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Covering the 'Scottish position adequately': Planning Civil Defence in Post-war Scotland, 1948–59

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Abstract

This article brings together the histories of post-war Scottish policymaking, local civil defence governance, and the British security state in the first decade of the Cold War, 1948–59. The article addresses three themes: organizational responsibility, evacuation and shelter, and nuclear radiation to show that Scottish cultural, social, and political contexts were distinct from the English precedents set by Whitehall. In the context of developing Cold War security measures, and regional differences, the article argues that Scottish policy-makers negotiated independence over early civil defence planning, while exercising a conciliatory relationship with the central government. Issues raised around regionality posed important questions in Whitehall about the implementation of nuclear era civil defence nationwide. In assessing how this occurred the article augments the debate around Scottish autonomy and administrative distinction in the post-war era and makes a wider contribution to understandings of civil defence cultures in Britain's Cold War. While studies of civil defence have provided important context to the history of the British Cold War state, local responses to such policy have not been adequately interrogated. This study shows that civil defence is not only an invaluable window onto local government perceptions of Cold War policy but is also a lens onto regional expressions of Second World War memory, post-war recovery, political power, and social organization.

From 1946 onwards, as Cold War tensions between the USA, Soviet Union, and European governments intensified, the British government revised civil defence policies from the Second World War to prepare for the new threats of the nuclear age. Civil defence mobilized British civilians to protect communities before, during, and after the attack.[1] Responsibility for its implementation was devolved to Local Authorities (LAs), with the exception of Scotland where, in a change from Second World War structures, the post-war Scottish administration had unique powers to govern how civil defence policy operated within the LAs under its jurisdiction. Scholarship on the history of civil defence in the UK focuses on how and whether it met the expectations and realities of the Cold War.[2]

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[1] Eric Alley, 'Civil Defence Corps, 1949-68', in Tim Essex-Lopresti, ed., *A Brief History of Civil Defence* (Derbyshire, 2005).
[2] Tracy C. Davis, *Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense* (Durham, N.C., 2007); Tracy C. Davis, 'Between History and Event: Rehearsing Nuclear War Survival', *TDR* 46 (2002), 11–45; Jessica Douthwaite, '"… what in the hell's this?" Rehearsing Nuclear War in Britain's Civil Defence Corps', *Contemporary British History*, 33 (2019), 187–207; Matthew Grant, *After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Britain, 1945-68* (Basingstoke, 2010).

However, despite being a manifestation of the British state's vision for nuclear warfare, civil defence was also the result of distinct cultural, social, and political expectations of post-war society and the social order.[3] As transnational scholars have demonstrated its implementation required interpretation rooted in geographical exceptionalism and related imagined worlds.[4] In this article, I evaluate how Scottish civil defence policymakers implemented and interpreted civil defence policy within this Cold War/post-war dichotomy. The article shows that the Cold War provided a distant, intangible context to regional dialogue about the execution of civil defence in Scotland. While the Cold War was the starting point for any civil defence policymaking process, I contend that in Scotland it was conditioned by two priorities: the immediate social policy concerns facing the Scottish Office and the amenability of Scottish policy-making networks to collaborate with each other, and with Whitehall.

The years 1948–59 were crucial to the development of Britain's Cold War security framework, including the preparation for civil defence to withstand both conventional and nuclear war. But these years are also synonymous with the post-war settlement in which individuals, regions, and the nation recovered from war and reconsidered the shape of Britain's future. Much scholarship has untangled how this process occurred and was experienced, with some reference to how the Cold War influenced and was influenced by the effort to define a new era in British history.[5] In this article, I reposition civil defence as a lens onto topics that bridge histories of post-war resettlement and Cold War Britain, thereby arguing its relevance beyond nuclear history and introducing a fresh perspective on civil defence as a facet of local governance, imbued with Second World War memory.[6] National civil defence policy acquired multiple meanings at local level—it could generate disagreement and discord depending on cultural, political, and topographical specificities. This article considers the civil defence policy-making experience as a window onto Scottish approaches to post-war rehabilitation in the context of a national, centralized security initiative. This intention as Rosanna Farbøl writes, draws a link between national and local constructs of Cold War security by paying 'attention to how the links between the local and the national—and indeed the global—were made, remade, resisted and broken'.[7]

The decade in question is also illustrative of how two discrete experiences—growing confidence to assert Scottish distinction and the development of increasingly dangerous nuclear weapons—interacted. After the Second World War, public policymaking and political administration built on pre-war trends towards local autonomy over Scottish

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[3] Matthew Grant, '"Civil Defence Gives Meaning to Your Leisure": Citizenship, Participation, and Cultural Change in Cold War Recruitment Propaganda, 1949–54', *Twentieth Century British History*, 22 (2011), 52–78. See also, Marie Cronqvist, 'Survivalism in the Welfare Cocoon: The Culture of Civil Defense in Cold War Sweden' in Annette Vowinckel et al., eds, *Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies* (New York, 2012), 191–210; Lucy McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford, 2000); Guy Oakes, *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture* (Oxford, 1994).

[4] Jonathan Hogg, 'Normalising Nuclear War: Narrative Scenarios, Imaginative Geographies and Sites of Leisure in 1950s Britain' in Marie Cronqvist et al., eds, *Cold War Civil Defence in Western Europe Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Survival and Preparedness* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 77–102; Rosanna Farbøl, 'Urban Civil Defence: Imagining, Constructing and Performing Nuclear War in Aarhus', *Urban History*, 48 (2021), 701–23; Matthew Grant, 'The Imaginative Landscape of Nuclear War in Britain, 1945–65', in Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann, eds, *Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90* (Manchester, 2016), 92–115; Silvia Berger Ziauddin, 'Superpower Underground: Switzerland's Rise to Global Bunker Expertise in the Atomic Age', *Technology and Culture*, 58 (2017), 921–54.

[5] Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, eds, *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History during the 1940s and 1950s* (Cambridge, 2003); Anne Deighton, ed., *Britain and the First Cold War* (London, 1990); Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford, 1990); Geoff Eley, 'When Europe Was New: Liberation and the Making of the Post-War Era', in Monica Riera and Gavin Schaffer, eds, *The Lasting War: Society and Identity in Britain, France and Germany after 1945* (Basingstoke; New York, 2008), 17–43; Peter Hennessy, *Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties* (London, 2006); Arthur Marwick, *British Society Since 1945* (London, 1982).

[6] See also: Douthwaite, '… what in the hell's this?'; Grant, 'Civil Defence Gives Meaning to Your Leisure'.

[7] Rosanna Farbøl, 'Prepare or Resist? Cold War Civil Defence and Imaginaries of Nuclear War in Britain and Denmark in the 1980s', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 57 (2022), 136–58, quote 138.

affairs.[8] This was slow to take hold and relied on a pragmatic approach to—and emphatic relationships—with Whitehall. The Scottish administration capitalized on its relationship with central government, aware that this would be an important driver in successfully transforming modern Scotland.[9] Scholars have interrogated the opportunities presented by this period to reconfigure a sense of Scottishness and invest in a Scottish model for society.[10] In this article, I demonstrate that within this broader post-war context, Scottish civil defence planners were preoccupied with more pressing questions of administrative and social policy than they were with nuclear attack. However, I also show that the impact of international thermonuclear weapons development on state-level war plans obliged the Scottish Office to engage in nuclear issues with increased consideration as the decade wore on. This is not to suggest that civil defence did not matter to those policy-makers tasked with its rollout, but to argue that the nuclear dimension was not as controversial as might be presumed.[11] Scottish policymakers, I argue, forged flexible relationships with Whitehall representatives to advocate for Scottish civil defence differences creating a dynamic of well-intentioned challenge between the two centres of power. This relationship ebbed and flowed, depending on domestic and international priorities, but remained conciliatory. The regional history revealed in this article augments understandings of how local government in Scotland harnessed independence of *and* dependence on the state, across the course of a decade in which the quality and weight of the national nuclear experience was transforming.

