national examinations will follow, allowing greater access to the elite. It is increasingly apparent that the TSR position is becoming the accepted interpretation of Young’s work, in the popular consciousness at least. In an article for The Guardian newspaper, for example, his ideas are boiled down to the sentence ‘social justice demands that children from low-income backgrounds have as much access to knowledge as their advantaged peers’ (Wilby, 2018: 36).

It is worth pausing here to emphasise how this position differs from thoroughgoing educational traditionalism of the Future 1 variety. For traditionalists, power, wealth and societal influence are simply a function of one’s knowledge. In 2010, the UK Education Secretary made this case in a speech to the Conservative Party Conference, saying, ‘the accumulation of cultural capital – the acquisition of knowledge – is the key to social mobility’ (Gove, 2013). In other words, to traditionalists ‘the more you know, the more successful you will be’. In contrast, the TSR position prizes disciplinary expertise above the mere accumulation of cultural capital. Consequently, TSRs can be critical of lists of inert inherited knowledge, while still asserting that rigorous subjection of oneself to disciplinary norms and specific items of knowledge will engender social mobility.

How, then, do these positions differ from the radical social realist position? First, the purpose of education is manifestly different. For RSRs, the existing societal arrangements are not a rationally ordered
hierarchy which one can simply ‘move’ upwards through. For RSRs – drawing on a critical pedagogy tradition – education must aspire to social change. Children today are entitled to feel fatalistic about the world they live in – theirs are lives lived against a backdrop of bad news: the normalisation of racism within political discourse, the bleaching of coral reefs and the environmentally enforced displacement of millions of people. History educators must ask what it can offer to children in this society. The promise that they will ‘get better at history’ (the limits of traditional social realist aspiration) is not enough. Even academic success – once a guarantee of security in adult life – now means little as stable employment and the dream of home ownership petrify as quaint fossils of twentieth-century optimism.

RSR aspires to more than this. At its heart is a view that history has been marked by societal change and that these changes are, in part, effected by human beings. In this tradition, there is something absurd about teaching children about the decline of feudalism, the Reformation and the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics while simultaneously implying that our society as currently organised is underpinned by some ineffable permanence. The radical social realist view holds that disciplinary knowledge is powerful and that these disciplines do broaden how people see the world, but it refuses to take the logical leap that it is this knowledge, in itself, which necessarily gives the powerful their power. In fact, despite their knowledge-rich educations, figures in positions of power delight in making pronouncements and reaching decisions which are utterly divorced from rigorous and informed disciplinary thinking. There is, RSRs suggest, something disingenuous about suggesting that children need only play by the rules and submit themselves to disciplines in order to achieve power in society, when those who actually hold power in society seem unable (or unwilling) to do so themselves.

A radical social realist position refuses to place children in deficit because they possess different knowledge to the elite. This is no defence of a hollowed-out ‘skills-based’ or ‘competency-based’ Future 2 curriculum, but it is a Freirean view that children must ‘read the world’ before they can ‘read the word’. This is not an education focused on what Young calls ‘everyday knowledge’, but it is an education which connects everyday knowledge to ‘powerful knowledge’. In doing so, it positions powerful disciplinary knowledge as something useful and knowable through the everyday, rather than something obscure and esoteric.

Knowledge is powerful if it confers on children the confidence to effect change. The TSR position sees change at an individual level through personal advancement and an improved standard of living.
This social mobility, it is hoped, will result in more working-class people in positions of influence and so bring about social justice in the longer term (Wheelahan, 2010). In conflating social mobility with social justice, there is always the risk of reifying existing societal arrangements. That is to say, the TSR argument suggests that there is nothing systemically which reinforces and reproduces inequality, rather it is simply a matter that the elite is made up of the ‘wrong’ people. While RSRs would agree that a diversification of the elite in terms of race, class and gender would be welcome, this still supposes that society is organised in the most rational way that it could be.

