Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/30295
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dc.contributor.authorAshton, Natalie Alanaen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-15T00:02:09Z-
dc.date.available2019-10-15T00:02:09Z-
dc.date.issued2015-12en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/30295-
dc.description.abstractAccording to Duncan Pritchard, there are two kinds of radical sceptical problem; the closure-based problem, and the underdetermination-based problem. He argues that distinguishing these two problems leads to a set of desiderata for an anti-sceptical response, and that the way to meet all of these desiderata is by supplementing a form of Wittgensteinian contextualism with disjunctivist views about factivity. I agree that an adequate response should meet most of the initial desiderata Pritchard puts forward, and that some version of Wittgensteinian contextualism shows the most promise as a starting point for this, but I argue, contra Pritchard, that the addition of disjunctivism is unnecessary and potentially counter-productive. If we draw on lessons from Michael Williams's inferential contextualism then it is both possible, and preferable, to meet the most important of Pritchard's desiderata, undercutting both closure-based and underdetermination-based sceptical problems in a unified way, without the need to resort to disjunctivismen_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherWileyen_UK
dc.relationAshton NA (2015) Undercutting Underdetermination-Based Scepticism. Theoria, 81 (4), pp. 333-354. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12076en_UK
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.en_UK
dc.subjectradical scepticismen_UK
dc.subjectinferential contextualismen_UK
dc.subjectunderdeterminationen_UK
dc.subjectclosureen_UK
dc.subjectBIVen_UK
dc.titleUndercutting Underdetermination-Based Scepticismen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargodate2999-12-31en_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[Ashton-2015-Theoria.pdf] The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.en_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/theo.12076en_UK
dc.citation.jtitleTheoriaen_UK
dc.citation.issn1558-5816en_UK
dc.citation.issn0040-5817en_UK
dc.citation.volume81en_UK
dc.citation.issue4en_UK
dc.citation.spage333en_UK
dc.citation.epage354en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.contributor.funderUniversity of Edinburghen_UK
dc.author.emailnatalie.ashton@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.citation.date24/06/2015en_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Edinburghen_UK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000363872300005en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-84946494004en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid1454233en_UK
dc.date.accepted2015-05-12en_UK
dc.description.refREF Compliant by Deposit in Stirling's Repositoryen_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2019-10-11en_UK
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