While extensive literature details the military (and pacifist) impacts of the Cold War on Scotland, consideration of civil defence is limited.[12] And yet a Scottish perspective, by offering a regional counterpoint, highlights the extent to which the Cold War couched modernizing aspirations within a new security context. Ultimately, Cold War civil defence was based on local and regional memories of war and an assertion of 'territorial distinctiveness', which political scientist Michael Keating argues sees Scotland 'taken seriously as a society on its own account' without need for state separation.[13] Different approaches to civil defence policy and planning reflect how decision-makers perceived the needs of Scottish society in an era of developing Cold War security *and* the context of post-war social change. Civil defence planning covered multiple issues and involved many different agencies, reflecting the enormous task of post-war politicians and civil servants anticipating war once again. As such, in this article, I foreground three themes: organizational responsibility, evacuation and shelter, and nuclear radiation, to investigate the changing landscape

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[8] Mary Macdonald and Adam Redpath, 'The Scottish Office 1954-79', in H. M. Drucker and N. L. Drucker, eds, *The Scottish Government Yearbook 1980* (Edinburgh, 1979), 101–34; Jean Mann, ed., *Replanning Scotland. Expert Evidence on Pre-war Conditions in Scotland and Post-war Speeches Delivered at Planning Conference, Largs, 1941* (Glasgow, 1942), Lindsay Paterson, *The Autonomy of Modern Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1994); Kenneth Roy, *The Invisible Spirit: A Life of Post-war Scotland 1945-75* (Edinburgh, 2014).

[9] Ian Levitt, ed., *The Scottish Office: Depression and Reconstruction, 1919-1959* (Edinburgh, 1992), 65–73; John S. Gibson, *The Thistle and the Crown: A History of the Scottish Office (*Edinburgh, 1985), 111–39; Michael Keating, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Scottish Politics.* (Oxford, 2020).

[10] Lynn Abrams and Callum G. Brown, eds, *A History of Everyday Life in Scotland in Twentieth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 2010); Miles Glendinning, *Rebuilding Scotland: The Postwar Vision, 1945-1975* (East Linton, 1997); Christopher Harvie, *No Gods and Precious Few Heroes: Scotland 1900–2015* (Edinburgh, 2016); Ian Levitt, 'New Towns, New Scotland, New Ideology, 1937-57', *Scottish Historical Review*, 76 (1997), 222–38; Holger Nehring, 'Failed Utopia? The University of Stirling from the 1960s to the Early 1980s', in Jill Pellew and Miles Taylor, eds, *Utopian Universities: A Global History of the New Campuses of the 1960s* (London, 2020), 193–209.

[11] For contrast see Nicholas Barnett's study of how Coventry councillors' rejected civil defence due to 1954 thermonuclear developments. Nicholas Barnett, '"No Protection against the H-Bomb": Press and Popular Reactions to the Coventry Civil Defence Controversy, 1954', *Cold War History*, 15 (2015), 277–300.

[12] Trevor Royle, *Facing the Bear: Scotland and the Cold War Edinburgh* (Scotland, 2019). See also: Niall Barr, 'The Cold War and Beyond', in Edward M. Spiers et al., eds, *A Military History of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 2012), 600–24; Christopher R. Hill, 'Nations of Peace: Nuclear Disarmament and the Making of National Identity in Scotland and Wales', *Twentieth Century British History*, 27 (2016), 26–50.

[13] Territorial distinctiveness is discussed in Michael Keating, *The Government of Scotland: Public Policy Making after Devolution* (Edinburgh, 2010), 18. Quote: Keating, *The Oxford Handbook of Scottish Politics*, 6.

of Cold War civil defence needs in Scotland, while assessing the responses of Scottish representatives bestowed with increased agency in Whitehall, yet limited influence in local government. The outcomes of Scottish influence on policy implementation were limited by the generalized needs of a universal civil defence strategy suited to communities across the UK. Nevertheless, this article demonstrates that the idiosyncrasies of Scotland's civil defence landscape sometimes jeopardized the standardized nature of the national civil defence vision and occasionally led to alterations to suit Scottish needs. Ultimately, I contend that viewing civil defence from a local perspective, as it evolved with Cold War developments, is an invaluable window onto how localized and centralized powers envisaged civil defence operationality in peacetime and wartime—much of which was an expression of regional Second World War memory, post-war recovery, political contest, and social organization.

Organizational Responsibility

Deciding which organizations and people had responsibility for the various duties of civil defence was an important first step in distinguishing Scottish structures within the national plan.[14] During the Second World War, the Air Raid Precaution Act (1937) obliged LAs to organize civil defence in their communities.[15] In 1949, the revival of civil defence policy was a pragmatic and precautionary measure enacted in the tense Cold War climate of 1948. From professional bodies such as the police, ambulance, and fire services, to voluntary services such as the Civil Defence Corps (CDC) and Women's Institute, civil defence involved a range of actors and required detailed and procedural planning to produce cooperation in the event of an air raid and war. Administered through a department dedicated to differentiating Scotland from the national government—the Scottish Office—civil defence automatically became a charged issue. In early planning consultations for civil defence the Scottish Home Department (SHD) and Department of Health for Scotland (DHS) frequently reiterated the need for communication and collaboration of Scottish specificities across organizations and departments (most especially between the two departments themselves) via the Scottish Office. As one review of the SHD summarized, aligning their messages would enable the, 'views of the various Scottish interests, or … a co-ordinated Scottish view, to be presented on questions referred to the Secretary of State as Scotland's Minister'.[16] In essence, a strategic approach to representing Scottish civil defence implementation in Whitehall would draw together both the disparate views of competing territories and political groups *within* Scotland, while advocating on behalf of a unified requirement *for* Scotland.

Historians depict the Scottish Office in war and the immediate post-war period as an administration of peak technocracy with a semi-federal structure.[17] In this context, Keating describes the Scottish Office as a 'managed dependency' in which 'Scottish politicians recognised a trade-off between autonomy [from] and access [to]' central government.[18] While culturally, politically, and socially salient issues such as education engendered Scottish

[14] 'Responsibilities of Scottish Home Department and Health Department Scottish Office representation on Civil Defence Committee. Civil Defence Planning, 1946-1948', National Records of Scotland [NRS], HH36/56; 'Civil Defence (General) Regulations, 1949; Civil Defence Corps Regulations. Civil Defence 1948-1950', NRS HH51/37. See also: Her Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], *Scottish Office. Scottish Administration: A Handbook Prepared by the Scottish Office* (Edinburgh, 1956).