This faith in the fundamental rationality of societal arrangements stems, in part, from teachers’ and academics’ personal success within this system. Teachers are, by definition, people who succeeded at (and enjoyed) school. Since they are also people who enjoy a position of some comfort in society, it is not hard to see how faith in academic disciplines and academic success as a driver of social justice takes root. Friere (1985:18) explained this positionality thus:

Many teachers unfortunately have been destroyed by the dominant ideology of a society and they tend to impose that way of seeing the world and behaving on kids. They usually view it as ‘saving’ kids, as a missionary would. This tendency stems from a superiority complex.

Friere’s analysis is not perfect – TSRs do not see teachers as rescuing pupils, rather they believe that knowledge can save pupils. To TSRs a knowledge-rich curriculum is intrinsically inspirational, opening minds and opening doors and spurring children to succeed. RSRs are more cautious: knowledge-rich approaches might inspire some children, but risk alienating and isolating many others. These arguments are reminiscent of the dispute between Adler (1982) and Noddings (1983) over the former’s recommendation of a Paideia curriculum. For his part, Adler quotes Dewey in arguing that ‘the best education for the best is the best education for all’ before adding his own addendum that ‘the shape of the best education for the best is not unknown to us’. For Adler, this best education is a traditional knowledge-rich curriculum organised in disciplines. In opposition, Noddings (1983: 84–5) argued that this curriculum would serve only to entrench inequality:

In my own secondary schooling, I participated in a program very like the one that Adler outlines. I loved it. I was completely
captivated by Caesar’s Gallic Wars, geometry, trigonometric identities, and even Cicero’s essay on old age. It was not until years later that I learned about the utter misery most of my classmates endured in the ‘same’ environment … No special effort or even genius teaching would have brought most of my classmates into fair competition with me. Whatever they did, however they improved, I would have done more of it and at a higher level. It was not that I was ‘better’ than they, I was interested in the sort of material the school wanted me to learn.

As the dispute between Noddings and Adler shows, we have been here before: knowledge might inspire, but it also alienates. In terms of history, Shemilt (1980) from the same period reveals exactly the sort of disenchantment that Noddings fears. When a boy was asked by Shemilt (1980: 22) whether his life was part of history, he replied ‘No, not in Castleford, maybe if I lived down south.’

Traditionalists and TSRs alike are fond of framing their arguments in the context of social mobility. An important part of ‘getting on’ in society is knowing as much (or possibly knowing the same) as the people who hold power. RSRs find such a simplistic interpretation of knowledge deeply troubling. Power might not, as more radical post-structuralists argue, confer the ability to create what is true and what is not, but it unequivocally does confer the power to determine which things we talk about and which we do not. For RSRs powerful knowledge is the ability to see the ways in which the bounds of legitimate discourse and the facts that ‘everyone knows’ are constructed by those in power. Once this noble aspiration is abandoned, RSRs suggest, history is robbed of its most precious gift.

Pedagogical differences – The child and the curriculum

As we have seen, the TSR view positions children as individuals learning and mobilising knowledge to their own benefit in order to ‘succeed’ in school and, by extension, society more generally. In contrast, the RSR view is more open to diverse forms of knowledge and in exploring and utilising the funds of knowledge which children bring to the classroom. In many ways, this debate parallels the distinction that Seixas (2017) made between ‘historical thinking’ which he says is valorised in the ‘British tradition’ of history teaching and the concept of ‘historical consciousness’ seen in continental conceptions of the subject.
In Britain, Seixas argues, history education research has tended to focus on the empirical question of progression in children’s historical understanding. The central question for British researchers has been – ‘How can children be helped to get better at history?’ This tradition has generated important insights such as the progression models devised by Shemilt (1983) and those offered by Lee and Ashby (2000). As important as this research is, it leaves unanswered (or rather unasked) the more philosophical question of why children ought to learn history at all. This is not to imply that these researchers are uninterested in the question of purpose (see Lee, 1992, 2011), just that such questions are not the focus of the research tradition. Instead, the importance of history is taken for granted: the historical discipline becomes something ‘out there’ to be learned and internalised by the child. This limited focus on ‘getting better at history’ guides the TSR position: since disciplines are intrinsically powerful, one only needs to ask how children might use them better.

