|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Rethinking Epistemic Relativism|
|Author(s):||Ashton, Natalie Alana|
|Citation:||Ashton NA (2019) Rethinking Epistemic Relativism. Metaphilosophy, 50 (5), pp. 587-607. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12389|
|Abstract:||‘Relativism’ is often treated as a dirty word in philosophy. Showing that a view entails relativism is almost always considered tantamount to showing that it is nonsensical. However, relativistic theories are not entirely unappealing – they have features which might be tempting if they weren’t thought to be outweighed by problematic consequences. In this paper I argue that it’s possible to secure the intuitively appealing features of at least one kind of relativism – epistemic relativism – without having to accept any problematic consequences. I do this by defending what I call 'stratified relativism'.|
|Rights:||This item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Ashton, N. A. (2019), Rethinking Epistemic Relativism. Metaphilosophy, 50: 587-607, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12389. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.|
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