[15] Lucy Noakes, '"Serve to Save": Gender, Citizenship and Civil Defence in Britain 1937-41', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 47 (1 October 2012).

[16] 'Review of the Department, Report No.4, Civil Defence Division—Division J', SHD (July 1949), 1. NRS HH51/62.

[17] Peter Hennessy, *Whitehall (*London, 2001), 463; Levitt, ed., *The Scottish Office*; David Milne, *The Scottish Office: And Other Scottish Government Departments* (London, 1957).

[18] Michael Keating, *The Government of Scotland: Public Policy Making After Devolution* (Edinburgh, 2010), 20.

specificities, Scottish debates about civil defence pivoted on practicalities.[19] The President of the Association of County Councils in Scotland stated at a meeting in 1948 that his organization 'felt strongly that Civil Defence was a national responsibility and should be financed by the Government', and if their representatives were to be consulted on the matter 'it must be wholly without prejudice to consideration of financial responsibility'.[20] In a 1949 House of Commons debate, the Secretary of State for Scotland (hereafter Scottish Secretary), Arthur Woodburn, was reminded of the 'dissatisfaction of many district councils in Scotland' allocated 'responsibility of provision of rest centres, shelters, voluntary services, evacuation and billeting'.[21] Woodburn's assurances that county councils would be encouraged to delegate functions on an appropriate basis to district councils and 'analogous services' is an indication of both the unwanted costs of civil defence and a local intention to be involved in the policymaking process. Indeed, these instances of agency are reminiscent of the pushback exercised by LAs and local bodies on the centralized, hierarchical implementation of the NHS Act in Scotland.[22] While the turbulence caused by councils over civil defence policy from the late 1950s to 1980s derived from consternation at the proposal of nuclear survival, in the early stages of the Cold War, LAs' interests in and resistance to civil defence structures resulted from the threat posed to autonomy by devolved authority.

A revision of civil defence responsibilities (and therefore allocated funds) in Scotland attended to the intricate relationships underpinning its administration before and during the Second World War.[23] Between 1939 and 1945, civil defence implementation was divided between several ministerial departments and seats of power: the Scottish Regional Commissioner's Office, the Scottish Secretary via the SHD and DHS, Deputy Regional Commissioners, District Commissioners, and Deputy District Commissioners. Civil defence orders were given by the Ministry of Security in Whitehall but the duty to fulfil them often depended on the nature of the issue, the region it pertained to, and the relationship between the Deputy Regional Commissioner and leaders in relevant departments.[24] As David Milne, the Permanent-Under-Secretary to the Scottish Office, wrote, 'this divided responsibility for a service whose efficiency depends very much on rapid, well co-ordinated [sic] action did not seem a very happy arrangement'.[25] In 1948, the SHD proposed a reorganization of command for civil defence because of the 'somewhat involved' arrangements of the Second World War.[26] In a six-page exposition on devolved authority addressed to the Home Office (HO) Charles Cunningham, Secretary of the SHD, wrote that, 'it would be in the interests of both efficiency and of effective local authority cooperation if the administrative work in connection with Civil Defence services in Scotland were done through the Scottish Secretary's departments'.[27] The Home Office agreed to these proposals.[28] Although appointment of the Scottish Secretary to this role, as opposed

[19]   Letter from R.S. Nixon, SHD, to R.J. Guppy, Home Office (23 October, 1948), NRS HH51/62.

[20]   Captain R .J. Thomson minutes in 'Civil Defence: Note on Meeting held in St Andrew's House' (28 June, 1948), 2. NRS HH51/62.

[21]   Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol. 467, Col. 116 (25 July, 1949), NRS HH51/62.

[22]   Leigh Ann Merrick, '"In need of care and attention" Local Authorities and the Implementation of the Scottish NHS Act, 1948–1960', *Family & Community History*, 12 (2009), 130–45; also, Leigh Ann Merrick, 'Local Authorities and the Development of the National Health Service (NHS) in Scotland, 1939 to 1974', PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 2008.

[23]   Memo, 'Crash Plan for War Emergency', from C. C. Cunningham, SHD, to Secretary of State (16 August 1948). NRS, HH51/62.

[24]   Letter from C. C. Cunningham, SHD, to A. S. Hutchinson, Home Office (30 July 1948). NRS, HH51/62.

[25]   Milne, *The Scottish Office*, 157.

[26]   Note for the Secretary of State, 'Ministerial Committee on Civil Defence' (6 September 1948), NRS HH51/62.

[27]   Cunningham to Hutchinson (30 July 1948).

[28]   Memo, 'Crash Plan for War Emergency'; 'Note of meeting held at St Andrew's House on Wednesday, 27th April 1949 with the Civil Defence Consultative Committee', NRS HH51/42; *The Courier*, advertisement, 'New Civil Defence Open to Recruits To-day' [sic] (15 November 1949).

to an MP as designated in England, caused a brief, unprecedented legal conundrum. An Order in Council was written to exclude Scotland from the English regulations, thus allowing the Scottish Secretary to administer civil defence without a ministerial appointment.[29]

While a conciliatory attitude towards the demands of various local government departments and entities reflected a Scottish Office trend towards streamlined bureaucracy and centralized power, it also occurred amidst and in response to the changeable and 'chaotic' nuclear war plans emerging from Whitehall.[30] Civil defence command offered the Scottish Office an opportunity to practice a coherent and placatory form of administration for the post-war era. For example, the Scottish Secretary assured two representatives of County Council Boards that issues regarding responsibilities that were jointly shared (such as the organization of the CDC) would be discussed at a mutual group level.[31] This, both attendees agreed, 'would relieve the feeling of members of LAs that they were not being brought sufficiently into consultation'.[32] The Scottish Secretary also smoothed tensions over conflicts of interest between competing authorities by deciding that future consultations would bring all stakeholders together to discuss common civil defence issues.[33] The Scottish Office actively mitigated the confusion caused to relevant civil defence groups by policies anchored in an English administrative system, and placated rivalries ignited by developments between Scottish groups.

In 1950, Cunningham, recognized by John Gibson for the 'patently obvious' enthusiasm he showed for the department, set about winning opportunities for the development of civil defence industries in Scotland.[34] Writing to A.S. Hutchinson in the Home Office, Cunningham noted the ambition to get 'as big a share as possible of the Government contracts to be placed under the defence programme', including the question of 'civil defence material and equipment'.[35] Although he recognized that civil defence contracts would be minimal, he noted that, 'apparatus for the detection of radio-activity, new protective devices, new types of clothing and so on' were of special interest in Scotland.[36] Cunningham's approach was characterized by his concern that Scottish companies would be disadvantaged by a national tendering process. He suggested putting Scottish matters directly to the Civil Defence Joint Supply Staff and embodying the 'virtue of self-help'.[37] As Ewan Gibbs and Jim Tomlinson conclude, this era was marked by 'technocrats in favour of Scottish industrial modernisation, based on widespread assumptions about the distinctive pathologies of an "old-fashioned" Scottish economy'.[38] In the early 1950s, to the SHD, civil defence was as much another demonstration of the character of post-war economic planning and 'balanced industrial development' in post-war Scotland as it was a regional war plan.[39]

By the early 1960s, as English LAs faced up to the consequences of local government reform, Scotland appeared to be better equipped to consider the overlapping power structures that would play out between civil defence controllers and LAs during nuclear war.[40]

[29]   Letter from A.R. Bunker, Home Office, to R.S. Nixon, SHD (16 July 1949); Extract from file NRS CD9/4 SHD (18–19 July 1949), NRS HH51/19.