In contrast, the question of purpose is at the centre of the Germanophone tradition of historical consciousness and, in turn, RSR. Derived from the work of Jörn Rüsen, historical consciousness places the knower at the centre of historical understanding rather than the Western historical method. Such a view does not denude the importance of the historical method as our best tool for knowing about the past, but it does remind us that historical knowledge is not created by the historical method itself, but by humans using this method. In terms of schooling, the implications of this are profound. An historical education becomes something more than an education in disciplinary methods and foundational concepts, it becomes an education in thinking about what these mean in the present. Duquette has described historical consciousness as ‘the understanding of the present, thanks to the interpretation of the past which allows us to consider the future’ (Duquette, 2015, cited in Seixas, 2017: 63). In centring the knower, the child simultaneously learns about the past and comes to see himself as an historical actor in his own right. Both TSRs and RSRs see the historical method as an essential tool in the child coming to know about the world, but to RSRs, schooling must aspire to more than examination success, university entry or a good job. Jason Todd (2014: 157) puts it thus ‘Simply conveying how history works is not enough. Any attempt at emancipatory task design must also involve learners in the construction of knowledge.’

To RSRs, this focus on the present – and on the child in the present – is crucial. Whether we like it or not, humans do not store historical knowledge in a mental silo, they use its insights and ‘lessons’ to inform how they conceive the world. The traditional social realist view abdicates
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Responsibility to consider how children deploy historical knowledge and holds that, if they can understand the past ‘better’ then they might understand the present ‘better’ too. In contrast, the RSR view demands a focus on how children use the past. By centring the child as the user of the academic historical method this position obliterates the sharp distinction which some social realists elevate between ‘powerful’ and ‘everyday’ knowledge. For example, quantitative research in the Netherlands explored how children mobilised historical knowledge in understanding contemporary issues and concluded that children are more likely to see history as useful or relevant to them if teachers attend to the links between historical phenomena and contemporary analogues (Van Straaten et al., 2019).

From a TSR perspective, however, this idea of relevance which Dutch researchers seek to develop is, itself, problematic. Rejecting the view that history need necessarily connect to the everyday, they argue instead for history as a bounded discipline. Fordham (2018) has been particularly clear on this point and it is worth quoting him at length:

We know that children are not empty vessels or blank slates, but what then are the implications of this for teaching? The most common response, and with some justification, is that teachers should attempt to relate the new knowledge being taught to what children already know. In some circles, this is framed as ‘drawing on a child’s experience’. It is a position frequently associated with the idea of relevance: we make things meaningful to children when we make them relevant, and relevance means relating to a child’s experience.

The mistake here is to think that new things that are learnt have to be linked to everyday experience, as opposed to what children already know. The assumption that new knowledge within the domain should be linked to something learnt beyond the domain results in questions like ‘Was Henry VII a gangster?’ This question is nearly meaningless in historical terms, and indeed could easily result in anachronistic misconceptions. Yet it is a question type that is quite common – and indeed seen in some published resources – precisely because it takes something which is supposedly distant and abstract (e.g. a king who lived half a millennium ago) with something that children can ‘relate to’ (e.g. gangsters).

However, from an RSR view, it is not at all clear why these two approaches are presented as an ‘either/or’ rather than a ‘both/and’. There are, we would suggest, meaningful parallels to be drawn between phenomenon
and concepts in the past and those in the present. To some extent this relates to the question of what the ‘proper’ level of substantive concept teachers should use when they are designing learning experiences. In the TSR view, the concept under formation here is medieval kingship and insights from early medieval kingship are useful in illuminating late medieval kingship. This, however, seems curiously narrow – why cannot the same lesson be used to develop children’s understanding of power: the ways in which violence buttresses power, the notion of ‘legitimate’ violence and the ways in which soft power is projected through dress and ceremony? None of this precludes children developing a more nuanced notion of medieval kingship, but it does, at least, suggest to children that learning history might have value beyond its own self-referential domain-specific knowledge.

In fairness, Fordham (2018) did permit knowledge to transcend the boundaries of school subjects, but only insofar as it connects to other school subjects:

This is not to say of course that new knowledge should not be taught in the context of what has been learnt in other domains. Teaching the Reformation is a great deal easier if children have already learnt something about Christian theology in their lessons on religion.

