Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/32664
Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Frege, the self-consciousness of judgement, and the indefinability of truth
Author(s): Johnston, Colin
Keywords: Frege
judgement
indefinability of truth
inference
self-consciousness
Issue Date: 2021
Date Deposited: 1-Jun-2021
Citation: Johnston C (2021) Frege, the self-consciousness of judgement, and the indefinability of truth. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 29 (6), pp. 1124-1143. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2021.1910484
Abstract: Frege characterizes judgement as the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought, appearing thereby to rule out false judgement. First in this paper I explain Frege’s characterization so that it does not have this consequence. Frege is not saying that for a subject S to judge that p is for S to acknowledge the truth of the thought that p. Rather, he is articulating judgement’s nature within self-consciousness. From within, to judge means to acknowledge a truth. Second, I suggest that this articulation is centrally operative in Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. As Frege argues, it follows from judgement’s self-consciousness that truth is indefinable.
DOI Link: 10.1080/09608788.2021.1910484
Rights: © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
Licence URL(s): http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

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