Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/2992
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dc.contributor.authorHaddock, Adrianen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-29T23:00:20Z-
dc.date.available2016-11-29T23:00:20Z-
dc.date.issued2011-03en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/2992-
dc.description.abstractJohn McDowell's conception of perceptual knowledge commits him to the claim that if I perceive that P then I am in a position to know that I perceive that P. In the first part of this essay, I present some reasons to be suspicious of this claim - reasons which derive from a general argument against 'luminosity' - and suggest that McDowell can reject this claim, while holding on to almost all of the rest of his conception of perceptual knowledge, by supplementing his existing disjunctive conception of experience with a new disjunctive conception of perceiving. In the second part of the essay, I present some reasons for thinking that one's justification, in cases of perceptual knowledge, consists not in the fact that one perceives that P but in the fact that one perceives such-and-such. I end by suggesting that the disjunctive conception of perceiving should be understood as a disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)en_UK
dc.relationHaddock A (2011) The Disjunctive Conception of Perceiving, Philosophical Explorations, 14 (1), pp. 23-42. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2011.544399.en_UK
dc.rightsPublished in Philosophical Explorations by Taylor & Francis (Routledge).; This is an electronic version of an article published in Philosophical Explorations, Volume 14, Issue 1, March 2011, pp. 23 – 42. Philosophical Explorations is available online at: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1386-9795&volume=14&issue=1&spage=23en_UK
dc.subjectMcDowellen_UK
dc.subjectknowledgeen_UK
dc.subjectperceivingen_UK
dc.subjectluminosityen_UK
dc.subjectPerception (Philosophy)en_UK
dc.subjectKnowledge, Theory ofen_UK
dc.subjectMcDowell, John Henryen_UK
dc.titleThe Disjunctive Conception of Perceivingen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[AH - The Disjunctive Conception of Perceiving.pdf] : Publisher conditions require an 18 month embargo.en_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/13869795.2011.544399en_UK
dc.citation.jtitlePhilosophical Explorationsen_UK
dc.citation.issn1741-5918en_UK
dc.citation.issn1386-9795en_UK
dc.citation.volume14en_UK
dc.citation.issue1en_UK
dc.citation.spage23en_UK
dc.citation.epage42en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.author.emailadrian.haddock@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.citation.date30/03/2011en_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophyen_UK
dc.identifier.isi000288963300004en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-79954440167en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid821922en_UK
dc.date.firstcompliantdepositdate2011-05-03en_UK
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