To Fordham, school knowledge must connect only to other school knowledge and not to knowledge of the everyday; thus, the border between powerful and everyday knowledge is stark and impermeable. His is a curiously desiccated view of knowledge in which all that needs to be known is contained within school subjects. RSRs reject this view and see schools as social sites in which meaning is socially constructed. Schools are populated by children and children are drawn from communities. It is, we would suggest, somewhat perverse to suggest that concepts such as aristocracy can mean the same thing to a child from a deprived council estate as they do to a baronet at Eton.

There is a further point to be made here about the way in which the teacher views him or herself in relation to the children. One of the authors is reminded of his own experience teaching the very lesson comparing Henry VII with a gangster that Fordham describes. The lesson began with a brainstorm about what the class knew about gangsters; however, it quickly became apparent that the class’s view of gangsters was very different from my own. For me, gangsters wore tuxedos and drove Mercedes; for my class, gangsters wore tracksuits and rode bicycles. The class was drawing on everyday knowledge, but not in the way I had
wanted. Sensing my lesson going awry, I ‘corrected’ their view of a
gangster with a video clip of Marlon Brando making an unrefusable offer.

Now the TSRs response to this turn of events is predictable – I had
confused the class by making inappropriate links to everyday knowledge
which took them further from a proper understanding of medieval
kingship. However, this lesson can be seen differently from a critical
education perspective. All of the points I had hoped to make – that
gangsters (and kings) rule by fear and favour, through violence,
comradeship and patronage – could still be made, but in the process I
might have learned something about the ways in which those mechanisms
operate in the modern world. I had planned the lesson believing my
stereotype of a gangster to be the correct one, this led me to disregard
children’s views when I had much to learn from them. The key thing
here, as Friere (1985: 15) highlighted, is the need for teachers to be
humble in their relationships with children:

Humility is an important virtue for a teacher … Humility accepts
the need we have to learn and relearn again and again, the humility
to know with those whom we help to know … The teacher has to be
free to say to the students ‘you convinced me’.

On reflection, it was this humility that my practice lacked and is, perhaps,
lacking in the disposition of many teachers. If humility is an important
professional disposition, then we must also have humility about knowledge
– something which his more difficult from a TSR position. In terms of
pedagogy, Todd (2014: 166) has proposed addressing this through
a ‘hermeneutic conceptualisation of task design’ which ‘emphasises the
place of context but also openness … thus allowing potential for students
and teachers to be surprised’.

It is worth spending some time looking at the way in which language
is used by social realists when discussing child-centred education, or
what is termed Future 2. Here some of the disagreement between
RSRs and TSRs could be attributable to infelicities in language. Consider,
for example, the social realist criticism that Future 2 education:
‘celebrate[s] the experience of the pupils, whatever that may be, rather
than the idea that the purpose of schools is to introduce them to
knowledge beyond their experience’ (Young et al., 2014: 62). Here the
significance of the sentence depends on two possible meanings of
‘celebrate’, as either ‘acknowledge or mark’ (to celebrate an anniversary)
or as ‘praise’ (to celebrate a dramatic performance). This distinction is
important to our understanding of what a child-centred curriculum
is trying to achieve. In one usage the sentence means that teachers should take account of pupils’ varied life experiences, that we should recognise the stories that children bring to the class. In the other usage, the implication is that children should be rewarded or praised for any contribution that they make to class irrespective of whether it furthers their own or others’ understanding of the world. The latter usage furthers a familiar traditionalist trope that education is bedevilled by an ‘all must have prizes’ culture, while the former simply asks that children be heard and respected as fellow human beings.

The radical social realist position is therefore unapologetically child-centred. However, centring the learning on the child does not de-centre the historical method, rather it emphasises the essential relationship between knowledge and knower. The question centres on the extent to which something ‘out there’ – the historical method – can be ‘taught’ to children:

You cannot overcome a student’s naivety by decree. We must start at the point where the students are … in order for students to go beyond their naivety, it is necessary for them to grasp that naivety in their own hands and then they will try to make the important leap, but they will make it with you. (Friere, 1985: 16)

The TSR view is that a rigorous focus on the discipline – and substantive knowledge – will automatically improve children’s historical thinking and, consequently, make them more reflective and informed about the present. In contrast, the RSR view is that all knowledge – even methodological knowledge – is refracted through the knowledge and experience of the knower.

