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Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Wittgenstein and Frege on Negation and Denial
Author(s): Johnston, Colin
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Issue Date: 2024
Date Deposited: 6-Oct-2023
Citation: Johnston C (2024) Wittgenstein and Frege on Negation and Denial. <i>Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy</i>, 12 (3).
Abstract: Frege maintains that there are not two distinct acts, assertion and denial; rather, denying p is one and the same as asserting not-p. Wittgenstein appears not to recognise this identity in Frege, attributing to him the contrary view that a proposition may have one of two verbs, ‘is true’ or ‘is false’. This paper explains Wittgenstein’s attribution as a consequence of Frege’s treatment of content as theoretically prior to the act of judgment. Where content is prior to judgment, the denial of p – what is rejected in asserting p – is distinct from the assertion of not-p. Wittgenstein’s own embrace of Frege’s identity is then considered, an embrace explained in part by his repudiation of Frege’s theoretical order.
Rights: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License.
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