Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/34116
Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing
Author(s): Field, Claire
Keywords: Praiseworthiness
Blameworthiness
Neuroatypicality
Moral responsibility
Moral recklessness
Moral Risk
Issue Date: 5-Mar-2022
Date Deposited: 4-Apr-2022
Citation: Field C (2022) At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01791-9
Abstract: I argue that there are some situations in which it is praiseworthy to be motivated only by moral rightness de dicto, even if this results in wrongdoing. I consider a set of cases that are challenging for views that dispute this, prioritising concern for what is morally important (de re, and not de dicto) in moral evaluation (for example, Arpaly, 2003; Arpaly & Schroeder, 2013; Harman 2015; Weatherson, 2019). In these cases, the agent is not concerned about what is morally important (de re), does the wrong thing, but nevertheless seems praiseworthy rather than blameworthy. I argue that the views under discussion cannot accommodate this, and should be amended to recognise that it is often praiseworthy to be motivated to do what is right (de dicto).
DOI Link: 10.1007/s11098-022-01791-9
Rights: This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Notes: Output Status: Forthcoming/Available Online
Licence URL(s): http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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