[30]   Note from E. U. E. Elliott-Binns to unknown (4 April 1961), NRS HH51/45.

[31]   Note of Meeting held on 11th November 1948. NRS HH51/62.

[32]   Note of Meeting held on 11th November 1948. NRS HH51/62.

[33]   Note of Meeting held on 11th November 1948. NRS HH51/62.

[34]   Gibson, *The Thistle and the Crown*, 118.

[35]   Letter from C.C. Cunningham, SHD, to A.S. Hutchinson, HO (21 August 1950). NRS, HH51/62.

[36]   Cunningham to Hutchinson (21 August 1950).

[37]   Cunningham to Hutchinson (21 August 1950).

[38]   Jim Tomlinson & Ewan Gibbs, 'Planning the New Industrial ation: Scotland 1931 to 1979', *Contemporary British History*, 30 (2016), 584–606, quote 599.

[39]   Quote from Levitt, *The Scottish Office*, 34. See also: Linda M. Ross, 'Dounreay: Creating the Nuclear North', *The Scottish Historical Review*, 100 (2021), 82–108; Paterson, *The Autonomy of Modern Scotland*, 112–15.

[40]   By 1962 a consultation commenced to better align the civil defence control structure in England and Wales with local authority organization and boundaries. See: Scottish Civil Defence Co-ordinating Committee, Civil Defence Control Structure, HH51/26.

In the meetings of a working party on 'Local Government in Time of War' the post-attack control of communities (by area, region, sub-region, or Local Authority) caused disagreement.[41] According to Elliott-Binns, working party delegate for Scotland, an 'involved and acrimonious discussion' between English delegates ensued over the 'basic level at which local government should function' after the 'life saving stage' of a nuclear attack.[42] 'Progress was definitely backwards' and 'no conclusion was reached', wrote Elliott-Binns, but the Scottish 'set-up seemed to fit more happily than the English into the kind of arrangements envisaged'.[43] James Hogarth, DHS, surmised that,

> It might well be maintained, for instance, that we in Scotland would want to get back to the normal pattern of local government responsibility as soon as possible in the "restoration stage" in view of the special position of the Secretary of State and the relative nearness of probable target areas to the centre of administration.[44]

In effect, in a post-attack England, the central government would not be capable of restoring power to local authorities immediately, therefore emergency civil defence controls would be devolved for a longer period. This was especially so because the likelihood was that London would experience high-magnitude targeted bombing and central government would be dispersed and paused indefinitely. However, in Scotland, the Scottish Office expected to reinstate local authorities as soon as possible so that the Scottish Secretary would be connected to local areas and maintain order, despite the potential loss of connection to central state control.[45] This was also significant to the nationwide survival effort, as if English emergency committees could not resume functions alone, and needed 'help from outside', Scottish authorities might send personnel across regions to support local civil defence efforts.[46] Ultimately, localized administrative control within a central framework contextualized, and to an extent, dictated how Scottish policy-makers imagined effective governance in the aftermath of a real nuclear attack.

On the whole, Scottish differentiation on civil defence was not politically obstructive. Despite this, the desire to demonstrate a sense of Scottish separateness in Whitehall subtly underpins many internal documents. In one perfunctory administrative exchange regarding the control of regional hospital services in wartime, an official at the SHD noted that the pro forma supplied by the Home Office for completion was 'obviously designed to cover the English regions and needs some modification for Scotland'.[47] On the pro forma itself 'Scottish region' has been crossed out and, in capital letters, 'Scotland' written across the top of the page.[48] In a letter to Wing Commander Gray of the Home Office J. E. Tinkler explains that, 'control of the Hospital Service in Scotland in wartime will be by this department [the SHD] through Scottish Central Control and the pro forma has therefore been amended to read "Scotland"'.[49] Though a trivial instance of wording, there is clearly an intention in this correspondence to delineate Scotland as an administrative territory in its own right through the civil defence apparatus. Various handwritten notes also reveal similar demands to be regarded as equals by Whitehall counterparts.[50]

[41]   NRS HH51/45.
[42]   Elliott-Binns to unknown (4 April 1961).
[43]   Elliott-Binns to unknown (4 April 1961).
[44]   Letter from J. Hogarth to Ian Buchanan-Dunlop, SHD (8 March 1961), NRS HH51/45.
[45]   Letter from Buchanan-Dunlop, SHD to Mr Hogarth, DHS (7 March 1961), NRS HH51/45.
[46]   Letter from E.U.E. Elliott-Binns to unknown (1 June 1961), NRS HH51/45.
[47]   Letter to J.E. Tinkler from unknown (31 March 1960), NRS HH51/6.
[48]   Proforma, 'Senior Medical Officer for civil defence (designate)', NRS HH51/6.
[49]   Letter to G.J. Gray from Mr Tinkler (8 April 1960), NRS HH51/6.
[50]   E.g. Notes handwritten on letter from T.S. Sharp (Ministry of Works, Scottish Headquarters) to T.H. McLean (DHS) (31 August 1950), HH51/43.

Such instances of informal communication on the issue of Scottish inclusion in national affairs are evocative of the bridging role that the Scottish Office assumed between Scottish networks and central government.[51] With 'fast and efficient' communications with Whitehall, Michael Keating and Arthur Midwinter write that conflicts could be 'smoothed over, ideas exchanged and advice to ministers brought into line'.[52] On the question of civil defence, there was a balanced approach to colleagues in Whitehall that acknowledged the national effort to implement policy and avoid an adversarial tone. In 1957, during the revision and amendment of the Government War Book, J. Hogarth (DHS) wrote to the Home Office to offer his support in supplying information on the Scottish position, recognizing that where it differed in 'detail only' from its counterpart that was unlikely to be necessary.[53] Indeed, Scotland's part, he said, had been 'adequately' represented on a pro forma previously submitted.[54] In essence there was no desire to fragment the national system of government through over-emphasis of local issues, an environment that Brian Harrison has referred to as 'collaborative venture'.[55] Overall, policymakers maintained this collaborative tenor of adequacy throughout dealings on civil defence policy. While it was important that their 'opposite numbers take account of Scottish interests', one candid official stated, the 'print need not worry us!'.[56] The organization of civil defence responsibilities in Scotland in the early Cold War period reflected the drive to decentralise and consolidate power in regional administration while negotiating and nurturing the economic and political link with Whitehall. Civil defence is a unique window into this administrative relationship because the implications of poor planning and implementation would mean the loss of security at a territorial as well as state level.

