Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/38153
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dc.contributor.authorMelis, Giacomoen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-10T00:08:42Z-
dc.date.available2026-06-10T00:08:42Z-
dc.date.issued2026-05-09en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/38153-
dc.description.abstractI compare the study of inference in some philosophical and psychological traditions, and I make three general points. First, I suggest that in both human and non-human animals, inference is a means of by which subjects aim to achieve an accurate and coherent representation of the world. Second, I contend that philosophical work on rational dispositions and empirical research on reasoning help to outline an unreflective notion of taking the premises to support the conclusion. Third, I claim that paying attention to the distinction between logic and reasoning is important to fine-tune the standards for observation of deductive reasoning in empirical research.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherUniversidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexicoen_UK
dc.relationMelis G (2026) The study of inference in philosophy and comparative psychology. <i>Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía</i>, 58 (172), pp. 127-157. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2026.1785en_UK
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.en_UK
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_UK
dc.subjectAnimal Rationalityen_UK
dc.subjectTaking Conditionen_UK
dc.subjectEpistemic Feelingsen_UK
dc.subjectLogic vs Reasoningen_UK
dc.subjectTwo Cup Tasken_UK
dc.titleThe study of inference in philosophy and comparative psychologyen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2026.1785en_UK
dc.citation.jtitleCrítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofíaen_UK
dc.citation.issn1870-4905en_UK
dc.citation.volume58en_UK
dc.citation.issue172en_UK
dc.citation.spage127en_UK
dc.citation.epage157en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.contributor.funderMedical Research Councilen_UK
dc.author.emailgiacomo.melis1@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.citation.date09/05/2026en_UK
dc.description.notes1en_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophyen_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid105039906748en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid2256495en_UK
dc.contributor.orcid0009-0006-9084-884Xen_UK
dc.date.accepted2026-03-10en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2026-03-10en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2026-05-27en_UK
dc.relation.funderprojectAgency, Rationality and Epistemic Defeat (ARED) - Phase IIen_UK
dc.relation.funderrefMR/Z000459/1en_UK
rioxxterms.apcpaiden_UK
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_UK
local.rioxx.authorMelis, Giacomo|0009-0006-9084-884Xen_UK
local.rioxx.projectMR/Z000459/1|Medical Research Council|http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000265en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2026-06-04en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/|2026-06-04|en_UK
local.rioxx.filenameInference.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source1870-4905en_UK
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