The differences between the historical thinking espoused by TSRs and the historical consciousness sought by RSRs have real implications for the lived experience of the child in the classroom. Since the pedagogical question asked by TSRs is limited to ‘How can children learn to do history better?’, problems of pedagogy are reducible to questions of effectiveness or efficiency. For this reason, the recent insights of cognitive scientists in education have been of tremendous importance to TSRs (Fordham, 2017). Traditional social realist pedagogy derives from the primacy of what Willingham (2009) calls ‘inflexible knowledge’ or ‘true postulates’. Exposure to multiple examples of these postulates gives rise to what Willingham calls the ‘deep structure’ or the concept. Since certain events in the past are seen as having greater explanatory power in this regard, exposure to these events becomes a curricular entitlement
which supersedes discussion of pedagogy and children’s understanding. For this reason, large academy chains which ascribe to knowledge-rich curricular are quick to impose their notions of the ‘best’ curriculum on all their ‘partner’ schools, irrespective of the differences between school context and intake.

Pedagogically, the implication is that, since children are not actively involved in the construction of their own understanding, they can simply be told information. In recent years, this approach has been termed ‘direct instruction’ and is referenced under the twitter hashtag #JustTellThem. It is worth mentioning that Willingham is, himself, sceptical about this approach taking former UK Education Secretary Michael Gove to task for suggesting that Willingham was a proponent of ‘memorisation’:

I’d have preferred ‘knowledge’ to ‘memorisation’ because the latter makes it sound as though one must sit down and wilfully commit information to memory. This is a poor way to learn new information – it’s much more desirable that the to-be-learned material is embedded in some interesting activity. (Willingham, 2012)

RSRs take a different view of pedagogy: that the road to powerful knowledge must always begin with the everyday. The argument here is that theoretical concepts which allow powerful thinking are not equally available to students of all backgrounds, and so students must necessarily follow different paths to attain it. While historians might have a shared understanding of how one interrogates and uses evidence, the way in which children are guided to this understanding differs between contexts and, indeed, between individual children. While in the TSR view, the universality of the knowledge means disregarding context, in the RSR view the specificity of the context influences the selection, appropriateness and sequencing of knowledge. RSRs emphatically do not believe in denying access to elite knowledge to children, but they do believe in doing important preparatory work with children on why this knowledge might be important to them. As Wrigley (2018: 15; drawing from Vygotsky, 1987) wrote, ‘there is a pedagogical/ psychological need to move backwards and forwards between experience and abstraction.’

**Epistemic differences – Knowledge and the curriculum**

To go further we need to define what is meant by ‘knowledge’ in history. There are, we suggest, three forms of knowledge. The first is the
metahistorical – the understanding of how the discipline of history works and how historical knowledge is constructed. The second is the substantive-conceptual – an understanding of concepts such as migration, power and other concepts that are central to thinking like an historian (or social scientist). The third is at the level of individual facts or truth claims.

In the diagram in Figure 7.3, the role of each of these types of knowledge in historical learning is outlined.

The relationship between these types of knowledge is conceived differently by TSRs and RSRs. To TSRs, children construct a metahistorical understanding of the past from encounters with specific substantive knowledge of the past. For RSRs, in contrast, children possess powerful schemas through which they interpret specific substantive knowledge. The crucial point of disagreement here is the extent to which human beings learn about the world inductively. The inductive position holds that humans form ideas about the world through encounters with true statements about it. Humans, it argues, form generalisable rules about the world (what might be called schemas) from experiencing individual instances or examples. In Hume’s classic illustration of this position, written in 1739, if I have only ever encountered white swans, I will come to the view that swans must be white (Hume, 1985). In terms of history education, such a view places enormous weight on historical facts as true statements about the past. In a simplistic and extreme version of this position, knowing more ‘true’ facts about the past means that our
historical schemas also become more ‘true’. Individual facts may have limited explanatory power, but cumulatively, lots of facts mean better explanations.

