“Discreet dominance”: peacekeeping deployments and international security force assistance, and their impact on civil–military relations in Nepal

Abstract

The Nepal Army has never attempted a coup or overtly obstructed transfer of power between different governments. Yet, the Nepal Army remains the most powerful institutions in Nepal, continues tower over civilian institutions, and prevails when civil–military relations are contested. This article explores the explanations for this “discreet dominance” of the military. While extant scholarship has focused on domestic variables to account for the military’s covert dominance, this article highlights the paradoxical effect of two external factors which contribute to the military’s discreet dominance: security assistance from international partners ranging from Western states as well as regional partners, India and China and increased demand and opportunities for UN peacekeeping deployments. Tracing the causal mechanism of the phenomenon, the article highlights how, on the one hand, prohibitions associated with troop contribution to UN’s peacekeeping missions, and security force assistance, have pressurized the Nepal Army to adapt some form of civilian control, notably the “anti-coup norm” leading it not to overtly intervene in civilian affairs through coups or interference in transfer of power. However, on the other hand, such external factors bestow significant political, economic and institutional benefits which enables the military to dominate its civilian counterparts and contributes to deterioration in civil–military relations.