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Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: 'Trusting-to' and 'Trusting-as': A qualitative account of trustworthiness
Author(s): Kelsall, Joshua
Keywords: Philosophy of trust
Issue Date: 24-May-2022
Date Deposited: 8-Jun-2022
Citation: Kelsall J (2022) 'Trusting-to' and 'Trusting-as': A qualitative account of trustworthiness. Inquiry.
Abstract: Philosophical accounts of trustworthiness typically define trustworthiness as an agent being reliable in virtue of a specific motivation such as goodwill. The underlying thought motivating this view is that to be trustworthy is to be more than merely reliable. If motivational accounts are correct, this is a problem for non-motivational accounts of trustworthiness, as motivations are not required for trustworthiness. In this paper, I defend the non-motivational approach to trustworthiness and show that the motivational approach is inadequate. I do this by making a novel distinction between trusting-to and trusting-as relations. A trusting-to relation is a relation in which a trustor ‘X’ trusts the trustee ‘Y’ to do something. Trusting-as relations are an overlooked relation implicit in all trusting-to relations. They describe the social relationship that holds between X and Y. I will argue that trusting-as relations determine whether any specific motivations are required for trustworthiness trusting-to relations. Thus, I show that acknowledging trusting-as relations enables us to provide a satisfactory explanation of the motivation intuition without making specific motivations constitutive features of trust.
DOI Link: 10.1080/0020174x.2022.2075456
Rights: © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
Notes: Output Status: Forthcoming/Available Online
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