Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/30871
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dc.contributor.authorWei, Xintongen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-30T07:57:25Z-
dc.date.available2020-03-30T07:57:25Z-
dc.date.issued2019en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/30871-
dc.description.abstractMany philosophers hold that a norm of truth governs the propositional attitude of belief. According to one popular construal of normativity, normativity is prescriptive in nature. The prescriptive norm can be formulated either in terms of obligation or permission: one ought to or may believe that p just in case p is true. It has been argued that the obligation norm is jointly incompatible with the maxim ought implies can and the assumption that there exists some truth that we cannot believe. The problem of the incompatible triad has motivated some to adopt the permissible norm of truth. I argue that the permissible norm faces an analogous problem of the incompatible triad.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherPhilosophy Documentation Centeren_UK
dc.relationWei X (2019) The permissible norm of truth and "ought implies can". Logos and Episteme, 10 (4), pp. 433-440. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910438en_UK
dc.rightsArticles published in Logos & Episteme can be freely distributed, copied and transmitted online for non-commercial purposes, provided that the journal's copyright is acknowledged.en_UK
dc.subjectepistemic normsen_UK
dc.subjectought implies canen_UK
dc.subjectnature of beliefen_UK
dc.subjectthe truthen_UK
dc.subjectnorm of belieen_UK
dc.titleThe permissible norm of truth and "ought implies can"en_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.5840/logos-episteme201910438en_UK
dc.citation.jtitleLogos and Epistemeen_UK
dc.citation.issn2069-3052en_UK
dc.citation.issn2069-0533en_UK
dc.citation.volume10en_UK
dc.citation.issue4en_UK
dc.citation.spage433en_UK
dc.citation.epage440en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.contributor.funderJohn Templeton Foundationen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophyen_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85079425788en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid1588430en_UK
dc.date.accepted2019-12-31en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2020-03-27en_UK
dc.relation.funderprojectKnowledge Beyond Natural Scienceen_UK
dc.relation.funderref58450en_UK
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