An alternative view supposes that humans perceive the world through ontological lenses which precede their lived experience of it. That is to say, all humans do not encounter the world in the same way. Instead, our view of the world is shaped by forces – cultural norms, ideologies and historical narratives – which create powerful schema and explanatory frameworks into which we fit our experiences. It is often said, for example, that no child is born racist. This is no doubt true, but many of children are racist before they know – conceptually – what racism is. Many of these frameworks, we now know, are invisible even to ourselves as unconscious or implicit biases.

An important function of education is, of course, to challenge these frames. Social realism holds that there is a ‘real’ world, but that our knowledge of it is necessarily gained through socially constructed lenses. On this much TSRs and RSRs agree, but there is disagreement about how to shift these assumptions. For TSRs, the solution is simply more knowledge. The work of Fordham has been influential in traditional social realist thinking about historical knowledge. In a 2015 blog entitled ‘Is “understanding” a thing?’ Fordham (2015) proposed that the notion of understanding something better was indistinguishable from the notion of knowing more about it. For Fordham, understanding is simply a product of the accumulation of examples, and the more examples one acquires, the better one’s understanding.

To analyse this further, we must separate knowledge of the strictly factual type (‘Wellington commanded an army at Waterloo’) from knowledge of the explanatory type (‘the French lost at Waterloo because…’). To TSRs, the latter is a necessary and inevitable consequence of the former – explanations arise from facts. However, such an assumption can be questioned. Human beings are known to form explanations before any access to facts. Such explanations will, to be sure, be tainted by teleology (we know Napoleon lost), prejudice (Britain always wins wars) or inference from repeated observations (wars of conquest inevitably fail). The TSRs’ view is that greater access to facts – and access to facts alone – will refine these explanations and shift the explanation to the more historical. That if children know that poor weather affected Napoleon’s plans or know that Prussian forces played a decisive role, then not only will their explanation of Napoleon’s defeat be improved, so too will their ability to form metahistorical explanations.
In contrast, RSRs are sceptical that knowledge and explanation are linked in such a simplistic way. The idea that ‘knowing more’ leads unproblematically to understanding better seems to be based on an accountancy view of knowledge – that good knowledge will drive out bad. Such an argument would hold water if all historians agreed on their explanations and accounts of the past – they do not. It is, of course, possible to acquire many examples and still possess a partial or distorted picture. The accumulation of more and more one-sided examples merely creates more certainty that one’s world view is correct. As an alternative to this, RSRs concentrate on the epistemic frames that children hold and ask how these are constructed and how they might be challenged at the level of the epistemological. In keeping with much experimental work from the Netherlands (van Drie and van Boxtel, 2008; Stoel, et al., 2015), RSRs argue that second-order knowledge (for example, the ability to construct explanations) must be the focus of history education.

Since Piaget, educationalists have become accustomed to thinking of learning in terms of ‘assimilation’ (fitting lived experience into existing schema) and ‘accommodation’ (adapting schema to account for new experiences). However, accommodation is effortful; it requires renegotiating everything that we thought that we knew. We might hope that experience affect schema – that a black swan would cause us to question our assumption that all swans are white – but some of our ‘knowledge’ of the world is guarded more preciously than our knowledge of waterfowl. As Limón (2002: 276–7) wrote, ‘students’ understanding of historical content is often filtered by their history meta-concepts and epistemological beliefs about history and its learning.’ For this reason, RSRs believe that children’s knowledge needs to be conceived at the level of the metacognitive.