Evacuation and Shelter

In the early 1950s, nuclear weapons were still viewed as conventional components in the state's defences, albeit ones with much more powerful consequences.[57] It is not surprising, then, that central planners took a pragmatic approach to nuclear attack in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but one which was under constant review and frequently forced to adapt to developments in nuclear weapons capabilities. The reorganization of civil defence administration in post-war Scotland created a greater degree of freedom to interpret central civil defence policies. While Scottish administrators referred to Whitehall's expertise in adapting to nuclear developments, they also identified Scottish differences that called into question national policy assessments. Sensitivity to these dilemmas shone a light on Scotland's territorial uniqueness and highlighted discord between Scottish departments on how those idiosyncrasies were communicated to Whitehall *and* to LAs in their jurisdiction. One such debate regarding air raid shelter provision illustrates this argument aptly.[58] In the early 1950s, Working Party of the Civil Defence Joint Planning Staff (CDJPS) guidelines introduced Grade A shelters to provide protection against gamma radiation at the centre of a nuclear explosion. The working party argued that given its costliness in labour and material, and the low likelihood that the enemy would use nuclear weapons anywhere except the most strategic targets, the gamma-proof shelter should only be used in locations

[51] Michael Keating and Arthur Midwinter, *The Scottish Office in the United Kingdom Policy Network* (Glasgow, 1981).

[52] Keating and Midwinter, *The Scottish Office*, 3.

[53] Letter from J. Hogarth to D.J. Trevelyan, Home Office (24 September 1957), NRS HH51/6.

[54] Letter from J. Hogarth to D.J. Trevelyan, Home Office (24 September 1957), NRS HH51/6.

[55] Brian Harrison, *The Transformation of British Politics 1860–1995* (Oxford, online edn, 2011), 88.

[56] Handwritten memo from unknown to Mr Braid, DHS records (22 August 1957), NRS HH51/6.

[57] Adrian Bingham, '"The Monster"? The British Popular Press and Nuclear Culture, 1945–early 1960s', *British Journal for the History of Science*, 45 (2012), 609–24.

[58] Draft submission to Secretary of State about provision of Grade A shelter, no author (20 June 1951). 1-5. NRS, HH51/62.

at the epicentre of attack.[59] Standard grade 'General' air raid shelters were deemed suitable elsewhere. Those responsible for deciding these shelter designations in Scotland were highly conscious that communicating allocations to LAs would be challenging.[60] On the one hand, receiving Grade A shelters signified vulnerability to nuclear attack, on the other, Standard designation suggested a failure to protect against worst case scenarios.

Meanwhile, emerging evacuation plans confused the risk status established by the shelter policy in some locations. The Home Office envisaged that, as well as 'key areas', anywhere with a population over 200,000 might experience nuclear bombing; while the Working Party on Evacuation stated that even 'key areas' might *not* be subjected to nuclear attack and any justification for 'special arrangements' was limited.[61] In effect, it was possible to classify a population larger than 200,000 as a target requiring Grade A shelter, yet simultaneously deny that location priority evacuation status and in some cases even appoint it as a reception area for evacuees. For example, the Home Office informed the University Grants Committee in Wales that Cardiff and Swansea had become 'reception towns for University [sic] purposes', yet the Ministry of Health had also assigned priority evacuation status to both towns and marked them 'down for atomic attack and consequently Grade A shelter provision'.[62] Scottish queries over the risk status of Edinburgh and Glasgow exposed the problems arising from these contradictory positions in central government.

Under the Home Office's terms, Edinburgh qualified for Grade A shelter with a population of around 467,000.[63] However, in the Working Party on Evacuation's appreciations, it was not named as a nuclear target and largely it was agreed that it was, 'not even marked down for heavy H.E. [high explosive] attack'.[64] Planners at the SHD and DHS were immediately concerned by the likelihood that if Edinburgh received Grade A shelter the council would also demand that Edinburgh qualify for priority evacuation.[65] The areas surrounding Edinburgh were, as in the Second World War, designated as reception areas for Glasgow's displaced and homeless in wartime. Due to this spatial proximity to Scotland's largest wartime target, there would be nowhere to accommodate Edinburgh's evacuees under these terms. Yet, designating Edinburgh as a nuclear target suited to Grade A shelter but refusing to evacuate 'priority classes'—especially children—'would clearly be psychologically and politically indefensible whatever arguments in support of the refusal could be logically adduced', according to a note to the Scottish Secretary.[66] The DHS, responsible for evacuation in Scotland, faced several problems: the department had to 'earmark the whole of Scotland' to accommodate an estimated evacuation from Glasgow and Clydeside of 305,000 people, if Edinburgh were included the department would need to find space for another 112,000 evacuees. Subsequently, if a second evacuation occurred there would be no reserve space for additional population movement. Furthermore, the continuation of industrial production in Clydeside persuaded some that Glasgow's evacuation was more important to the war effort.[67]

As early as November 1950, planners in the DHS were predicting the considerable political embarrassment that could be caused by the publication of these contradictions.[68] The

[59] Draft Civil Defence (Scotland) Circular No. C.D.13/9/2; 'Air Raid Shelter for the General Public: Selection of Areas for Grade A planning', SHD, no date. 1–2. NRS HH51/43.

[60] Draft Civil Defence (Scotland) Circular No. C.D.13/9/2, 2.

[61] Mr Hughson, Notes on draft submission to Secretary of State about provision of Grade A shelter (20 June 1951). 1–2. NRS HH51/43.

[62] Note, from J.H. McGuinness to Mr R.D.M Bell—on DHS comments (28 June 1951). 1–2.

[63] Draft submission to Secretary of State. NRS, HH51/62.

[64] Note, McGuinness to Bell. Quote 1. See also: NRS, HH51/62.

[65] Notes on draft submission to Secretary of State about provision of Grade A shelter (20 June 1951), 1–2. See also Minute, 'Civil Defence: Shelter Policy and Evacuation'; and 'Submission by the SHD to the Secretary of State', (1 August 1951), NRS HH51/43.

[66] Notes on draft submission to Secretary of State about provision of Grade A shelter. Quote 1.

[67] Minute, 'Civil Defence: Shelter Policy and Evacuation', from J. H. McGuinness to Craig Mitchell (22 June 1951). 1–3. NRS HH51/43.

[68] Memo from J. H. McGuinness, DHS, to Mr Cowan, SHD (22 November 1950). NRS HH51/43.

DHS contended that Edinburgh should not receive Grade A shelter status unless it was asked for, so as to avoid magnifying public debate on nuclear attack and evacuation.[69] However, officials in the SHD believed that Grade A shelters should automatically be conferred on Edinburgh Corporation in line with Home Office guidance and that any demands for evacuation measures by the council be pursued as and when they occurred. As a result, jointly, the DHS and SHD consulted the Home Office on the logistical and political urgencies presented by this case.[70] The Home Office acknowledged the 'political difficulty' caused by inherent policy contradictions and advised that, though Edinburgh might be 'suitable' for a nuclear attack, there were 'at least 20 targets in Britain more likely to attract an intensive H.E. attack'.[71] This seemingly evasive answer on the part of central government may be reflective of an impulse to be dismissive of local concerns that complicated national planning, but it is also reflective of a moment in time when even elite understandings of nuclear strategy and attack were limited and vague. Despite the Home Office advice, the SHD remained adamant that Grade A shelter automatically be granted to Edinburgh not only because of its sizeable population, but because waiting to concede to local pressure on allocation would appear as both a failure to appreciate the position of the councils under its jurisdiction and a weakness of principles.[72] While the SHD and DHS did not agree, the two Scottish departments did show a united approach to the national inconsistencies generated by Whitehall policy. The issues raised from the perspective of mutual administrative, organizational and defence concerns demonstrate both an awareness of Scottish specificities and a pro-active endeavour to interrogate Whitehall policy amidst the tense political and administrative backdrop of local government relations in post-war Scotland.

