|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Book Chapters and Sections|
|Title:||Perceptual-Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge|
|Citation:||Millar A (2008) Perceptual-Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge. In: Haddock A & Macpherson F (eds.) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 330-347. http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/?ci=9780199231546.|
|Abstract:||A conception of recognitional abilities and perceptual-discriminative abilities is deployed to make sense of how perceptual experiences enable us to make cognitive contact with objects and facts. It is argued that accepting the emerging view does not commit us to thinking that perceptual experiences are essentially relational, as they are conceived to be in disjunctivist theories. The discussion explores some implications for the theory of knowledge in general and, in particular, for the issue of how we can shed light on the nature of knowledge is if we do not aim to provide conceptual analyses of knowledge in terms of true belief plus something else. Consideration is also given how we can best make sense of the practical value that knowledge has for us.|
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