TSRs are not uninterested in children’s metahistorical development and many continue to assert the importance of procedural (second-order) concepts within this. However, there is little doubt that some TSRs are becoming sceptical about whether these should be used to frame curriculum design and to plan for progression. Counsell (2017: 89) has been outspoken in this respect and argued that although teachers need to pay attention to disciplinary concepts such as significance this ‘all too often collapses into formula’. Instead she argued that children best understand metahistorical concepts such as significance through thorough knowledge chronological reference points. With this in mind, Counsell (2017: 88) argued that curriculum planners should ‘make certain items non-negotiable for memorisation’ and bemoans that ‘in England, as least, systematic attention to recall is rare in … non-examination classes’.
Counsell’s arguments are based heavily on the work of two psychologists: Hirsch and Willingham. From Hirsch she takes the view that we hold ‘prototypes’ of substantive concepts (such as king or empire) in our heads which are an essential precursor to comprehension, while from Willingham, she takes the view that ‘the more the pertinent material is secure in memory, the more mental space is freed up for thinking’ (Counsell, 2017: 86). Based on this, Counsell (2017: 94) argued: ‘In light of the role of prototypes in mitigating limits of short-term memory (Hirsch, 1988; Willingham, 2009), my classroom experience of where lower attainers struggle makes me doubt the adequacy or primacy of a second-order solution.’

Both Counsell and Fordham illustrate the importance of prototypes to their thinking by inviting their readers to examine a piece of writing by a historian, in Counsell’s (2017: 82) case an extract from Schama’s *A History of Britain, Volume 1* (2000: 66–8) and in Fordham’s (2016: 42) case from Hobsbawm’s 1962 classic *The Age of Revolutions* (1962: 13). Both writers – following Hirsch – contend that we comprehend the passages better because we have prototypical understandings of the middle class (in Fordham’s case) and ‘custom’, ‘loyalty’ and ‘lords’ (in Counsell’s). In one sense, this is incontrovertible; knowing what words mean allows language to flow, not least by saving the time and interruption involved in looking up words in a dictionary. However, it is possible to agree with this while also questioning the narrow empiricism of the assumption that our understanding of words is formed solely based on prototypes that we have encountered. It is, of course, true that inductive reasoning based on experience – or ‘true postulates’ – informs our knowledge of the world, but so too do a priori assumptions, epistemological heuristics and language structures themselves. Cain and Chapman (2014) use research by Wineburg (2001) to distinguish reading historically from reading informatically. While background information can help children comprehend the text on a correspondence level, something else is involved when ‘expert’ historians read a text which is independent of their knowledge of the period. Cain and Chapman – and Wineburg – argue that people ‘read’ historical texts through epistemic frames which are disciplinary – rather than factual – in nature.

Fordham and Counsell are no naïve realists, but they do hold to something of a simplistic signifier-signified relationship in their account of knowledge acquisition. Take, for example, Fordham’s (2016: 44) explanation of how the phrase ‘middle class’ is intelligible to him:

I think not of dictionary definitions, but rather of London coffee houses, Viennese concert halls and Parisian tennis courts. I call
upon a lifetime of textual encounters in imagining the middle class: Lucy Pevensie, Phileas Fogg and Marius Pontmercy … These images furnish the words ‘middle class’ for me, endowing them with a lingering residue that I call on in subsequent encounters with the term.

There is no doubt that such images do inform an understanding of ‘middle class’, but the adjective ‘middle’ surely indicates that we also understand the term relationally: people who are less dependent on labour for sustenance than the working class, but not drawn from the landed nobility. If we were to read an historical account about an unfamiliar context it is surely this relational definition of ‘middle class’ that we would draw on, rather than the archetypal images of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe that Fordham describes.

Furthermore, there is general agreement between TSRs and RSRs that language choice by historians is, in itself, significant. However, the RSR view maintains more faith in the modernist view that historians (acting in good faith) are trying their best to render reality into words as best they can. RSRs, in contrast, are sceptical about the extent to which this is possible. It is not the case that words mean whatever historians choose for them to mean, but slippage between signifier and signified are inevitable. As an example, what is the meaning of the concept of ‘gentry’? We know as readers that it is related to ‘nobility’ and ‘middle class’, but under what circumstances is it historically ‘correct’ to use it? Were members of Russia’s decaying nobility in the nineteenth-century nobles or gentlemen? What does it mean when we choose one word over another? To what extent are we conscious of the linguistic implications of our choice? Which leads, of course, to the final criticism of the TSR account of how substantive concepts emerge from knowledge of prototypes – if prototypes create concepts, then which prototypes should be taught? Since, as Fordham (2016) accepts, there is no ‘Platonic form’ of a revolution – which prototypes are ‘best’? While superficially attractive, the desire to ‘know more’, ignores the question of ‘which examples?’ and ‘whose examples?’ By ignoring these questions, TSRs place inordinate faith in the ‘objectivity’ and wisdom of the teacher as a gatekeeper of examples, facts and contexts.