In some cases, the perception of a unique Scottish Home Front experience, coupled with newfound agency in post-war Whitehall, also created grounds for criticism of national policy. In 1948, delegates from the DHS and Scottish Education Department (SED) avidly disagreed with the inclusion of mothers with children under-five in the 'priority evacuation classes' (groups of civilians deemed vulnerable and evacuated from dangerous areas prior to the commencement of war).[73] A jointly drafted paper by the departments evocatively described the special problems attributed to this group in Scotland's Second World War:

> In 1939 there was very strong feeling against the compulsory billeting of mothers with pre-school children. Mothers as well as children were not always clean and domestic difficulties arising from two or more housewives sharing the same kitchen and washing facilities were very real. Moreover the separation of wives from husbands left at home created an unstable position and led to many returning. The memory of what happened on the last occasion is still very much alive in reception areas and any repetition, or even the announcement of a repetition, of the inclusion of mothers with pre-school children would almost certainly lead to an outcry and a demand for all sorts of impracticable measures to be taken to ensure that only mothers and children guaranteed clean and of good habits should be billeted with householders.[74]

[69]   Submission by the SHD to the Secretary of State (1 August 1951). NRS HH51/43.
[70]   Letter, from F. O. Stewart, SHD, to Major General S. F. Irwin, Home Office Civil Defence Department (4 July, 1951). 1–3. NRS HH51/43.
[71]   Letter from Major General S. F. Irwin, Home Office Civil Defence Department, to F. O. Stewart, SHD (23 July 1951). 12, quote 2.
[72]   Draft paragraph insertion, enclosed with note from unknown author to Mr Braid (31 July 1951); Submission, from unknown to Herbison and Secretary of State, page 8; Submission, from unknown to Miss Herbison (Junior Minister, Scottish Office) and Secretary of State (1 August 1951). 1–9. NRS HH51/43.
[73]   'Working Party on Evacuation and Care of the Homeless: notes of meetings. Policy: notes of meetings. 1948-1953'. NRS HH51/7.
[74]   No date, Draft paper prepared by the Department of Health for Scotland and Scottish Education Department, 'Question of Inclusion of Mothers and Pre-school children in Organised Evacuation'. HH51/7, NRS.

The visceral memory of recent wartime evacuation, especially during the 'phoney war', threw a cloud over evacuation planning and produced a voice of Scottish opposition against Whitehall proposals.[75] 'Those of us who have had personal experience of this problem in the last war are quite convinced that Scottish LAs', wrote J. Mackenzie (DHS), 'will not co-operate in any plan which proposes evacuation of this class at any time in advance of bombing, even if it is left until bombing appears imminent'.[76]

In the nuclear age, however, it was impossible to justify the exclusion of mothers with pre-school children from protection. Indeed, governments left themselves open to censure for immorality if this group was ignored in the new scheme. Scottish misgivings were responded to curtly by Whitehall on the basis that, 'the press and public may criticise … on grounds of inhumanity'.[77] As S.F. Wilkinson (Ministry of Health), Chairman of the working party, argued, 'a defence based on expediency and administrative convenience seems to me so weak that it ought not to be adopted. The same need for Parliamentary debate washes out any possibility of keeping the exclusion of the group secret'.[78] In effect, on a topic of public resonance, high sensitivity, and political weight—unique to the nuclear era—mothers of under-fives undeniably deserved inclusion as high-priority candidates for emergency evacuation, regardless of difficulties encountered in previous wars.

Moreover, changing expectations for a healthy social body underpinned by family structures, and the progressive language of social policy, were confusing Scottish policy obstruction.[79] For example, family-centred logic was used by Scottish planners to advocate that this class could not be effectively evacuated. In an era of nuclear warfare, it was understood that 'an increasingly large proportion of the male population will be engaged in essential war industry and will have to remain at home'. Thus, wrote one critic of Whitehall's plans,

> This creates a real problem as the mothers, even if they agree to be evacuated with their children, at once begin worrying about the well-being of the father, and [sic] are very apt in these circumstances to prefer to keep the family united in the sending area and accept the hazards, than to submit to a separation which gives rise to all sorts of inconveniences and hardships.[80]

Rather than address the evidence that nuclear attack entirely changed the shape of civilian evacuation and industrial productivity, Scottish policymakers perceived social distinctions from England as an obstacle to policy implementation—expecting Scottish Reception Authorities to 'react violently if asked to make plans now … Some … may refuse to make plans altogether'.[81]

Yet, recognizing that due to the nuclear dimensions of this issue, Scotland could *not* be treated differently to England, planners resolved to minimize resistance from LAs while

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[75] Letter from Mackenzie to Boucher (3 February 1949); Whitehall analysis in, Letter A.B. Taylor to Mackenzie (19 January 1949). HH51/7, NRS. On the 'Phoney War' see John Welshman, *Churchill's Children: The Evacuee Experience in Wartime Britain* (Oxford, 2010), 109–11. See also, Lynn Abrams, *The Orphan Country: Children of Scotland's Broken Homes from 1845 to the Present Day* (Edinburgh, 1998).

[76] Mackenzie, DHS to Boucher, Ministry of Health (3 February 1949). NRS HH51/7.

[77] No date. 'Paper prepared by the Department of Health for Scotland and Scottish Education Department'. NRS HH51/7.

[78] Letter from S.F. Wilkinson, Ministry of Health, to Mackenzie, DHS (10 February 1949). HH51/7, NRS.

[79] Letter from A.B. Taylor to Mackenzie (19 January 1949), Letter from unknown to A.B. Taylor (22 January 1949), NRS HH51/7. On post-war family life: David Kynaston, *Family Britain: 1951-57* (London, 2009); Pat Thane, 'Family Life and "Normality" in Postwar British Culture', in Bessel and Schumann, *Life After Death*, 193–210; John Stewart, ' "The Most Precious Possession of a Nation Is Its Children": The Clyde Committee on Homeless Children in Scotland', *Scottish Economic and Social History*, 21 (2001), 43–66; John Stewart and John Welshman, 'The Evacuation of Children in Wartime Scotland: Culture, Behaviour and Poverty', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies*, 26 (2006), 100–20; Marga Vicedo, *The Nature and Nurture of Love: From Imprinting in Ducks to Attachment in Infants* (Chicago, 2013).

[80] Unknown to Taylor (22 January 1949). NRS HH51/7.

[81] Letter from unknown to Mackenzie (28 January 1949); also, letter from Mackenzie DHS to W.H. Boucher, Ministry of Health (3 February 1949). NRS HH51/7.

avoiding uproar from Scottish householders at publicly leaked plans.[82] To placate those most riled by the decision to include mothers with under-fives in Scottish evacuation schemes the SHD put increased emphasis on the opportunity to make 'private arrangements' for evacuation.[83] This relieved the burden on LAs to formalize and finance services while absolving their culpability for poor relations between receptions centres and evacuees. Evacuation and shelter were topics directly affected by the ever-changing consequences of nuclear warfare and therefore were under closer scrutiny in Whitehall, with Scottish peers given less room for compromise. Not only do the two policy debates discussed here expose how policymakers perceived civil defence in the nuclear age—influenced by public perception, changing notions of urban, and family life, and with significant emphasis on memories of the Second World War—but they also demonstrate that the practicalities of implementation in an over-stretched and discordant post-war political environment proved central to policymaking. The intersection of civil defence with ideas and issues beyond state security merits further attention in British historiography.

Nuclear Radiation

Urban centres were not the only locations in which geography, topography, and demographics necessitated unique consideration in the Scottish civil defence context. By the mid-to-late-1950s, scientists had confirmed that radiation fallout could be transported far from the point of explosion on the wind, in rain, and via water supplies, thus putting rural communities at as much risk of contamination as populations dwelling in urban targets.[84] In a seminal Whitehall review of civil defence conducted in 1955, the implications of thermonuclear warfare were starkly laid bare. The Strath report, as the review became known, reframed policymakers' visions of post-attack survival and civil defence with projections of a slow, staggered and faltering national recovery.[85] As urban historian Luke Bennett writes, the new threat assessment contained in the Strath report demonstrated that hydrogen bomb attack 'represented an interaction with complex, natural atmospheric processes, producing an uncertain, mobile and not at all urban-centric lethality'.[86] Until that point, civil defence planning had been linked irrevocably with post-war urban reconstruction—prioritizing city landscapes and the built environment, but the radioactive nature of hydrogen warfare coupled with its meteorological influence meant that, in Bennett's words, 'nuclear warfare could no longer be conceptualised in an urban-centric manner'.[87]

Rural areas, though unlikely to experience targeted attack, were thus required to set-up specialist rural defence infrastructures in order to prepare for the disruption to communications, healthcare, food resources, and water supplies that might arise in nuclear war. Preparations were further intensified by government awareness that in the event of attack reinforcements would be prioritized in urban areas, thereby obliging rural populations to exercise a larger degree of self-sufficiency than those in towns and cities.[88] Furthermore,

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[82]   Taylor to Mackenzie (19 January 1949); Unknown to Taylor (22 January 1949). NRS HH51/7.
[83]   Submission by Minister of Health by Working Party on Evacuation and Care of the Homeless 'Provisional Outline Plan For Evacuation and Care of the Homeless If War Should Break Out In The Next Few Years' (17 February 1949), NRS HH51/7.
[84]   Luke Bennett, 'Cold War Ruralism: Civil Defense Planning, Country Ways, and the Founding of the UK's Royal Observer Corps' Fallout Monitoring Posts Network', *Journal of Planning History*, 17 (2018), 205–25; Jessica Douthwaite, 'Is Radioactive Iodine Present Equally in the Cream on Milk as in the Milk Itself?': Lonely Sources and the Gendered history of Cold War Britain', *Gender & History*, 34 (2022), 827–37; Christoph Laucht, 'Scientists, the Public, the State, and the Debate over the Environmental and Human Health Effects of Nuclear Testing in Britain, 1950–1958', *The Historical Journal*, 59 (2016), 221–5; Melissa Smith, '"What to Do If It Happens": Planners, Pamphlets and Propaganda in the Age of the H-Bomb', *Endeavour*, 33 (2009), 60–64.
[85]   Matthew Grant, *After the Bomb*, 92–8.
[86]   Bennett, 'Cold War Ruralism', 11.
[87]   Bennett, 'Cold War Ruralism', 12.
[88]   Report, SHD, 'Working Party on Civil Defence in Rural Areas' (no date, 1960). 1–23, quote 1. NRS HH51/44.

rural populations were important to the national recovery effort and might be called on to serve in urban rescue and welfare operations, accommodate evacuees, and maintain national agricultural production and the food supply chain.[89] The Home Office led detailed planning for rural civil defence across the UK, but the loosely populated and highly dispersed nature of Scotland's rural regions became a topic of contention. This intersected with a longstanding Scottish debate about rural cohesion with urban social and economic hubs and regional depopulation.[90]

The topic of radiation in civil defence preparation threw into stark relief the poor state of Scottish infrastructure and dislocation in rural life. Home Office guidance highlighted not only comparative differences between the English and Scottish physical environments, but also distinctions between the cultures and structures that governed rural communities. In 1960, the SHD established a working party on civil defence in rural areas (concomitant with a similar exercise in Whitehall) to review the syllabus and organization of training received in Scotland's remote regions and to give consideration to possible structural changes for civil defence in sparsely-populated areas.[91] The Home Office's solution for rural civil defence in Essex was used repeatedly by the working party as an example against which to distinguish Scottish needs. In Essex, 'village utility parties' were proposed as a means to 'provide live and alert civil defence cadres in each major village or group of villages in rural areas of the county'—all trained as teams to meet the needs of a local emergency.[92] The training syllabus for village utility parties in Essex had been adapted to rural circumstances after 2 years testing it on the ground. The Home Office believed that this new syllabus was less intrusive to rural volunteers, suited their working, day-to-day lifestyles and allowed individuals to exercise their best skills in the defence task at hand.

Whereas the Essex utility parties were intended to allow for as much adaptability in volunteer responsibilities as possible, and therefore as much breadth in training, the SHD's working party concluded that the 'merging of identity of all sections of the Corps … would be unlikely to appeal to existing volunteers or potential recruits in Scotland'.[93] The working party implied that volunteers in rural locations of Scotland joined the CDC for particular reasons—'outlook or interests'—and that their ongoing participation depended on performing defined roles.[94] The report suggested that rural volunteers were familiar with the organization of CDC and a change to its structure would be unacceptable. Instead, the working party proposed a Scottish alternative to the village utility party model while adhering to the guiding principles established in the Essex studies. The Scottish model was termed the 'community party'; it involved increasing local involvement in CDC tasks under emergency conditions by recruiting the assistance of residents involved in other voluntary organizations and unaffiliated activities. This idea was rooted in the observation that in Scotland's rural areas, 'groups of people congregated within a definable terrain who have a common bond or interest of one kind or another which binds them together as a unit distinct from similar neighbouring communities'.[95] Thus, while maintaining pre-existing civil defence hierarchies and allowing for flexibility of volunteer recruitment during an emergency, the 'community party' reflected a different concept of community engagement rooted in rural traditions and affiliation with CDC ranks.

[89]   HMSO pamphlet, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Central Office of Information, 'Home Defence and the Farmer', (1958), 1–32, quote 4.

[90]   Michael Anderson, *Scotland's Populations from the 1850s to Today* (Oxford, 2018); Ewen A. Cameron, 'The Scottish Highlands as a Special Policy Area, 1886 to 1965', *Rural History*, 8 (1997), 195–215; Mann (ed.), *Replanning Scotland*; Tomlinson and Gibbs, 'Planning the New Industrial Nation'.

[91]   Report, 'Working Party on Civil Defence in Rural Areas' (no date, 1960), 1.

[92]   Appendix A, Brief Report on 'Village Utility Party' Scheme in Essex in Report, 'Working Party on Civil Defence in Rural Areas', 14. NRS HH51/44.

[93]   Report, 'Working Party on Civil Defence in Rural Areas', 2.

[94]   Report, 'Working Party on Civil Defence in Rural Areas'.

[95]   Report, 'Working Party on Civil Defence in Rural Areas'.