These are linguistic challenges to which one response is the fatalism of accepting that faithful uptake is an impossibility. Such a solution feels inherently unsatisfying, but so too is the other extreme proposed by TSRs – that more prototypes lead to a ‘better’ understanding. Surely a third view is to make the use of language our focus of study. There is little to be
gained from discussing whether or not the term ‘genocide’ is ‘correct’ when referring to the Holodomor or Armenian massacres, but there is much more to be gained from learning why the Russian and Turkish governments refuse to do so.

Children in England do, in fact, engage in debates such as these as part of their learning about interpretations of history. TSRs, unlike more thoroughgoing traditionalists, are enthusiastic about this curriculum organiser and the way in which it invites children to think about the ways in which the past is mediated. However, the TSR emphasis on ‘knowledge’ as formed of ‘true postulates’ creates something of a contradictory message – on the one hand children learn that terms are contested and put to use by historians, on another they learn that ‘more’ knowledge can take us closer to a ‘better’ understanding. Despite Counsell’s ongoing support for the place of historical interpretations in the school curriculum (Burn et al., 2020), this sits awkwardly with a faith in a Hirschian relationship between signifier and prototypes.

It may be, of course, that rigorous attention to prototypes and their memorisation will engender more sophisticated mental models in children, but the fact is we just don’t know. As Counsell (2017) and Fordham (2016) reminded us, existing research on these questions is interesting but too small scale to be compelling. Until these questions are investigated empirically (with respect to history in particular, rather than psychological models of ‘learning’), it is important to consider the insights of neuroscience alongside the radical social realist critique of it.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has done much to emphasise differences between the TSR and RSR views and so it is perhaps appropriate to conclude by spending some time looking at how the positions are in agreement. It is important to remember that these positions are both social realist in orientation and both reject much of the so-called ‘progressive’ and ‘traditional’ philosophies. They do, however, differ in the extent and nature of their critiques of each.

Both stand in opposition to a narrow form of progressivism which took root during the New Labour era in Britain. This was a form of child-centredness which dispensed with the hard-thinking of disciplines and replaced it with a technical-instrumentalist view of schooling. In emphasising employability, transferrable skills and interdisciplinary thinking approaches, this approach was child-centred only insofar as it...
aspired to the cultivation of the self as a potential employee. The TSR critique of progressivism extends beyond this empty progressivism, however, to encompass all forms of child-centredness. To TSRs, re-centring the discipline means de-centring the child. RSRs agree that the discipline should be re-centred but contend that this must share the stage with the child and his/her reading of that discipline.

Both positions also reject the inherited inert knowledge implied by a Future 1 curriculum. They do this principally for epistemic reasons: because knowledge is too diffuse and dynamic to be captured in an approved list. However, the TSR position does borrow from traditionalism the view that some substantive knowledge is inherently more ‘powerful’ than others. In this view, it is the teacher’s responsibility to select this best knowledge with a view to developing the sophistication of children’s substantive concepts. Although a long way from a core knowledge curriculum, it still positions the teacher as expert in terms of knowledge selection. However, for RSRs such a position is fatally undermined by the inseparability of questions of knowledge from questions of power. RSRs do not seek to question the veracity of agreed historical facts – as more committed postmodernists might – but they do remind us that question of ‘why this fact and not this one?’ does not disappear even if we accept both facts are equally true.

As Cain and Chapman (2014) showed, debates around the history curriculum have been plagued by inappropriate polarities and we are loath to contribute another. That said, pedagogical debates in England are rapidly polarising, particularly on social media. As is so often the case, a certain unreflective tribalism marks these positions as contributors talk past one another or mischaracterise their opponents’ views. Our intention in writing this chapter was to sketch the outlines of these positions in contradistinction to the Twitterverse’s strawman archetypes of ‘prog’ and ‘trad’ education. It is our hope that the exposition of these two positions will encourage rather than inhibit further debate.

References