While in the East of England 'village utility parties' had been proposed to unify local efforts in the aftermath of attack across a dispersed population, in Scotland this was considered unworkable. Scottish planners believed that the legitimacy conferred to those in defined civil defence roles needed protection—the suggestion being that a village utility model would dilute hierarchies and responsibilities by having volunteers get involved on any, and many, different tasks. Indeed, the working party argued for a continuation of the 'existing [CDC] control structure' to bring every 'living community … within the ambit' of command.[96] Yet, in 1962, while conceding to the 'very real' problems of preparation for nuclear war in sparsely populated areas, the Home Office flatly refuted the 'working party's way of tackling them'.[97] Having reviewed the SHD Working Party's proposals Robin North, of the Home Office Civil Defence Department, wrote that he was 'left with a general impression of individual members of the Corps … running round the countryside on motorcycles and in cars to see what good they [could] do with the aid of uninjured survivors'—an image that, he said, represented 'such a dissipation of effort, as well as an undue allotment of resources'.[98]

The working party's report was shelved.[99] The discussion it ignited, however, is evocative of the distinct challenge that Scotland's social structures, geography and topography posed to preparations for the newly envisioned thermonuclear war. Ultimately, it was this territorial uniqueness that made Scotland a prime location for the military hardware of the Cold War and Britain's strategic nuclear defence. Scotland's rural, unpopulated coasts, highlands, islands, and existing military infrastructure became home to the training grounds, radar communications, missile-readied airfields, and deterrent-loaded submarine ports of the Cold War era.[100] It is little wonder, then, that as instances like this Home Office rebuttal of sincere and specifically Scottish civil defence planning highlighted, the deterrent took on an increasing importance in national strategy. While Scottish characteristics and differences could be incorporated into the developing civil defence policies of the earlier 1950s, by 1962 such peculiarities jeopardized the strengthening of the British Cold War state and even brought attention to the ineffectiveness of civil defence against megaton thermonuclear explosives. The demise of civil defence paralleled an increasing dependence on nuclear deterrence and inaugurated another chapter in Scottish experiences of the Cold War and central government. Historians have discussed how and why Whitehall curtailed civil defence in 1968, but we gain an interesting perspective on the process by which it was reappraised in considering regions like Scotland.

Conclusion

This article argues that Scottish policymakers were sensitized to the planning of national Cold War civil defence policies because of perceived differences between Scotland and England that affected implementation. Scottish cultural, social, and political contexts were distinct from the English precedents set by Whitehall. I show that policymakers made Scottish specificities clear in Whitehall and in doing so negotiated independence over early civil defence planning while also exercising a conciliatory relationship with central government. Communications between the two seats of government remained amiable, but the

[96]   Report, 'Working Party on Civil Defence in Rural Areas', 4.
[97]   Letter, from Robin North, Home Office to E. U. E. Elliott-Binns (23 February 1962), 1–3, quotes page 3. NRS HH51/83.
[98]   Letter, from Robin North, 2.
[99]   Handwritten comment on file memo notes, 13 March 1962. NRS HH51/83.
[100] Barr, 'The Cold War and Beyond'; Wayne Cocroft and A. J. Schofield, *A Fearsome Heritage: Diverse Legacies of the Cold War* (Walnut Creek, CA, 2007); Catherine Eschle, 'Faslane Peace Camp and the Political Economy of the Everyday', *Globalizations*, 13 (2016), 912–914; J. B. Gunn, 'A Unique Journey In Preserving Nuclear Industrial Heritage', in *WIT Transactions on the Built Environment* (Southampton, 2012), 123–75; Royle, *Facing the Bear*.

experience of Scottish difference posed important questions for the operation of nuclear era civil defence on a nationwide scale and in other English localities. Importantly, my research highlights that this policy wrangling often derived from political tensions emerging from local government structures within Scotland, where different formal and informal organizations were challenging the plans of the Scottish Office and its two main departments for civil defence, the SHD and DHS. As Cold War scholars continue to question how local administrative relationships with central government effected the course of defence policy and conditioned attitudes towards nuclear issues within regional communities, this study highlights the strength of political discord in limiting the pragmatic endeavours of a regional seat of government. Civil defence therefore provides an interpretative window onto how Scotland's post-war interests were imagined territorially while the relationship with Whitehall was fostered and compromise promoted.

Providing Scottish interests—the specific geography, population, and culture—were recognized and catered for, national civil defence policies were implemented without question in Scotland. Civil defence signified far more than the Cold War concerns from which it emanated. From the distribution of Scottish populations, the contrast between rural and urban communities, town planning, economic strategy, and the willingness of Scottish people to support the initiative, civil defence policymaking dovetailed with issues of post-war recovery and modernization. The Scottish Office actors involved in the administration and implementation of civil defence policy were committed to the ambition of Cold War preparedness, but their views on how such policies would play out in a future war were highly influenced by the social context of post-war Scotland and its incumbent concerns. Thus, though the impact of nuclear warfare was a serious question, to those at a territorial level, whose roles were less contingent on state security and international politics, the priority was to produce an adequate, efficient, and unobtrusive solution to a yet-to-be-encountered danger. These findings bear an important lesson for historians of civil defence and nuclear history in Britain; they show that particularly in the early period of the Cold War, civil defence planning was approached as much for its interaction with, and repercussions on social and welfare policy in the post-war state as it was for its relevance to population survival and security.

Administratively, the Scottish Office showed a great deal of pragmatism and efficiency in handling a changeable civil defence brief from Whitehall. But Scottish policymakers also tended to avoid undertaking increased responsibility for civil defence for the sake of separateness. Thus, though it is clear Scottish concerns were advocated in discussions about civil defence, national policy and implementation were largely unaffected. The sense of a Scottish distinction becomes more apparent in this history where the memory of the Second World War and projections for a nuclear war combine to create a unique topographically, culturally, and socially *unpredictable* war. On issues of evacuation, shelter locations and rural preparations, the effects of nuclear radioactivity added immense weight to considerations by Scottish policymakers involved in planning policy. Adapting the guidance for Scottish communities and Scotland's physical landscape was an important task. Guided by failures to deliver civil defence in the Second World War the Scottish Office was even keener to distinguish its activities in the Cold War. However, state security demands, limited resources, and the transient, short-lived nature of civil defence policymaking prevented a thoroughly Scottish civil defence effort from emerging.

Furthermore, in the context of evolving understandings of, and responses to, nuclear threat between 1948 and 1959, I conclude that where the pressures of planning for nuclear survival were especially salient Scottish protagonists had little influence over national policy decisions. Strikingly, instances of willingness to acquiesce to, or deny, Scottish claims of exceptionality by the Home Office gesture to where local civil defence did or did not merit special attention from the British state. The article demonstrates that Scottish opinion was only in conflict with Whitehall where policies for the nuclear era contrasted and

contravened existing assumptions about Scotland's population. In doing so, it highlights the Cold War issues on which the government would not back down—those with negative political and reputational consequences. In this sense, Scottish independence over civil defence was less a manifestation of the Cold War and more a function of Scotland's post-war administration, while responses from Whitehall tended to ignore localized idiosyncrasies but focus on non-negotiable national security tasks. To conclude, this article is a cautious provocation to British historians of civil defence to study it in the round: as both a barometer of Cold War priorities, nuclear security contexts *and* an arm of local administrative policy with social and cultural weight in local communities.

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